Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Ranson

• Decision Date: 29 July 1931
• Citation: 41 S.W.2d 169,328 Mo. 524
• Parties: Kansas City Public Service Company, Appellant, v. John R. Ranson, As Collector of the Revenue of Jackson County
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

41 S.W.2d 169

328 Mo. 524

Kansas City Public Service Company, Appellant, v. John R. Ranson, As Collector of the Revenue of Jackson County

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 29, 1931

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Brown Harris Judge.

Affirmed.

Watson Gage, Ess, Groner & Barnett for appellant; Robert W Otto, Henry N. Ess and Powell C. Groner of counsel.

(1) By virtue of the Act of 1897 (now Secs. 13020-2, R. S. 1919) the property of street railroad companies must be assessed, apportioned and certified, and taxes levied thereon, in the same manner as is provided by law for the assessment, apportionment, certification and levying of school and other taxes on the property of railroad companies. The decision in State ex rel. Gottlieb v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 161 Mo. 188, in holding that the "dominant idea" of said act was the provision that street railroad property should be taxed to the same extent as the property of private persons, thereby precluding application of the average rate in levying school taxes on street railroad property, although such average rate is applied to railroad property (Secs. 13030-1, R. S. 1919), was erroneous. Said provision merely subjected street railroad property to taxation. The manner of levy was to be as prescribed for railroad property, including application of the average rate in determining school taxes. Laws 1897, p. 215 (now Secs. 13020, 13021 and 13022, R. S. 1919); Secs. 13030, 13031, R. S. 1919; Sec. 13056, R. S. 1919; Straughan v. Meyers, 268 Mo. 591; State ex inf. Collins v. Railroad Co., 238 Mo. 605; Gaston v. Lamkin, 115 Mo. 33; Sayle v. Paving Co., 166 Mo. 671; State ex rel. Hammer v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 208 Mo. 622; State v. Williams, 237 Mo. 178; State v. Rogers, 253 Mo. 399; State ex rel. Columbia Natl. Bank v. Davis, 314 Mo. 373; State ex rel. Koeln v. Lesser, 237 Mo. 318; State ex rel. Union E. L. & P. Co. v. Gehner, 315 Mo. 666; State ex rel. Union E. L. & P. Co. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853; Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, 315 Mo. 485; State ex rel. Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 315 Mo. 1126; State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Gehner, 27 S.W.2d 3. (2) By virtue of the Act of 1897 (now Secs. 13020-2, R. S. 1919) the property of street railroad companies must be assessed, apportioned and certified, and taxes levied thereon, in the same manner as is provided by law for the assessment, apportionment, certification and levying of school and other taxes on the property of railroad companies, and the decision in State ex rel. Gottlieb v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 161 Mo. 188, in not so holding, is erroneous, because it is apparent from the opinion that the court in construing said statute ignored the plain language contained therein, misconceived the intention of the Legislature, and failed to apply old and approved rules of statutory construction. Laws 1897, p. 215 (now Secs. 13020, 13021, 13022, R. S. 1919); Sec. 13031, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. Dean v. Daues, 14 S.W.2d 1002; Hannibal Trust Co. v. Elzea, 315 Mo. 485, 500; Strottman v. Railway Co., 211 Mo. 251; State ex rel. Barlow v. Holtcamp, 14 S.W.2d 650; State ex rel. Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 292 Mo. 342; State ex rel. Compton v. Buder, 308 Mo. 253; State ex rel. Motor Co. v. Gehner, 27 S.W.2d 3; State ex rel. Greene County v. Gideon, 273 Mo. 79; Secs. 13002, 13003, 13006, 13007, 13024, 13026, 13027, 13030, 13031, 13032, 13037, 13041, 13042, 13056, R. S. 1919. (3) The construction placed upon the Act of 1897 (now Secs. 13020-2, R. S. 1919) in State ex rel. Gottlieb v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 161 Mo. 188, that street railroad property should be taxed as the property of private persons, would render the assessment and levy under which respondent seeks to recover absolutely void because said assessment and levy was not made in the manner prescribed by law for the taxation of the real and personal property of private persons. Laws 1897, p. 215 (now Secs. 13020, 13021, 13022, R. S. 1919); Secs. 13030, 13031, R. S. 1919; Secs. 12802, 12803, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. Jennings v. Hamilton, 293 S.W. 378; State ex rel. Wyatt v. Railroad Co., 114 Mo. 12; Meriwether v. Overly, 228 Mo. 250; Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo. 94; Mosely v. Reily, 126 Mo. 124; State ex rel. McKee v. Clements, 281 Mo. 195; State ex rel. Brown v. Railway Co., 92 Mo. 137; Johnston v. Ragan, 265 Mo. 435. (4) The inconsistency of respondent's position is further revealed by the fact that the form of the cross-petition follows Sec. 13041, R. S. 1919, providing a form of petition for the recovery of delinquent railroad taxes and the judgment rendered follows Section 13042 pertaining to the rendition of judgments for delinquent railroad taxes. If respondent's theory is correct and the Gottlieb case is sound, then the judgment of the trial court will have to be reversed, because the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the recovery of taxes against the property of private persons, and the judgment rendered herein is void upon its face because it does not comply with the laws of this State regarding judgments rendered in actions for the recovery of taxes against the property of private persons. Secs. 13041, 13042, R. S. 1919; Secs. 12945, 12946, R. S. 1919; Sec. 13031, R. S. 1919; O'Day v. McDaniel, 181 Mo. 529; Milner v. Shipley, 94 Mo. 106; Vaughan v. Daniels, 98 Mo. 230; Brown v. Chaney, 256 Mo. 219; State ex rel. Hayes v. Snyder, 139 Mo. 549; Bland v. Windsor & Cathcart, 187 Mo. 131. (5) The levy of school taxes against the property of appellant at the local rates constitutes an arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair discrimination against appellant because a greater amount of tax is thereby imposed upon appellant's property than was imposed at the same time on property of the same general character and class for the same purpose, and by reason thereof appellant has been denied the equal protection of the laws and is deprived of its property without due process of law in contravention of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Laws 1897, p. 215 (now Secs. 13020, 13021, 13022, R. S. 1919); Secs. 13031, 13056, R. S. 1919; Constitution of United States, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1; State ex rel. Union E. L. & P. Co. v. Gehner, 315 Mo. 666; State ex rel. Union E. L. & P. Co. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853; State ex rel. Power Transmission Co. v. Baker, 320 Mo. 1146; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U.S. 153; Boonville National Bank v. Schlotzhauer, 317 Mo. 1298; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350; Columbia Terminals Co. v. Koeln, 319 Mo. 445; Jefferson City Bridge & Transit Co. v. Blaser, 318 Mo. 373; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Schnipper, 31 F.2d 593; People ex rel. Miller v. Railroad Co., 300 Ill. 399; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22; Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, 272 U.S. 494; Greene v. L. & I. Railroad Co., 244 U.S. 499; Toy National Bank v. Nelson, 38 F.2d 261; Bank of Arizona v. Howe, 293 F. 600; Munn v. Des Moines National Bank, 18 F.2d 269; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). (6) The school tax which respondent is seeking to recover is illegal and void and in violation of Sections 3 and 4 of Article X of the Constitution of Missouri, because said tax is arbitrary, discriminatory and at a greater rate than was levied upon property of the same general nature and class for the same purpose at the same time, and by reason thereof said tax is not uniform as required by said Section 3, and said property of appellant was not taxed in proportion to its value, as required by said Section 4. Authorities cited under Point 5, supra. (7) The taxation of appellant's property for school purposes at greater rates than were imposed on railroad companies and the companies named in Sec. 13056, R. S. 1919, deprives appellant of its property without due process of law in contravention of Sec. 30, Art. II, Constitution of Missouri. Authorities cited under Point 5, supra.

E. H. Wright, H. L. McCune and McCune, Caldwell & Downing for respondent.

(1) The decision in case of Gottlieb v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 161 Mo. 188, made almost thirty years ago is a correct interpretation of the statutes providing for the assessment, levy and collection of taxes upon street railroad companies as provided by Laws 1897, p. 215, now Secs. 13020, 13021, 13022, R. S. 1919, and gives operative effect to all relative sections of the statute pertaining to taxation of street railroad companies. Secs. 13002, 13027, 13056, 13020, 13021, 13022, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853. The parties to the Gottlieb case were the County Collector of Jackson County and the Metropolitan Street Railway Company of Kansas City, the predecessor of the appellant. This decision, if not res adjudicata, must at least be considered as stare decisis. The rule of stare decisis is founded largely upon considerations of expediency and sound principles of public policy, it being indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort, that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered settled and closed to further argument, and the courts are slow to interfere with the principle announced by the decision and it may be upheld, even though the court would decide otherwise were the question a new one. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 863; State v. Everett (Mo.), 190 S.W. 287; St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis (Mo.), 195 S.W. 721; Coulter v. Construction Co., 131 Mo.App. 230; Kansas City v. Public Service Commission, 276 Mo. 539; 15 C. J. 916. (3) If the revenue derived by appellant from its operation of the street railway properties in Kansas City is inadequate, the remedy is not by reducing taxes which...