HUGHES, Judge.
This was a criminal prosecution by the state of Indiana against appellant in the Marion county criminal court upon an indictment charging appellant with violating the provisions of section 41 of chapter 213 of the Acts of 1925 (as amended, section 2, c. 190, Acts of 1929), commonly known as the Hit and Run Drivers' Act, and the same being section 47-518, vol. 8, Burns' Ann. St. 1933, and section 11171, Baldwin's Indiana Statutes 1934.
The indictment charged that the appellant on the 7th day of January, 1932, while driving and operating an automobile on a public street in the city of Indianapolis, struck and hit one John Batkin, who died from the injuries received, and that said appellant unlawfully and feloniously failed to stop his automobile and render and offer to render assistance to said Batkin; that he failed to report said accident to any police officer, peace officer, or police station, and he failed to give his name, address, and license number of his automobile.
The appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment which was overruled. He was tried by the court, and found guilty as charged, and sentenced to the Indiana reformatory for one year and fined $100.
The errors relied upon for reversal are as follows:
(1) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment.
(2) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion in arrest of judgment. Other errors were assigned, but are not set out underpropositions, points, and authorities, nor discussed, and are therefore waived.
The section of the statute under consideration is as follows:
‘Any person, who while driving or operating a motor vehicle or motor-bicycle on any highway in this state, although he may not be at fault, shall strike, wound or injure any human being, or shall meet with an accident whereby any other person receives an injury or the property of any other person is damaged, shall immediately stop, render or offer to render assistance, and give to the injured person or to some person who is with such injured person or to the owner or person in charge and control of the damaged property, his name, residence address including street number, city or town, county and state, also the license number of said motor vehicle or motor-bicycle and produce or offer for inspection, the certificate of registration therefor: Provided, That if such person is either killed or rendered unconscious and there is no other person to whom such person involved in the accident can report, then such person shall report such information to a police or peace officer, or in case no police or peace officer is in the vicinity of the place of such injury or accident, then he shall report such injury or accident to the nearest police station, peace officer or judicial officer. Any person who shall fail or refuse to comply with the provisionsof this section shall, if he shall have caused an injury to any other person, be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall, for a first offense, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), to which may be added imprisonment for a term of not to exceed two (2) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and if any such person be convicted a second or subsequent time for a like offense, he shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than one (1) year and not more than two (2) years; and if he shall have caused an injury to property, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, he shall be fined in any sum not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) and not more than two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) to which may be added imprisonment for not to exceed sixty (60) days.’
It is contended by the appellant that the act is in conflict with section 14, art. 1, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides that: ‘No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.’
There is no question but that the section in question was enacted on the theory that it is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state, necessary and proper for the protection of the safety and general welfare of those who travel upon the public highways of the state. The constitutionality of the section in question has never been presented to this court for consideration, but the constitutionality of statutes of other states, very similar to ours, has been passed upon by courts of last resort.
In the case of Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983, 984,40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 622, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 923, practically the same question is raised and passed upon as is presented in the instant case, and under a statute very similar to the one in this state. The court said:
‘The statute is a simple police regulation. It does not make the accident a crime. If a crime is involved, it arises from some other statute. It does not attempt in terms to authorize the admission of the information as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The mere fact that the driver discloses his identity is no evidence of guilt, but rather of innocence. * * * On the contrary, flight is regarded as evidence of guilt. In the large majority of cases, such accidents are free from culpability. If this objection to the statute is valid, it may as well be urged against the other provisions, which require the owner and chauffeur to register their names and number, and to display the number of the vehicle in a conspicuous place thereon, thus giving evidence of identity, which is the obvious purpose of the provisions. * * * We have several statutes which require persons to give information which would tend to support possible subsequent criminal charges, if introduced in evidence. Persons in charge are required to report accidents in mines and factories. Physicians must report deaths and their causes, giving their own names and addresses. Druggists must show their prescription lists. Dealers must deliver for inspection foods carried in stock. We held a law valid which required a pawnbroker to exhibit to an officer his book, wherein were registered articles received by him, against his objection based on this same constitutional provision. We held this to be a mere police regulation, not invalid, because there might be a possible criminal prosecution in which it might be attempted to use this evidence to show him to be a receiver of stolen goods. * * * If the law which exacts this information is invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.’
And the court, in the same case, further said: ‘Common observation and experience show that unrestricted use of motor vehicles on public streets would be extremely dangerous to life and limb and the property of the public. Their use thus becomes a fit subject for state regulation. Every person who operates or uses a motor vehicle must be regarded as exercising a privilege, and not an unrestricted right. It being a privilege granted by the Legislature, a person enjoying such privilege must take it subject to all proper restrictions.’
In the case of People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530, 532, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 161, a very similar statute to the one in question was passed upon by the court and held to be valid, and the case of Ex parte Kneedler, supra, was cited and relied upon. In the case of People v. Rosenheimer, supra, the court said:
‘There is one ground upon which, in my opinion, the validity of the statute can be safely placed. The Legislature might prohibit altogether the use of motor vehicles upon the highways or streets of the state. It has been so held in State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 A. 295,26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502,20 Ann. Cas. 512, and Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848 [L. R. A. 1915E, 264],127 Am. St. Rep. 513. Doubtless the Legislature could not prevent citizens from using the highways in the ordinary manner, nor would the mere fact that the machine used for the movement of persons or things along the highway was novel justify its exclusion. But the right to use the highway by any person must be exercised in a mode consistent with the equal rights of others to use the highway. That the motor vehicle, on account of its size and weight, of its great power and of the great speed which it is capable of attaining, creates, unless managed by careful and competent operators, a most serious danger, both to other travelers on the highway and to the occupants of the vehicles themselves, is too clearly a matter of common knowledge to justify discussion. The fatalities caused by them are so numerous as to permit the Legislature, if it deemed it wise, to wholly forbid their use. Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 23 S. Ct. 168, 47 L. Ed. 323;People v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397, 97 N. E. 877. If the Legislature may declare it a crime to use a motor vehicle on the highway under any circumstances, I do not see why it may not equally declare it a crime to so use such a vehicle as to injure any one in person or property. That, in effect, is a diminution, not an increase, of the criminality it had the power to attribute to the use of a...
