State ex rel. Vega v. Medina

• Decision Date: 22 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-491,95-491
• Citation: 549 N.W.2d 507
• Parties: STATE of Iowa ex rel. Yvonne Marie VEGA, Appellee, v. Ronald MEDINA, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 507

549 N.W.2d 507

STATE of Iowa ex rel. Yvonne Marie VEGA, Appellee, v. Ronald MEDINA, Appellant.

No. 95-491.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 22, 1996.

Dawn E. Mastalir of Legal Services Corporation of Iowa, Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Diane Stahle, Deputy Attorney General, Robert R. Huibregtse, Assistant Attorney General, and John C. Baker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

The State of Iowa, on behalf of Yvonne Marie Vega, brought suit against Ronald Medina seeking to establish paternity, current support, and reimbursement of AFDC benefits paid for Yvonne Vega, a minor child. Medina appeals the district court's determination it had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Ronald Medina is a member of the Santee Sioux Indian tribe and currently resides on the Santee Sioux Reservation in Niobrara, Nebraska. During the fall of 1990, Medina engaged in a sexual relationship with Linda Vega, and in June of 1991, Vega gave birth to appellee Yvonne Vega. The Iowa Department of Human Services then filed suit on behalf of the child in order to establish paternity in Medina, establish current support, and obtain reimbursement of AFDC benefits previously paid by the state for support of the child.

Medina challenged the district court's subject matter jurisdiction on the basis he resided on the reservation and was merely visiting Sioux City during the time period in which the child was conceived. Linda Vega alleges Medina was a resident of Sioux City at the time and presented evidence Medina obtained an Iowa driver's license at that time listing a Sioux City address as his residence. She also alleges she visited Medina at that address several times. Medina argues he obtained an identification card only for the purpose of cashing checks and that it was not a driver's license.

Medina admitted to the relationship and the parties consented to DNA testing which provided a 99.4% likelihood Medina was the father. Medina later agreed to the entry of a consent decree establishing paternity but continued to challenge the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. In ruling on his motion to dismiss, the district court held Medina was a resident of Sioux City at the time of the child's conception and that the court therefore had jurisdiction over the matter.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Questions of a court's subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4; S.S. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 528 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1995); White v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 514 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Iowa 1994). Because the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and subject matter jurisdiction may not be established by consent or estoppel, such a challenge may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and this court may also raise the issue sua sponte. Milks v. Iowa Oto-Head & Neck Specialists, P.C., 519 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Iowa 1994).

In its ruling on Medina's motion to dismiss, the district court found subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of Medina's presence in Sioux City at the time of the child's conception. Medina challenges the finding of jurisdiction on the basis of this court's decision in State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Whitebreast, 409 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Iowa 1987), in which we characterized the department's action as regulatory. In Whitebreast, both the mother and father, along with the child, were enrolled members of the Sac and Fox Tribe residing in Tama, Iowa. The mother received AFDC benefits for the child, and the Child Support Recovery Unit filed a petition seeking reimbursement for benefits previously paid and future support from Whitebreast, the father. Whitebreast then challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction by raising the question whether 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1983), commonly known as "Public Law 280," provided jurisdiction in such cases.

Public Law 280 provides in pertinent part

The consent of the United States is hereby given to any state not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume ... such measure of jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.

25 U.S.C. § 1322.

The statute further states

Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property....

Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.

Id. § 1322(a)-(c).

Originally, only five states, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington, were given jurisdiction under this statute, but others were given the option of assuming jurisdiction in this manner. Iowa is one of ten states which have chosen to do so and has adopted full Public Law 280 jurisdiction with the following language in Iowa Code section 1.12 (1985):

The state of Iowa hereby assumes jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or other persons or to which Indians or other persons are parties arising within the Sac and Fox Indian settlement in Tama county. The civil laws of this state shall obtain on the settlement and shall be enforced in the same manner as elsewhere throughout the state.

In Whitebreast, this court held due to the regulatory nature of the proceedings of the Child Support Recovery Unit, jurisdiction was not present under Public Law 280. Whitebreast, 409 N.W.2d at 463-64. Medina's reliance on Whitebreast, however, is misplaced as Public Law 280 is not controlling in this case. Pursuant to Iowa Code section 1.12, the state has assumed jurisdiction over matters arising in the Sac and Fox settlement, the residence of all parties in Whitebreast. None of the parties in the instant case are residents of the Sac and Fox settlement, therefore Iowa Code section 1.12 is not implicated. Furthermore, Public Law 280 confers jurisdiction to a state over civil causes of action which arise in areas of Indian country. In Whitebreast, the cause of action arose in Indian country, i.e., on the reservation. In the instant case, the cause of action arose in Sioux City, i.e., off the reservation. Therefore, Public Law 280 is not implicated in the instant case.

In the absence of express federal law stating otherwise, Indians venturing beyond the boundaries of their reservations are generally subject to the nondiscriminatory state laws applicable to all citizens of the state. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 119 (1973). In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270-71, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 253-54 (1959),...