State ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel

• Citation: 180 N.E. 865,203 Ind. 457
• Decision Date: 27 April 1932
• Docket Number: 26,038
• Parties: State, ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel et al
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

180 N.E. 865

203 Ind. 457

State, ex rel. Test v. Steinwedel et al

No. 26,038

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 27, 1932

1. MANDAMUS---Defense of Unconstitutionality of Statute---When may be Interposed by Ministerial Officer.---A ministerial officer who is a defendant in an action of mandate may interpose the unconstitutionality of a statute in excuse of nonperformance of a duty enjoined by that particular statute p. 462.

2. STATUTES---Unconstitutional Statute---Legally binds No One.---A legislative enactment which conflicts with the Constitution is void and legally binds no one. p. 464.

3. MANDAMUS---Defense of Unconstitutionality of Statute---Compulsory Education Act.---In an action of mandate to compel the county auditor to call a special session of the county council for the purpose of making an appropriation to pay the salary of the relatrix as school attendance officer for a city of such county, a defendant may interpose the defense that the Compulsory Education Law providing for such attendance officers (6448 et seq. Burns 1926) is unconstitutional. p. 466.

4. STATUTES---Constitutional Provision as to Act Embracing but One Subject---Validity of Statute Embracing Two Subjects.---Under the provision of 19, Art. 4 of the Indiana Constitution (122 Burns 1926) that "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith," if two subjects are embraced in one act and both expressed in the title, the entire act is void. p. 467.

5. STATUTES---Constitutional Provision as to Act Embracing but One Subject---Contemplates Rational Unity of Subject-Matter.---The constitutional provision restricting the contents of an act of the Legislature to one subject (19 Art. 4, Constitution, 122 Burns 1926) contemplates that there must be some rational unity between the matters embraced in the act, such unity being found in the general purpose of the act and the practical problems of efficient administration p. 467.

6. STATUTES---Constitutional Provision as to Act Embracing but One Subject---Reasonable Basis for Joining Matters in one Act All that is Required.---Notwithstanding the Constitution provides that every act of the Legislature "shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith" (19, Art. 4, Constitution, 122 Burns 1926), if, from the standpoint of legislative treatment, there is any reasonable basis for the grouping together of various matters in one act, the Supreme Court cannot say that such matters constitute more than one subject. p. 467.

7. STATUTES---Act Embracing more than One Subject---Object of Act Considered in Determining Question.---The object of an act of the Legislature must be considered in determining whether matters embraced in an act may be reasonably treated as "one subject" as required by the Constitution (19, Art. 4, Constitution, 122 Burns 1926). p. 469.

8. STATUTES---Title---Generality Not Objectionable---Exception.---Generality of the title to a statute is not objectionable as not complying with 19, Art 4, of the Constitution (122 Burns 1926) if it is not made a cover for legislation which is incongruous in itself and which cannot fairly be considered as having any necessary or proper connection. p. 470.

9. STATUTES---Act Embracing more than One Subject---Compulsory Education Act does not Violate Constitution.---The title of the Compulsory Education Law, being, in effect, "An act concerning minors, regulating the [school] attendance and employment thereof," is limited to one subject and "matters properly connected therewith" (19, Art. 4, Constitution, 122 Burns 1926), and, therefore, does not violate that section of the Constitution. p. 470.

10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Taking Property without just Compensation---Not Restriction on State's Taxing Power---Relates to Exercise of Eminent Domain.---That provision of 21 of the Bill of Rights (73 Burns 1926) declaring that "No man's property shall be taken by law without just compensation" was not intended as a restriction on the state's taxing power, but relates only to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. p. 470.

11. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---School Attendance Officers---Payment of Salary---Of City Attendance Officers---By People of the County outside the City.---That part of the Compulsory Education Act which provides for school attendance officers (6449 Burns 1926) does not compel the people of the county in which a city is located, considered apart from the people of such city, to pay the salary of the city school attendance officer. p. 471.

12. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Payment of Salary of City Attendance Officer by County---Statute does not Violate Constitutional Provision as to Taxation.---The act of 1921 regulating the attendance of school children and providing for city and county school attendance officers, and requiring payment of both city and county attendance officers by the county (Acts 1921, ch. 132, p. 337, 6448 et seq. Burns 1926) does not violate the constitutional provision requiring uniform and equal rate of taxation (1, Art. 10, Constitution, 200 Burns 1926). p. 471.

13. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---Attendance Officers in Cities---Salaries of Officers Payable from County Funds---Exception.---That part of the Compulsory Education Act which provides for school attendance officers and for the payment of their salaries (6448 Burns 1926) requires the salary of a city attendance officer's salary to be paid from county funds, the reference to salaries to be paid by a city or town is to "additional officers" in cities having a school enumeration of 2,000 or more and to the attendance officer who may be appointed in any city or town with a school enumeration of less than 2,000. p. 472.

14. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS---School Attendance Officers---Action of Mandate to Compel Payment of Salary---Sufficiency of Complaint.---In an action of mandate by a school attendance officer to compel the payment of his salary, it is not necessary to allege in the complaint that the plaintiff had filed an itemized statement of his claim against the county (5899 Burns 1926) or that he "has a valid liquidated claim," as it was the county council's imperative duty to make the appropriation (6449 Burns 1926). p. 473.

15. COUNTIES---"County Reform Act"---General Assembly may Require County Council to Make Specific Appropriation.---Notwithstanding the provisions of the "County Reform Act" of 1899 (5862 et seq. Burns 1926), the General Assembly has the power to require a county council to make a specific appropriation without regard to the usual procedure required by that act. p. 473.

16. MANDAMUS---Action of Mandate---To Compel Payment of School Attendance Officer's Salary---Proper Procedure.---Where the county council was under the absolute duty to appropriate the amount of a school attendance officer's salary at the September meeting of the council (6449 Burns 1926), but adjourned without making an appropriation, an action of mandate was the proper and necessary procedure to compel performance of that duty. p. 474.

From Jackson Circuit Court; John C. Branaman, Judge.

Action of mandate on the relation of Annette K. Test against Martin Steinwedel as auditor of Jackson County and the members of the county council of that county. From a judgment for the defendants on their demurrers to the complaint, the relatrix appealed.

Reversed.

Montgomery & Montgomery, James M. Ogden, Attorney-General, and Joseph W. Hutchinson, Deputy Attorney-General, for appellant.

Thomas H. Branaman and Coulter M. Montgomery, for appellees.

OPINION

Treanor, J.

This is an appeal from the action of the lower court in sustaining the demurrers of appellees, who were auditor and members of the county council of Jackson County, to appellant's complaint for mandate to require the auditor "to call a special session of the County Council for the purpose of appropriating the sum of $ 630.00 to pay the salary of Relator as attendance officer for the City of Seymour, Indiana, for the school year of 1930-1931" and to command "the other defendants . . . to meet at the call of said County Auditor and appropriate the sum of $ 630.00 to pay the salary of the Relator as such attendance officer for said school year."

Among other things, appellant alleged in her complaint that the city of Seymour is a municipal corporation in Jackson County, Indiana; that it has a school enumeration of more than 2,000 children of school age; that said city constitutes a separate attendance district; that the salary of such attendance officer had been fixed by the board of school trustees of the city of Seymour at $ 3.50 per day for 180 days and that the sum of $ 630 will be required to pay her salary as such attendance officer; that she has, since the beginning of the school year, performed the duties of attendance officer for the city of Seymour and intends to continue to perform such duties during the remainder of the year; that there were sufficient funds in the treasury of said county that were available and could have been appropriated for this purpose, but that the county council, at its annual meeting, failed and refused, and has ever since refused, to appropriate funds necessary to pay such salary.

Demurrers were filed by both the county auditor and the members of the county council, the ground of each demurrer being that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. With each demurrer the same memorandum was filed, which made the following points: (1) The statute upon which the relatrix' cause of action is founded (Acts 1921, ch. 132, p. 337, § 6448 et seq. Burns 1926) is unconstitutional.

(2) By the terms of the act itself, the duty of paying the salary of relatrix devolves upon the school city...