State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 30 June 1941
• Docket Number: 37535
• Citation: 153 S.W.2d 40,348 Mo. 319
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation of Hussmann-Ligonier Company, a Corporation, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a Corporation, Relators, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson, Judges of and Composing the St. Louis Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

153 S.W.2d 40

348 Mo. 319

State of Missouri at the relation of Hussmann-Ligonier Company, a Corporation, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a Corporation, Relators, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson, Judges of and Composing the St. Louis Court of Appeals

No. 37535

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 30, 1941

Rehearing Denied July 25, 1941.

Opinion of Court of Appeals quashed.

John F. Evans for relators.

(1) The ruling and conclusion in respondents' opinion that the occurrence of a coronary occlusion in a diseased artery precipitated by an increase in the flow of blood from the exertion of lifting and carrying a bucket of water in the course of the employment, constituted an accident within the meaning and construction of Section 3695 (b), Revised Statutes 1939 (3305(b), R. S. 1929), of the Workmen's Compensation Law, is in direct conflict with the latest controlling decision of this court. DeLille v Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834. In that decision it was ruled on a similar state of facts that the rupture of an aneurism of the heart, precipitated by the exertion of sawing a board in the course of employment, did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Compensation Law. (2) Respondents' opinion construes Section 3695 (b), Revised Statutes 1939 (3305(b), R. S. 1929), to mean that the occurrence of a coronary occlusion in and of itself, without any happening or occurrence external to the body, was an "event" constituting an accident, and this construction is in direct conflict with the latest controlling decision of this court. Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 139 S.W.2d 918. This court, in construing the statute, ruled that "the event which constitutes an accident is thus clearly a happening or occurrence in part at least external to the body itself. The physiological changes which may result in the workman's own body are consequences of the accidental event." (3) The opinion shows on its face that, in reversing and setting aside the award of the Compensation Commission, respondents failed to rule on all of the evidence and determine the appeal solely on the basis of the evidence most favorable to the award, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In failing to follow this statutory rule, the opinion is in direct conflict with the latest controlling decisions of this court. Shroyer v. Livestock Comm. Co., 332 Mo. 1219, 61 S.W.2d 713; Burgstrand v. Crow Coal Co., 336 Mo. 119, 77 S.W.2d 97; Crutcher v. Curtiss-Robertson, 331 Mo. 169, 52 S.W.2d 1019. Where, as here, an opinion specifically refers to a part of the testimony of certain witnesses by setting it out in haec verba, this court on certiorari may refer to the record for the whole of such testimony to determine whether an opinion based thereon is in conflict with controlling decisions. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Ellison, 281 Mo. 667, 220 S.W. 498; State ex rel. Natl. Council v. Trimble, 292 Mo. 371, 239 S.W. 467; State ex rel. Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Hostetter, 342 Mo. 859, 119 S.W.2d 208; State ex rel. Banks v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 155, 125 S.W.2d 835; State ex rel. Talbot v. Shain, 334 Mo. 617, 66 S.W.2d 826.

Hay & Flanagan and Robert W. Herr for respondents.

(1) On certiorari, the sole issue is whether the opinion of the Court of Appeals announced some general principle of law contrary to the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court upon the same subject, or on a given state of facts announced and applied a conclusion of law contrary to a conclusion announced and applied by the Supreme Court upon the same or a similar state of facts. The Supreme Court sits only as a supervisory body, rather than as an appellate court, and the soundness of the appellate court's opinion or the merits of the case generally have no bearing upon the issue involved. State ex rel. Vesper Buick Automobile Co. v. Daues, 323 Mo. 388, 19 S.W.2d 700; State ex rel. Fichtner v. Haid, 324 Mo. 130, 22 S.W.2d 1045; State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 702, 32 S.W.2d 760; State ex rel. Railroad Assn. v. Hostetter, 342 Mo. 859, 119 S.W.2d 208. (2) Where the Court of Appeals recognizes the ruling of the Supreme Court case with which relators claim conflict, but distinguishes such case on the facts, there is no basis for a writ of certiorari, and the correctness of the finding of facts by the Court of Appeals, which took the case out of the ruling relied on, cannot be determined. State ex rel. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ellison, 263 Mo. 509, 173 S.W. 690; State ex rel. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 291 Mo. 206, 236 S.W. 868. (3) The ruling in respondents' opinion, made on uncontradicted medical testimony showing a positive causal connection between the strain and the occlusion, that a coronary occlusion resulting from the strain incident to lifting a heavy bucket constituted a compensable accident within the meaning of the Compensation Act, does not conflict with any decision of this court, and more particularly, does not conflict with the decision of this court in the case of DeLille v. Holton-Seelye Co. 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834. (4) The respondents' opinion recognized the rule of and distinguished on the facts the cited opinion, thereby removing any basis for an allegation of conflict between the two opinions. (5) The ruling in respondents' opinion that the occurrence of a sudden physical change, such as the tearing loose of a blood clot causing a coronary occlusion, at a particular time and as the result of a strain incident to lifting a heavy bucket, was an unexpected or unforseen "event" constituting an accident under the Compensation Act, does not conflict with any controlling ruling of this court, and more particularly does not conflict with the decision of this court in the case of Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co., 139 S.W.2d 918. (a) The two decisions are wholly dissimilar on the facts, particularly with reference to the type of injury involved, the manner in which the injuries were sustained, and the causal connection shown between the employment and the injury. (b) The two decisions do not conflict on the legal principles involved. The cited opinion did not require the definition of an accidental "event" as there set out for the determination of the issues in the case, since the denial of compensation was based on the failure to show that an infectious disease, pneumonia, had been caused by a single sudden unexpected occurrence. Consequently, the definition of "event" was merely dicta, and not the controlling rule of the case. Rinehart v. Stemper, 227 Mo.App. 653, 55 S.W.2d 729; Carter v. Priebe & Son, 77 S.W.2d 171. (c) The definition of "event" set out in the cited opinion is in direct conflict with previous definitions by this court, and by the St. Louis Court of Appeals and the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and consequently, is not the controlling rule in this situation. Schulz v. Great A. & Pac. Tea Co., 331 Mo. 616, 56 S.W.2d 126; Carr v. Murch Bros. Const. Co., 223 Mo.App. 788, 21 S.W.2d 897; Guillod v. Kansas City P. & L. Co., 224 Mo.App. 382, 18 S.W.2d 97. (6) Relators' allegation that respondents' opinion fails to set out the facts properly does not state any basis for the granting of a writ of certiorari, since the ascertainment of the facts of a given case is wholly within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal and on certiorari this court is bound by their conclusions in that respect. State ex rel. Koenen v. Daues, 288 S.W. 14. (a) Relators' attempt to present to this court additional evidence other than that appearing in the opinion is highly improper and completely without legal foundation; it is not the province of this court on certiorari to examine into the details of the evidence, or to consider any additional evidence outside of the opinion. State ex rel. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Hostetter, 339 Mo. 630, 98 S.W.2d 683. (b) Even assuming the propriety and legality of relators' attempt to go beyond the opinion for additional facts, there is no basis shown for the granting of a writ of certiorari, since the essential facts in the case are still uncontradicted, and respondents were within their rights in reversing the Commission. Where there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding, or even where there is some evidence, yet if it be not legally sufficient, such finding is not binding on the appellate court. Similarly, where the facts are essentially undisputed, the Commission's finding presents a question of law and is not binding on appeal. Carlton v. Henwood, 232 Mo.App. 165, 115 S.W.2d 172; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 909.

OPINION

Clark, J.

Certiorari. Relators, who were defendants in the case of Juhl v. Hussmann-Ligonier Co. et al., 146 S.W.2d 106, have filed a petition here claiming that the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in that case is in conflict with certain controlling opinions of this court.

One Charles Juhl commenced a proceeding before the Workmen's Compensation Commission on June 6, 1938, to recover compensation for an alleged accidental injury sustained by him on December 22, 1937, while in the employ of the Hussmann-Ligonier Company. The Commission denied compensation and its finding was sustained by the circuit court. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals where, on suggestion of plaintiff's death, the case was revived in the name of his widow. The Court of Appeals, holding that the Commission had proceeded on a wrong theory of law, remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to reverse the award and remand the cause to the Commission.

The employee had been laid off for some time and returned to work only a day or two before the occurrence of the alleged accident.

In accordance with the company's custom,...