Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

• Decision Date: 21 April 1937
• Docket Number: 34371
• Citation: 104 S.W.2d 385,340 Mo. 1133
• Parties: The Massey-Harris Harvester Company, a Corporation, Plaintiff in Error, v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, a Corporation, Defendant in Error
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

104 S.W.2d 385

340 Mo. 1133

The Massey-Harris Harvester Company, a Corporation, Plaintiff in Error, v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, a Corporation, Defendant in Error

No. 34371

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 21, 1937

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Allen C. Southern Judge.

Affirmed.

Samuel Feller for plaintiff in error.

(1) Section 10159d, Session Laws 1919, page 606, being Section 2821, Revised Statutes 1929, is unconstitutional and void (a) being in conflict with Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, in that it contains more than one subject and the purpose of said section is not clearly expressed in the title of the act; and (b) because said section is in conflict with Section 53, Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, in that it is class legislation. State ex rel. Neidermeyer v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 743; State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Gordon, 188 S.W 162; State v. Great Western Coffee & Tea Co., 71 S.W. 1013; State v. Sloan, 167 S.W. 501; St. Louis v. Worthman, 112 S.W. 520; State v. Fulks, 105 S.W. 735; State v. Rawlings, 134 S.W. 530; State v. Miksick, 125 S.W. 511; State v. Empire Bottling Co., 168 S.W. 1176; Ex parte French, 285 S.W. 513. (2) At the conclusion of all the evidence both plaintiff and defendant requested peremptory instructions directing the jury to return a verdict in their respective favor, thereby each party, in effect said, that under the undisputed facts he is entitled to a verdict. Since both parties to the action thus asserted that the facts were undisputed, it was the duty of the court to take the case from the jury and decide the issues under the uncontroverted facts. It was error to submit the case to the jury. 64 C. J. 338, sec. 336; Douglas v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 297 S.W. 87; Richey v. Woodmen of the World, 146 S.W. 461; Gooden v. Modern Woodmen of America, 189 S.W. 394; Wharton v. Denny, 296 S.W. 187; Empire State Cattle Co. v. Ry. Co., 147 F. 457; Natl. Bank of S. C. v. Am. Surety Co., 67 F.2d 131; Coleman Furn. Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 F.2d 347; Humgate v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 267 Ill.App. 257; Sheldon v. American Ins. Co., 181 N.E. 497; United States v. De Armond, 48 F.2d 465; Clopper v. Gamble, 28 F.2d 755. (3) The court erred in refusing to give Instruction 4, requested by the plaintiff, to the effect that the plaintiff was not bound or affected by the provisions, of Regulation J issued by the Federal Reserve Board, nor by the general letter D-1, dated July 21, 1924, issued by defendant and addressed to the member banks of District No. 10, for the reason that such regulations and letter did not have the force and effect of law and there was no evidence introduced tending to show that plaintiff had any knowledge thereof. First Natl. Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 6 F.2d 339; Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211. (4) The court erred in refusing to give the peremptory instruction requested by the plaintiff, and in refusing to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, because under the undisputed facts the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. Bank v. Bank, 71 Mo.App. 451; Maronde v. Vollerwider, 279 S.W. 774; Midland Natl. Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358; Landa v. Traders Bank, 94 S.W. 773; Natl. Bank of Commerce v. Am. Ex. Bank, 151 Mo. 320; Gowling v. Am. Express Co., 120 Mo.App. 366; Majet v. Bartlett Bros. Land Co., 41 S.W.2d 849; Fed. Res. Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160; First Natl. Bank v. Bank, 15 F.2d 913; Bank v. Bank, 109 Mo.App. 665; 7 C. J. 609-610; Hornmerberg v. State Bank, 212 N.W. 16; State v. Neb. State Bank, 234 N.W. 32; Fed. Res. Bank v. First Natl. Bank, 87 Colo. 158; Dakin v. Bagly, 289 U.S. 722; Hamilton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 34 F.2d 115; Plainville v. Board of Co. Comnrs., 137 Kan. 61; Carr v. Carson, 62 Mo. 214; Southwestern F. & C. P. Co. v. Standard, 44 Mo. 82; Houston v. Mahoney, 219 S.W. 128; Foster v. Peoples Bank, 170 S.E. 408; Peoples Gin Co. v. Carrol Bank, 146 So. 308; Pankey v. Ry. Co., 168 S.W. 279. (5) The defendant by the use of due diligence could have collected said cashier's check in money, instead of accepting a draft in payment thereof, because the First State Bank of Cunningham continued to carry on its banking business in the usual way until September 8, 1925, and the evidence shows it had ample cash funds at all times after the defendant received said check for collection up to the time it failed with which to pay the same in money, had defendant demanded payment thereof. The cashier's check was surrendered to the debtor by defendant and the same was never returned to the plaintiff. By accepting a draft in payment the defendant must account to the plaintiff the same as if it had received money. Herider & Herider v. Phenix Loan Assn., 82 Mo.App. 427; Perry State Bank v. Myers, 251 S.W. 685; Bank v. Bank, 71 Mo.App. 451; Kach v. Sanford Loan & Realty Co., 286 S.W. 732; Federal Reserve Bank v. Quigley, 284 S.W. 164. (6) The court erred in refusing to give Instruction 5, requested by plaintiff, which reads as follows: "The jury are instructed that the plaintiff was not bound by any custom of banks relating to the collection of checks such as the cashier's check mentioned in evidence, unless you find from the evidence that plaintiff had actual knowledge or notice of such custom." Ober v. Carson, 62 Mo. 214; Starkse v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 138 S.W. 36; Southwestern F. & C. P. Co. v. Standard, 44 Mo. 82; Houston v. Mahoney, 219 S.W. 128; Bank v. Bank, 71 Mo.App. 451.

H. G. Leedy for defendant in error.

(1) Section 2821, Revised Statutes 1929 (Section 10159d, Sess. Laws 1919, p. 606), is constitutional and valid. State v. Goad, 246 S.W. 917, 296 Mo. 452; O'Brien v. Ash, 169 Mo. 283; State v. Parker Distilling Co., 237 Mo. 103; State v. Bennett, 102 Mo. 356; Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 633; Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo. 688, 147 S.W. 1042; Blind v. Brockman, 12 S.W.2d 742; State v. Scullin-Gallagher Iron & Steel Co., 268 Mo. 178, 186 S.W. 1007; Waterman v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Works, 328 Mo. 688, 41 S.W.2d 575. (2) The trial court was not required to take the case from the jury by reason of the fact that both plaintiff and defendant requested instructions in the nature of demurrers to the evidence. Midland Valley Railroad Co. v. Lynn, 38 Okla. 395, 135 P. 370; 64 C. J., p. 434. (3) The court did not err in refusing to give the peremptory instruction requested by plaintiff directing the jury to find a verdict in favor of plaintiff. James v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Assn., 148 Mo. 1, 49 S.W. 978; Smith v. Ry. Co., 279 Mo. 173, 213 S.W. 481; Jablonowski v. Modern Cap Mfg. Co., 279 S.W. 89; Cluck v. Abe, 328 Mo. 81, 40 S.W.2d 558; Prichard v. Dubinsky, 89 S.W.2d 530. (4) The effect of Section 2821, Revised Statutes 1929, in the case at bar was to constitute the Cunningham bank a collecting agent to collect the cashier's check from itself, upon such check being forwarded to it by defendant. 3 R. C. L. 622, sec. 251; Daley v. Butchers & Drovers Bank, 56 Mo. 94; Cavanaugh v. Bank, 59 Mo.App. 547; Hoffman & Coppersmith v. Natl. Bank of St. Louis, 211 Mo.App. 645; Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo. 412, 281 S.W. 733; Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, 314 Mo. 1, 282 S.W. 706; Federal Reserve Bank v. Quigley, 284 S.W. 164; State ex rel. Percy v. Cox, 30 S.W.2d 46; Kesl v. Bank, 109 Kan. 776, 204 P. 994; Griffith v. Burlington State Bank, 128 Kan. 279, 277 P. 42; Sec. 979, R. S. 1919; Adams County v. Meadows Valley Bank, 277 P. 575. (5) Section 2821, Revised Statutes 1929, authorized defendant to send the cashier's check to the Cunningham bank even though it was the debtor. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Barrow, 127 S.E. 3; Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 214 N.W. 918. (6) The court did not err in refusing to give plaintiff's Instruction 4 to the effect that plaintiff was not bound or affected by the provisions of Regulation J issued by the Federal Reserve Board, nor by General Letter D-1 issued by defendant Federal Reserve Bank. Semingson v. Stockyards Natl. Bank, 203 N.W. 412; Alexander v. Birmingham Trust Co., 89 So. 66, 16 A. L. R. 1072; Farmers State Bank v. Union Natl. Bank, 173 N.W. 789.

Hyde, C. Ferguson and Bradley, CC., concur.

OPINION

HYDE

This is an action for damages alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence in the collection of a check. There have been two trials of the case. In the first trial, plaintiff had a judgment which was reversed by the Kansas City Court of Appeals. [226 Mo.App. 916, 48 S.W.2d 158.] In the second trial, a jury trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brought the case here by writ of error.

Reference is made to the opinion of the Court of Appeals for a complete statement of facts, most of which were agreed to by the stipulation there set out in full. The following dates show the various steps in the transaction. Plaintiff indorsed and deposited a cashier's check of the First State Bank of Cunningham, Kansas, for $ 3180 in the Union Avenue Bank of Commerce of Kansas City on August 22, 1925. On that day, the Union Avenue Bank indorsed and deposited the check in the Commerce Trust Company of Kansas City. On that same day, the Commerce Trust Company indorsed the check and mailed it to the Oklahoma City branch of defendant. The next day was Sunday so that the check was received by defendant's Oklahoma City branch on August 24th. Because it was only authorized to make collections in Oklahoma, this branch mailed the check to defendant in Kansas City which received it there on August 25th. On that day, defendant mailed the check to the First State Bank of Cunningham with other checks drawn on that bank. August 30th was Sunday....