State Ex Rel. Vars v. Knott

• Decision Date: 28 November 1938
• Citation: 184 So. 752,135 Fla. 206
• Parties: STATE ex rel. VARS v. KNOTT, State Treasurer, etc.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

184 So. 752

135 Fla. 206

STATE ex rel. VARS v. KNOTT, State Treasurer, etc.

Florida Supreme Court

November 28, 1938

Original proceeding by the State of Florida, on the relation of William W. Vars, against W. V. Knott, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner, as Insurance Commissioner, to require the Insurance Commissioner to issue to the relator insurance agents' licenses. On motion to quash alternative writ.

Motion to quash granted.

COUNSEL

Guyte P. McCord, of Tallahassee, and Nicholas S Kiefer and Walter F. Dodd, both of Chicago, Ill., for relator.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., Tyrus A. Norwood, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Waller & Meginniss and Chas. H. Spitz, all of Tallahassee for respondent.

OPINION

TERRELL Chief Justice.

Relator, William W. Vars, having been refused an insurance agent's license by W. V. Knott, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, this Court, on his (Vars') petition, issued its alternative writ of mandamus directed to said Insurance Commissioner commanding him to issue to said Vars insurance agents' licenses to transact business in this State on behalf of the insurance companies named in the petition, to wit; Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Hardware Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Minnesota, Minnesota Implement Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Hardware Mutual Casualty Company, or to show cause why he refuses so to do.

The Insurance Commissioner moves to quash the alternative writ because the Relator, Vars, did not bring himself within the applicable provisions of Section One of Chapter 17069, Acts of 1935, and other applicable provisions of the insurance laws of this State relating to the issuance of such licenses. Relator counters with the contention that Chapter 17069, Acts of 1935, is violative of Sections One and Twelve, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, and is accordingly ineffective to require compliance with its provisions.

Section One of Chapter 17069, Acts of 1935, is as follows:

'An insurance agent is hereby defined to be any person who solicits, negotiates or effects contracts of insurance, surety or indemnity on behalf of any insurer, on a strictly commission basis; or any member of a copartnership, or association, or any stockholder, officer or agent of a corporation, who solicits, negotiates or effects contracts of insurance, indemnity or surety, where said copartnership, association or corporation lawfully holds an agency appointment from any insurer, to solicit, negotiate or effect contracts of insurance, surety or indemnity, on a strictly commission basis, on its behalf; and no person, copartnership, association or corporation employed by an insurer on a salary basis or representing any insurer in any capacity except primarily to solicit, negotiate, or effect contracts of insurance, surety or indemnity, on a strictly commission basis, shall be deemed or held to be an insurance agent or solicitor, Provided, that nothing in this Section shall prohibit the granting of licenses to general agents of casualty and surety companies working on a strictly commission basis.'

The feature of the act which is alleged to be in violation of the State and Federal Constitution is that part limiting insurance agents to those who solicit, negotiate, or effect contracts of insurance, surety, or indemnity strictly on a commission basis. Sick and funeral benefit companies and life insurance companies or associations are exempt from the terms of the Act. Section Eight, Chapter 13663, Acts of 1929.

It is not contended by Relator that the business of insurance is not subject to regulation and control by the legislature, but the point of cleavage between Relator and Respondent is that there are limits beyond which the legislature cannot go in exercising its power to regulate such businesses and that Section One of Chapter 17069, Acts of 1935, surpasses the allowable limit permitted.

This Court is committed to the doctrine that the power of the legislature to regulate professions and businesses is not absolute but is subject to reasonable restrictions. Riley v. Sweat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48; Sweat v. Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc., 112 Fla. 428, 150 So. 617; Perry Trading Company v. City of Tallahassee, 128 Fla. 424, 174 So. 854, 111 A.L.R. 463; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 S.Ct. 662, 61 L.Ed. 1336, L.R.A. 1917F, 1163, Ann.Cas.1917D, 973. The foregoing and cases of like import are relied on by Relator to support his contention.

All of these cases treat legislative regulations that directly or indirectly cut off the complainants inherent right to engage in the business brought in question or placed limitations and burdens on the right to engage therein which amounted to a prohibition. This seems to be the acid by which the constitutional validity of such regulations must be determined. Regulations of this character grow out of the exercise of the police power and must bear some relation to the health, safety, morals, or welfare of those affected.

Strong reliance is placed by Respondent on Harrison v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Company, 183 Ga. 1, 187 S.E. 648 and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 57 S.Ct. 838, 81 L.Ed. 1223; to uphold the act here brought in question. These cases involved the interpretation of a Georigia statute very similar to the act under review in that it applied to the same class of insurance and provided that it must be written by resident agents. It was however different from the act under review in that it exempted all salaried employees of insurance companies doing business in the State of Georgia and included all agents of mutual insurance companies however compensated.

The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the validity of the act against all assaults, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Supreme Court of...