State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Hughes

• Citation: 169 S.W.2d 328,350 Mo. 869
• Decision Date: 04 January 1943
• Docket Number: 38047,38048
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation of Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Relator, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Respondents. State of Missouri at the relation of Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Relator, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

169 S.W.2d 328

350 Mo. 869

State of Missouri at the relation of Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Relator, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Respondents. State of Missouri at the relation of Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Relator, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, Respondents

Nos. 38047, 38048

Supreme Court of Missouri

January 4, 1943

Rehearing Denied March 25, 1943.

Writ quashed.

Carleton S. Hadley and Arnot L. Sheppard for relator.

(1) Although respondents' opinion may be undeniably wrong this court's jurisdiction may not be invoked, unless it is also in conflict with this court's latest controlling opinion, upon either the specific or general question of law involved in the decision of the cause. State ex rel Snider v. Shain, 345 Mo. 950, 137 S.W.2d 527; State ex rel. Mills v. Allen, 344 Mo. 743, 128 S.W.2d 1041; State ex rel. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shain, 344 Mo 623, 127 S.W.2d 675. (2) Respondents' opinion conflicts with this court's opinion on the specific question involved here, viz., to whom must the request be made and whose duty is it under the statute to issue the letter contemplated? This court has said the request for the letter must be made to, and it must be issued by, "the superintendent or manager." Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.W. 387. (3) Respondents' opinion conflicts also with this court's latest and controlling opinions on the general principle involved, viz., the proper rule to be applied in the construction of criminal and penal statutes, even if it is admitted solely for this argument that the Cheek case, supra, is not decisive of our question, and assuming further that Section 5064 is ambiguous. (4) The statute is a criminal one as well as highly penal and in direct derogation of common law. Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.W. 387; Lynch v. M., K. & T. R. Co., 61 S.W.2d 918; Cummins v. K. C. Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 920. (5) Moreover, as it is a criminal as well as a penal (in the civil sense) statute, perforce it must be liberally construed in favor of relator (defendant below). Such a construction does not permit the inclusion of anything or anyone not within the letter as well as the spirit of the statute. State ex inf. Collins v. St. L.-S. F. R. Co., 238 Mo. 605; State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58, 263 S.W. 95; State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512; St. Louis v. Goebel, 32 Mo. 295; State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271; Priest v. Capitain, 236 Mo. 446, 139 S.W. 204; State v. Burke, 151 Mo. 136. (6) The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain if possible the intent of the lawmakers from the words used, and to give the language of the statute its plain, rational meaning. Artophone Corp. v. Coale, 345 Mo. 344, 133 S.W.2d 343; Cummins v. K. C. Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920; Meyering v. Miller, 320 Mo. 885, 51 S.W.2d 65. (7) Of almost equal importance is the further rule that words in common use must be given their natural, plain and common meaning. Berry-Kofron Dental Laboratory Co. v. Smith, 345 Mo. 922; O'Malley v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 335 Mo. 1115, 75 S.W.2d 837. (8) Where one class of persons is designated as subject to its penalties all others not mentioned are exonerated. Such statutes are not to be extended or enlarged by judicial construction to embrace offenses or persons not plainly written within their terms. State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58, 263 S.W. 95. (9) All doubts concerning their interpretation are to preponderate in favor of the accused. State v. Burke, 151 Mo. 136. (10) Strict construction means construction of a statute or other instrument according to its letter, which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact and technical meaning, and admits no equitable considerations or implications. Priest v. Capitain, 236 Mo. 446, 139 S.W. 204. (11) Neither respondents nor any other court may interpolate into the statute the words station-master, agents or representatives. State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58, 263 S.W. 95. (12) The general rule is that punitive damages are not recoverable against an employer unless they could have been recovered against the employee for whose actions it is sought to make the employer liable. 15 Am. Jur., Damages, sec. 287; Lake Shore & Michigan So. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 13 S.Ct. 261, 37 L.Ed. 97; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 12 F.2d 818. (13) This principle has been announced by this court as to compensatory damages, and is of necessity applicable to punitive damages as well. McGinnis v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 200 Mo. 347. (14) Although this question is ignored in respondents' opinion, they of necessity held against relator's contention else the circuit court judgment awarding damages could not have been affirmed. Implicit in the affirmance is a finding by respondents against the inapplicability of this doctrine. State ex rel. Boeving v. Cox, 310 Mo. 367, 276 S.W. 869. (15) Respondents' opinion says "a strict construction is one which limits the application of the statute by the words used. It places no greater burden on one party litigant than on the other; both must comply with the terms of the statute." This statement of the law directly conflicts with this court's opinions in: State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58, 263 S.W. 95; State ex inf. Collins v. St. L.-S. F. R. Co., 238 Mo. 605; State v. Burke, 151 Mo. 136; Priest v. Capitain, 236 Mo. 446, 139 S.W. 204. (16) Respondents' opinion has by judicial legislation, rewritten the statute by exercising the words "the superintendent or manager," contrary to this court's rule. State v. Bartley, 304 Mo. 58.

Hay & Flanagan for respondents.

(1) Rulings of other jurisdictions are not considered on certiorari to quash record of a Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 339 Mo. 1156, 100 S.W.2d 487; State ex rel. Mechanics'-American Natl. Bank v. Sturgis, 276 Mo. 559, 208 S.W. 458. (a) Supreme Court has no power to interfere with the construction of a statute by a Court of Appeals unless such construction is contrary to prior controlling decisions. State ex rel. McClain Jones v. Robertson, 262 Mo. 535, 172 S.W. 21; State ex rel. Tummons v. Cox, 313 Mo. 672, 282 S.W. 694; State ex rel. Harrington v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 623, 31 S.W.2d 783; State ex rel. American Surety Co. v. Haid, 325 Mo. 949, 30 S.W.2d 100; State ex rel. and to Use of Huering v. Allen, 342 Mo. 81, 112 S.W.2d 843. (2) The Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 5064, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1939, being on an altogether different point than the one considered in respondents' opinion, cannot furnish ground for conflict. Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.W. 387. (3) Respondents' opinion fully conforms to the rules of statutory constructions applied and suggested by the Supreme Court and is not, therefore, subject to be quashed on certiorari. Meyering v. Miller, 330 Mo. 885, 51 S.W.2d 65; Cumming v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920; Lentine v. State Board of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 65 S.W.2d 943; Rust v. Missouri Dental Board, 155 S.W.2d 80.

Bohling, C. Westhues and Barrett, CC., concur.

OPINION

BOHLING

Originating as actions for damages for failure of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (hereinafter designated Terminal) to issue service letters under Sec. 5064, R. S. 1939, these two certiorari proceedings are prosecuted by the Terminal. The issue is whether a conflict with previous rulings of this court arises from the ruling of the court of appeals that requests for service letters made by ushers or redcaps of the stationmaster at the St. Louis union station constituted a sufficient compliance with said section under the facts in evidence to impose civil liability upon the Terminal. Chrisman v. Terminal Rd. Ass'n (Mo. App.), 157 S.W.2d 230; Hopkins v. Terminal Rd. Ass'n (Mo. App.), 157 S.W.2d 236. The cases presented like facts and issues. The principal opinion was delivered in the Chrisman case. Sec. 5064 reads:

"Whenever any employee of any corporation doing business in his state shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of such corporation, it shall be the duty of the superintendent or manager of said corporation, upon the request of such employee (if such employee shall have been in the service of said corporation for a period of at least ninety days), to issue to such employee a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager, setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee has quit such service; and if any such superintendent or manager shall fail or refuse to issue such letter to such employee when so requested by such employee, such superintendent or manager shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

Mr. Chrisman and Mr. Hopkins made their request for a letter upon the Terminal's stationmaster. They made no request upon any person designated superintendent or manager by the Terminal. The opinion of the court of appeals states that a Mr. Mathewson had been designated as general superintendent and a Mr. Davis had been designated as superintendent of the Terminal; that there was no evidence whatever as to the duties of said general superintendent or superintendent or whether they had any supervision or management over the ushers or redcaps; and that the stationmaster had "'supervision over...