State ex rel. State Bldg. Commission v. Smith

• Decision Date: 08 April 1935
• Citation: 81 S.W.2d 613,336 Mo. 810
• Parties: State of Missouri at the Relation of the State Building Commission and Guy B. Park, Dwight H. Brown, Richard R. Nacy and Lloyd W. King, constituting a majority of Members thereof, Relators, v. Forrest Smith, State Auditor
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

81 S.W.2d 613

336 Mo. 810

State of Missouri at the Relation of the State Building Commission and Guy B. Park, Dwight H. Brown, Richard R. Nacy and Lloyd W. King, constituting a majority of Members thereof, Relators, v. Forrest Smith, State Auditor

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 8, 1935

Alternative writ quashed.

John D McNeely for relators.

(1) In construing a statute, words of common use are to be considered in their natural and ordinary meaning. Sec. 5, Laws 1933-1934 (Ex. Sess.), p. 110; Rubey v. Coal & Mining Co., 21 Mo.App. 169; Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City v. St. Peter's Academy, 50 Md. 346; Betz v. Ry. Co., 284 S.W. 461, 314 Mo. 390. (2) In determining the meaning of a statute, historical conditions leading to its passage may be considered. Sullivan v City of Butte, 211 P. 302, 65 Mont. 495. (3) A statute will not be given a construction which will make it unreasonable or absurd. Stack v. General Baking Co., 223 S.W. 93, 283 Mo. 396. (4) Conclusion. Secs. 5, 10, Laws 1933-1934 (Ex. Sess.), pp. 110, 113.

Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, for respondent; Max Wasserman of counsel.

(1) It is the duty of the courts in construing a statute to interpret particular words by reference to the context so as to effect the legislative intent as shown by the entire enactment if such may be fairly ascertained rather than to declare the precise meaning of the words standing alone. Secs. 1, 3, 4, 5, Laws 1933-1934 (Ex. Sess.), pp. 107-110; Sec. 655, R. S. 1929; State ex rel. Buchanan County v Imel, 219 S.W. 637, 280 Mo. 554; In re Ryan's Estate, 156 S.W. 761, 174 Mo.App. 202; Rubey v. Coal & Mining Co., 21 Mo.App. 169; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 151; City of Wichita Falls v. Robison, 46 S.W.2d 966. (2) The courts will take judicial notice of legislative journals. 23 C. J. 102; State v. Wray, 109 Mo. 598, 19 S.W. 86; Senate Journal, Ex. Sess. 1933-1934, pp. 13, 17, 319, 324, 333, 350, 352, 391, 422, 425 and 464. (3) The history and reason of the enactment of any statute may always be invoked in its construction. State v. Balch, 77 S.W. 551, 178 Mo. 392; Secs. 2, 3, 5, Laws 1933-1934 (Ex. Sess.), pp. 108, 110, 115; Hatton v. Ry. Co., 162 S.W. 233; Valley Spring Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 220 S.W. 1, 282 Mo. 3, 15 A. L. R. 266.

OPINION

Leedy, J.

Original proceeding by mandamus to compel respondent, the State Auditor, to draw his warrant on the State Treasurer, chargeable to the State Building Fund, in payment for sundry articles of equipment ordered and approved by relator, State Building Commission.

Upon the filing of relators' application for the writ, respondent, by stipulation, waived the issuance of the alternative writ and agreed that relators' application should be taken as and for such writ, and filed his return thereto. Whereupon, relators filed what is denominated a "motion for judgment notwithstanding respondent's return," reciting "that the allegations in said return do not constitute a lawful reason why said warrant should not be drawn." We look, therefore, to the facts stated in respondent's return as the ultimate facts of the case.

Involved here are varying quantities of seventeen separate and distinct items or articles of equipment, all portable, and not such as, when installed, become appurtenances or fixtures of the building. They are divided into classifications, as follows: (1) Furniture and fittings; (2) Food service; (3) Laundry; (4) Clinical, and (5) Industrial. The following units are typical of the several classifications mentioned, and will serve the purposes of this opinion without enumerating them all at length: (1) Tubular steel chairs, bedside tables, wheel chairs, hospital chart files; (2) Knives, forks and spoons; (3) Electric irons, canvas baskets; (4) Colonic irrigation outfit; (5) Forge, hand drill.

A constitutional amendment authorizing the bond issue in question was submitted by resolution of the Fifty-seventh General Assembly, Extra Session (Laws of Missouri, Ex. Sess., 1933-1934, p. 174), and adopted at a special election. The history of the bond issue, including the pertinent provisions of the constitutional amendment and the statute enacted in pursuance thereof, will be found narrated in an opinion of this court, by Gantt, J., in State ex rel. v. Smith, Auditor, 335 Mo. 840, 74 S.W.2d 27, wherein the validity of the bonds was sustained. It may be here stated that the constitutional amendment, declared that the bonds were authorized "for the purpose of repairing, remodeling or rebuilding, or of repairing, remodeling and rebuilding State buildings and properties at all or any of the eleemosynary institutions of this State, for building additions thereto and additional buildings where necessary." But it further expressly provided, "The proceeds of the sale of the Ten Million Dollars ($ 10,000,000) of bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purpose of repairing, remodeling or rebuilding any of the public buildings of the State of Missouri devoted to eleemosynary and penal purposes, and for building additions thereto, and additional buildings where necessary." (Italics ours.) [Constitution, Art. 4, sec. 44d.]

It is a provision of Section 5 of the statute above mentioned which, by the record and briefs in this case, we are asked to construe. It reads as follows: ". . . All improvements, repairs or additions which may be made to any of the state eleemosynary or penal institutions under this act, shall be of fireproof construction throughout, and shall be provided with proper heating, lighting and ventilating facilities and with the most modern approved sanitary arrangement and equipment." (Italics ours.) [Laws of Missouri, Ex. Sess., 1933-1934, p. 110.] It is the contention of relators that the word "equipment" as used in the italicized portion of the above-quoted act embraces items of the character in question, because the term is to be taken in its plain, ordinary and usual sense. [Sec. 655, R. S. 1929.] On the other hand, the respondent, in his brief, says: "The serious question in this case is as to whether the word 'equipment' . . . is to be construed in its plain, ordinary and usual sense so as to provide all the furnishings usual and necessary for the operation of the penal and eleemosynary institutions. . . . That the term 'equipment' is not only to be interpreted as reflected by the entire enactment and sentence in which it appears, but even more strictly to the phrase of which it is a part. The term 'equipment' clearly modifies 'sanitary arrangements' and we submit that what the Legislature had in mind was sanitary equipment, and not equipment as the term is generally defined when standing alone." Obviously, the question tendered by the parties is one of statutory construction.

So much for the case as made by the pleadings and briefs. Were we to hold that the term "equipment" as used in the statute is to be construed in its usual and ordinary sense it would admittedly include the items in question, and our alternative writ would have to be made permanent, if decided on the statute. But if a proper construction of the restrictions placed upon the purposes by the constitutional amendment excludes equipment in its general and ordinary sense, an entirely different result would necessarily follow. It is elementary that the statute could not authorize an expenditure out of the proceeds of the bond issue not sanctioned by the constitutional amendment itself. In other words, the purposes for which the statute directs expenditures can be no broader than the restrictions placed thereon by the constitutional amendment. And so in the view we take of it, it is upon the meaning of the words employed in the Constitution rather than the peculiar wording of the statute, that the case must turn. "Being possessed of the cause, and having the express right...