State ex rel. United Transports v. Blair

• Decision Date: 05 June 1944
• Docket Number: 38421
• Citation: 180 S.W.2d 737,352 Mo. 1091
• Parties: State of Missouri, at the Relation of United Transports, Inc., a Corporation, Relator, v. Hon. David E. Blair, Hon. Robert J. Smith, and Hon. James F. Fulbright, Judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

180 S.W.2d 737

352 Mo. 1091

State of Missouri, at the Relation of United Transports, Inc., a Corporation, Relator, v. Hon. David E. Blair, Hon. Robert J. Smith, and Hon. James F. Fulbright, Judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals

No. 38421

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 5, 1944

Writ quashed.

Moser Marsalek & Dearing and J. C. Jaeckel for relator.

(1) The ruling and conclusion in respondent's opinion that the alleged rupture claimed by George Neidert to have resulted from a strain sustained while performing an intentional act (which act was performed in the manner intended and exactly in accordance with preconceived design on Neidert's part) constituted an accident within the meaning and construction of Section 3695 (b), R.S. 1939, of the Workmen's Compensation Law, is in direct conflict with the latest controlling decisions of this court. State ex rel Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 153 S.W.2d 40; DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834. The conflict arises in the following manner: In State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes et al., supra, it was held that a coronary occlusion, resulting from the exertion of lifting and carrying a five-gallon bucket of water, did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Compensation Law. And in DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co., supra it was ruled that the rupture of an aneurism, precipitated by the exertion of sawing a board, did not constitute an accident within the meaning of said law. (2) Respondents' opinion construes Section 3695 (b), R.S. Mo. 1939, to mean that the alleged rupture in and of itself, without any happening or occurrence external to the body, was an "event" constituting an accident, and this construction is in direct conflict with the latest controlling decision of this court. State ex rel Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 153 S.W.2d 40; Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 346 Mo. 58, 139 S.W.2d 918. The conflict arises in this manner: In State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes et al., supra, this court held that the injury itself does not constitute the "event" or "accident" contemplated by Section 3695(b), R.S. 1939. And in Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., supra, this court ruled that "the event which constitutes an accident is thus clearly a happening or occurrence in part at least external to the body itself. The physiological changes which may result in the workman's own body are consequences of the accidental event." (3) "If an opinion of the Court of Appeals either rules differently from this court's ruling as to the legal effect of the same or substantially similar facts, or contravenes a general principle of law stated in this court's decisions, then there is a conflict of decision." State ex rel. Huering v. Allen, 342 Mo. 81, 112 S.W.2d 843; State ex rel. Kroger G. & B. Co. v. Haid, 323 Mo. 9, 18 S.W.2d 478. (4) In order to warrant corrective action by this court, it is not necessary that this court should have ruled on identical facts. It is sufficient if both sets of facts as a matter of law require the application of the same rule. State ex rel. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 1195, 105 S.W.2d 915; State ex rel. Lusk v. Ellison, 271 Mo. 463, 196 S.W. 1088; State ex rel. Trading Post Co. v. Shain, 342 Mo. 588, 116 S.W.2d 99.

Norman & Foulke and Henry Warten for respondents.

(1) This court is not concerned, on certiorari, with dictum or nonconsequential inconsistencies appearing arguendo in an opinion, but is concerned solely with determining if there is a real conflict with Supreme Court's latest controlling decisions. State ex rel. Appel v. Hughes, 173 S.W.2d 45; State ex rel. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Hughes, 169 S.W.2d 328. (2) This court on certiorari looks only to the opinion for the facts. See authorities cited under (1). (3) Respondents' opinion does not conflict with State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, because the facts are not similar, and the application of the same rule of law was not required and for the further reason that the rules of law announced in the two decisions are in harmony. State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 153 S.W.2d 40. (4) Respondents' opinion does not conflict with DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co., because the facts are not similar and the application of the same rule of law was not required and for the further reason that the rules of law announced in the two decisions are in harmony. DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834. (5) Respondents' opinion does not conflict with Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., because the facts are not similar and the application of the same rule of law was not required and for the further reason that the rules of law announced in the two decisions are in harmony. Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 346 Mo. 58, 139 S.W.2d 918.

OPINION

Tipton, J.

This is a certiorari to review the opinion of respondents in the case of Neidert v. United Transports, Inc., reported in 167 S.W.2d 404, wherein the respondents affirmed an award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which held that the claimant, Neidert, received injuries as a result of an accident while an employee of relator.

The sole question before the respondents was: Did the claimant employee receive an accident, as that word is defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act, which is found in Section 3695, R.S. Mo. 1939? Subsection (b) of that section is as follows: "(b) The word 'accident' as used in this chapter, shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury . . . ."

In respondents' opinion, they found, "The evidence of Dr. Moody tended to show some 'objective symptoms of an injury.' The evidence also tended to show that the event was both sudden and violent. We therefore feel that there was substantial evidence before the commission that the event was sudden and violent and produced 'objective symptoms' of an injury. Was the event itself unexpected or unforeseen?"

In answering that question, the respondents said: "So all we have to do is to determine whether the commission was justified under the evidence in finding that such injury came within the meaning of 'accident,' as defined by said Section 3695, R.S. 1939.

"There was evidence from which the Commission could have found that the event was unexpected or unforeseen. The claimant was changing an automobile tire and apparently was not expecting the force he was exerting on the pipe to cause any strain. There was no evidence that complainant was not hearty and well at the time. He complained of soreness immediately afterward. Complainant testified that he had changed many tires before that and did not customarily put his foot on the pipe. We think the commission was justified, under the evidence, in finding that the strain received by claimant was an accident within the meaning of Section 3695, R.S. Mo. 1939.

"In one sense, every act of an employee is intentional. It was necessary for complainant to remove the tire on the road, when said tire could no longer be used in that condition. It was to be expected that force applied in the usual manner would effect removal of the lug which held the tire on the wheel. When the usual and ordinary force would not cause such removal, complainant pulled and tugged on the pipe to loosen the lug and, in so doing, according to the evidence before the commission, received the strain, afterwards found to be a bad rupture. We think there was sufficient evidence authorizing the commission to find that the event was both unexpected and unintentional, and, therefore, an accident within the meaning of Section 3695, R.S. 1939." (Italics ours.)

The relator contends respondents held that the "injury" or rupture that the claimant received was the "event" or "accident" which was "unexpected or unforeseen" and there was no finding of a mishap "in part at least external to the body itself," and, therefore, no compensable accident was established and the respondents' opinion conflicts with our cases of DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834; Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 346 Mo. 58, 139 S.W.2d 918; and State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. et al. v. Hughes et al., 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d 40.

In the DeLille case, supra, the deceased employee was a carpenter was doing his work in his usual manner, and was apparently in good health. We held that there was substantial evidence to support the award of the commission in denying the claim because there was medical testimony showing that the deceased employee died of aneurysm which was described as a sac formed upon the wall of a blood vessel due to a diseased condition of the vessel wall, and that death was a natural one resulting from this disease. The finding of the commission, therefore, was in accord with the act defining an "accident" which says, "The said terms ['injury or personal injuries'] shall in no case except as hereinafter...