The State ex rel. Terry v. Allen

• Decision Date: 13 April 1925
• Docket Number: 24822
• Citation: 271 S.W. 469,308 Mo. 230
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. P. S. TERRY v. WILLIAM H. ALLEN et al., Judges of St. Louis Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

271 S.W. 469

308 Mo. 230

THE STATE ex rel. P. S. TERRY v. WILLIAM H. ALLEN et al., Judges of St. Louis Court of Appeals

No. 24822

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 13, 1925

Peremptory rule discharged.

Albert Miller and P. S. Terry for relator.

The case at bar is exactly like the case of Davison v Hough, 165 Mo. 561. In both cases the plaintiff had a fund. In each case a resident of the county in which the plaintiff resided claimed the fund. In each case two or more residents of other counties than where the plaintiff resided also claimed the fund. In each case an interpleader suit had been filed, and after the interpleader suit had been filed an injunction was applied for. In each case the judgment in the circuit court was one where the injunction was sustained and the defendants restrained from the prosecution of at least two suits, two or more of which were pending in jurisdictions other than that in which the injunction and interpleader suits were filed. In each case the defendant, who was a resident of the county in which plaintiff lived and where the suits were filed, filed no suit against the plaintiff interpleader. The only difference in the cases that we are able to discover is that in the Davison case the court was in session all the time and the case was tried at once. In that case the interpleader suit was not delayed. In the case at bar the interpleader suit was delayed and, in the case at bar, in addition to asking that three suits be restrained the plaintiff asked that Pilliard and Hague be restrained from prosecuting any suits and that the defendant insurance companies be restrained from further annoying plaintiff in regard to taking depositions, etc., making the case at bar a little stronger, because it had another object than that of restraining suits and that was to restrain Pilliard and Hague from prosecuting suits and to restrain the insurance companies from annoying plaintiff by taking unnecessary depositions. Pilliard and Hague concede that plaintiff had a cause of action against them and the Court of Appeals is bound to concede it because Pilliard and Hague did not appeal from the injunction. The relator had brought his interpleader suit in good faith against three insurance companies and Pilliard and Hague. After that interpleader suit had been filed and all of the defendants had answered, then these three insurance companies attempted to deprive the Circuit Court of Jefferson County of its jurisdiction, make its decrees ineffective and make its judgment void and of no force. The interpleader suit had been tried; it was taken under advisement. If these suits and threats to sue had been permitted to go on it would have deprived plaintiff of all of the benefits secured to him under the interpleader suit and they would have compelled him to go to the expense of defending himself against these three suits in St. Louis and deprived him of the four thousand dollars which he had put up in court. The interpleader suit in the circuit court was decided in plaintiff's favor. All of the defendants appealed, and in the Court of Appeals attorneys for respondents come into court and say that the relator was entitled to interplead and have an interpleader fee taxed. Yet there are three cases pending against this relator in the Circuit Court of St. Louis which relator is compelled to defend if the opinion of the Court of Appeals be upheld. We claim "that the statute was not intended to deprive courts of equity of inherent powers which are necessary to enable them to make their decrees effective," and that the Circuit Court of Jefferson County had a right to prevent interference with its jurisdiction; that the Circuit Court of St. Louis could not remove the subject-matter of the litigation, to-wit, the four thousand dollars from Jefferson County to St. Louis, and compel either plaintiff or defendants to be forced out of the jurisdiction of Jefferson County to the city of St. Louis, because the parties plaintiff in the cases in St. Louis were already parties defendant in Jefferson County. "Equity regards the substance rather than the form." 24 C. J. 204.

Leahy Saunders & Walther for respondents.

OPINION

Ragland, J.

Certiorari, Relator seeks to quash the judgment of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of Terry v. Hague et al., 251 S.W. 77, lately pending before it on appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. In general outline the pertinent facts, as disclosed by the opinion of the Court of Appeals, are these: Relator, Terry, had in his possession a fund of $ 4,000 with respect to which John Hague, W. H. Pilliard, American Central Insurance Company, National Fire Insurance Company and Reciprocal Exchange made conflicting claims. Terry filed a bill of interpleader in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County making the claimants of the fund parties defendant; he also deposited $ 4,000 with the clerk of that court. Summonses were served upon the several defendants and in due time each filed his answer setting up his claims to the fund, or a part of it. A trial of the issues thus made was had, the cause submitted and taken under advisement by the court. After the institution of the interpleader suit, but before the submission of the cause, each of the three insurance companies instituted a suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against Terry for recovery of the fund of $ 4,000. After the submission in the interpleader suit, Terry, the plaintiff therein, instituted against all the defendants therein, in the Jefferson Circuit Court, an independent action to restrain the defendants from bringing any further suits against him for the fund and from prosecuting the actions therefor then pending in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. In this latter suit plaintiff obtained judgment in the trial court. On appeal of three defendants, the three insurance companies, the judgment as to them was reversed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the trial court is the judgment sought to be quashed in this proceeding.

The ground of decision of the Court of Appeals and the underlying reasons therefor are tersely stated in the opinion as follows:

"The point raised, that the Circuit Court of Jefferson County was without jurisdiction to prevent the prosecution of the three cases pending in the Circuit Court of City of St. Louis, is in our opinion well taken. Section 1951, Revised Statutes 1919, provides that proceedings on an injunction to stay a suit or judgment shall be had in the county where the judgment was rendered or the suit is pending.

"It will be perceived that this...