State ex rel. Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Baker

• Decision Date: 01 March 1927
• Docket Number: 27809
• Citation: 293 S.W. 399,316 Mo. 853
• Parties: The State ex rel. Union Electric Light & Power Company v. Sam A. Baker et al., Members of Board of Equalization of State of Missouri, and J. T. Waddil et al., Members of State Tax Commission
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

293 S.W. 399

316 Mo. 853

The State ex rel. Union Electric Light & Power Company v. Sam A. Baker et al., Members of Board of Equalization of State of Missouri, and J. T. Waddil et al., Members of State Tax Commission

No. 27809

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 1, 1927

Motion for Rehearing Overruled April 8, 1927.

Writ quashed.

Rassieur & Goodwin for relator.

(1) There can be no lawful assessment of property except in the manner prescribed by law and of property designated by law for assessment. State ex rel. Koeln v. Lesser, 237 Mo. 310; Hannibal ex rel. v. Bowman, 98 Mo.App. 108; Leavell v. Blades, 237 Mo. 700; State Board of Tax Commrs. v. Railroad, 130 N. E. (Ind.) 642; Wallace v. Hughes, 171 N.W. 843. (2) Therefore as the statutes fail to designate the classes of proeprty which respondents have assessed, for assessment by them their assessment is void. Sec. 13056, R. S. 1919, as amended Laws 1923, pp. 372-373. (3) The declaration in a statute that property shall be subject to taxation does not levy any tax. State ex rel. Koeln v. Lesser, 237 Mo. 321. (4) Where the method of assessment prescribed by law can by no possibility be conformed to, no tax can be levied. State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Gehner, 286 S.W. 117. (5) Respondents have no power to apportion or certify the assessed value of electric power and light companies for taxation, by county and city authorities, on a wire mileage basis. Sec. 13056, R. S. 1919, as amended, Laws 1923, pp 372-373; Secs. 13024, 13026, R. S. 1919. (6) Neither the State Board of Equalization nor the State Tax Commission has any legislative powers. Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo 616. (7) Certiorari is the proper remedy whereby to obtain relief from a void assessment. State ex rel Armour Packing Co. v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 662; State ex rel. Compton v. Buder, 271 S.W. 770; State ex rel Union Elec. Co. v. Gehner, 286 S.W. 117.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, and George W. Crowder, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondents.

(1) The Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization assessed relator's distributable property in the manner provided for by law for the taxation of railroads, and the railroad statutes are not unworkable when resorted to for the manner of assessing the property of electric power and light companies. Laws 1923, p. 372; Secs. 13002, 13027, 13056, R. S. 1919. (a) Relator's contention, as made in this case, was passed on by this court, adversely to relator, in the case of State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Gehner, 286 S.W. 117. (b) The ascertainment of what property is directly involved, and what is only indirectly involved, in the transmission of electric energy is the determination of a fact, and involves no legislative function. (c) The particularization employed in Secs. 13002, 13027, R. S. 1919, was not intended by the Legislature to be the conferring of a power, with limitations upon that power to tax only what was therein specified, but the undertaking to particularize was manifestly intended to be only illustrative of the method or manner of handling the property for taxation purposes. State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Gehner, 286 S.W. 117. (2) The State's policy of taxation as expressed in both the Constitution, and the statutes, is that all property shall bear its just proportion of taxation for the support of the government. Constitution, Art. X, secs. 6, 7; Sec. 12752, R. S. 1919. (3) The theory that, in order to make a valid assessment, every species or particular kind of property must be specifically named in the statute, is erroneous. If such were true our system of taxation would be a threadbare fabric, and many kinds of property would, of necessity, go untaxed, for it is wholly impracticable, if not impossible, to name each particular kind of property which is to be taxed. In order to obviate such an injustice our taxing statutes make use of the term, "all other property," or equivalent terms. Laws 1923, p. 375. (a) The equivalent of this term is found in Sec. 13002, R. S. 1919, where it says "and all other movable property owned, used or leased;" and in Sec. 13027, where it says "all property, real, personal or mixed, not hereinbefore specified." (4) The action of the State Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization in assessing relator's distributable property, as shown by their records, was within the law. The writ of certiorari heretofore issued herein should be quashed, and relator's application be dismissed.

Atwood, J. White, Ragland and Gantt, JJ., concur; Blair, C. J., dissents; Graves and Walker, JJ., absent.

OPINION

ATWOOD

This is an original certiorari proceeding in which relator seeks to quash the orders, judgments, records and proceedings of the State Tax Commission and the State Board of Equalization pertaining to relator's assessment for the year 1926, on the ground that they are "unauthorized, unjust, illegal and void, and without authority and beyond the jurisdiction" of respondents.

Respondents filed return to our writ admitting certain formal averments of relator's petition, and alleging that respondent State Board of Equalization assessed, adjusted and equalized for taxation, for the taxes of 1926, all of relator's property except property essentially local, such as lands and buildings, supplies, tools, office furnishings and fixtures, motor vehicles, steam-heating equipment, money and notes, the said property so assessed having been duly returned by relator to respondent State Tax Commission and originally assessed by said Tax Commission without protest on the part of relator save as to valuations fixed thereon by said Tax Commission; that the final order of the State Board of Equalization fixing the valuation and assessment of said assessed property at the sum of $ 21,227,785, was made on the 19th day of October, 1926; that, following the making of said final order, and prior to the issuance of the writ herein, respondents made an apportionment of said valuation and assessment, as expressed in said final order, to the city of St. Louis and to the respective counties through which and into which relator's lines of transmission run, and have certified such apportionment to the county courts of said counties, and to the Assessor of the city of St. Louis, as authorized by law, particularly Section 13026, Revised Statutes 1919; that respondents made the assessment of said property according to the method provided, and in the manner prescribed by law for the assessment of railroad property, as prescribed in Article XIII, Chapter 119, particularly Section 13024, that is to say, respondents fixed, adjusted, equalized and assessed the valuation of relator's distributable property, and apportioned said assessed valuation to the several counties aforesaid, and to the city of St. Louis, according to the wire-mile-age basis, apportioning to each such subdivision such part of the entire valuation as the number of miles of transmission lines within such subdivision bore to the entire mileage of relator's system within the State of Missouri; verified copies of relator's return to said Tax Commission, and certified copies of the apportionments made by said Board of Equalization being attached to said return. In their said return respondents also deny the allegations made in said petition, to the effect, that there is no authority under the laws of Missouri for the procedure adopted and followed by respondents in making said assessment and apportionment, and deny the allegations, to the effect, that respondents, in making said assessment, valuation and apportionment, disregarded the law; but aver that the findings made by the Tax Commission, and by respondents as the State Board of Equalization, and all orders resulting therefrom were legal, and that in the making thereof respondents were performing their duty and acting within the scope of their powers as laid out by the law. Attached to said return are full and complete copies of the findings and orders, entries and minutes of said State Tax Commission and said State Board of Equalization pertinent and relevant to the issues herein.

Thereupon relator filed motion for judgment on the pleadings and record, containing specific requests as follows:

"First: To quash, set aside and for naught hold the order entered by respondents on the 19th day of October, 1926, being the final order of assessment of the property of relator, and all other orders and proceedings entered by respondents or the State Tax Commission relating to the assessment of the property of relator and which have heretofore been certified to this court.

"Second: To quash, set aside and for naught hold all the acts and proceedings of respondents mentioned and referred to in the return of respondents and relating to the assessment of the property of relator.

"Third: To quash, set aside and for naught hold the apportionment of the value placed by respondents on relator's property as made and certified to this court.

"Fourth: To quash, set aside and for naught hold all the acts and proceedings of respondents in reference to the apportionment of the valuation placed by respondents upon relator's property which are mentioned and referred to in the return of respondents heretofore filed herein."

The grounds for said motion are therein stated as follows:

"(a) That the statutes of this State fail to designate the specific property assessed by respondents for assessment by respondents.

"(b) That the statutes of this State fail to designate any specific property of relator for assessment by respondents.

"(c) The method of assessment designated by Section 13056, Revised Statutes 1919, as amended, Laws 1923, pages 372-373, is indefinite, uncertain and unworkable, and confers no jurisdiction upon respondents...