State ex rel. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, Child Advocate Office on Behalf of Jason Gavin S. by Diann E.S. v. Carl Lee H.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 23108,23108
• Citation: 472 S.E.2d 815,196 W.Va. 369
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CHILD ADVOCATE OFFICE, ON BEHALF OF JASON GAVIN S. BY DIANN E.S., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CARL LEE H., Defendant Below, Appellee.

Page 815

472 S.E.2d 815

196 W.Va. 369

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CHILD ADVOCATE OFFICE ON BEHALF OF JASON GAVIN S. BY DIANN E.S., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CARL LEE H., Defendant Below, Appellee.

No. 23108.

Supreme Court of Appeals

of West Virginia.

Submitted April 24, 1996.

Decided June 14, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "A circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard." Syl. pt. 1, Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995).

2. "Under the clearly erroneous standard, if the findings of fact and the inferences drawn by a family law master are supported by substantial evidence, such findings and inferences may not be overturned even if a circuit court may be inclined to make different findings or draw contrary inferences." Syl. pt. 3, Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995).

3. "If a circuit court believes a family law master failed to make findings of fact essential to the proper resolution of a legal question, it should remand the case to the family law master to make those findings. If it is of the view that the findings of fact of a family law master were clearly erroneous, the circuit court may set those findings aside on that basis. If it believes the findings of fact of the family law master are unassailable, but the proper rule of law was misapplied to those findings, the circuit court may reverse. However, a circuit court may not substitute its own findings of fact for those of a family law master merely because it disagrees with those findings." Syl. pt. 4, Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995).

4. " 'Mere delay will not bar relief in equity on the ground of laches. "Laches is a delay in the assertion of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or such delay as will warrant the presumption that the party has waived his right." ' Syllabus point 2, Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608, 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941)." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Smith v. Abbot, 187 W.Va. 261, 418 S.E.2d 575 (1992).

5. " 'Where a party knows his rights or is cognizant of his interest in a particular subject-matter, but takes no steps to enforce the same until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed, that he cannot be restored to his former state if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable, and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right. This disadvantage may come from death of parties, loss of evidence, change of title or condition of the subject-matter, intervention of equities, or other causes. When a court of equity sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a ground for denial of relief.' Syllabus Point 3, Carter v. Price, 85 W.Va. 744, 102 S.E. 685 (1920); Syllabus Point 2, Mundy v. Arcuri, 165 W.Va. 128, 267 S.E.2d 454 (1980)." Syl. pt. 5, Laurie v. Thomas, 170 W.Va. 276, 294 S.E.2d 78 (1982).

6. If the reason a plaintiff delays in bringing an action for reimbursement child support is because he or she was misled by the misrepresentations of the defendant as to his or her rights to bring such action or because the delay was induced by the defendant, then the defendant may not raise the defense of laches. However, if the plaintiff does not use due diligence in bringing an action once he or she learns of the misrepresentations, then the defendant may raise the defense of laches, provided the defendant can also demonstrate that such delay has worked to his or her detriment.

R. Jeffrey Johnson, Ilene S. Schnall, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Child Support Enforcement Division, Charleston, for Appellant.

Scott Evans, Holroyd & Yost, Charleston, for Appellee.

Maureen Conley, Charleston, Amicus Curiae, for National Organization for Women, West Virginia Chapter.

McHUGH, Chief Justice.

The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter the "WVDHHR") appeals the March 21, 1995 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County which reversed the June 8, 1994 order of the family law master. More specifically, the family law master had ordered that a judgment in the amount of $79,687.52, plus interest, be granted against Carl L. H. ¹ (hereinafter "Carl") for reimbursement child support. The circuit court reversed the order, holding that the doctrine of laches prevented Diann S. (hereinafter "Diann") from collecting reimbursement child support from Carl. For reasons explained below, we reverse the March 21, 1995 order of the circuit court.

I

Unless stated otherwise, the factual background comes from the family law master's findings of fact and from testimony given at a January 13, 1994 proceeding before the family law master. On February 11, 1979, Diann gave birth to a child named Jason S. (hereinafter "Jason"). On June 24, 1993, it was determined, pursuant to a blood test, that Carl was the father of Jason. The events prior to and after Jason's birth are important in determining whether laches applies so as to prevent Diann from collecting reimbursement child support from Carl.

Sometime in the spring of 1978 Diann ended her relationship with Alvin M. (hereinafter "Alvin"), whom she had been dating. Soon thereafter, in May of 1978, Diann went to a party hosted by her friends, Bernie S. and his wife. Carl was also at this party. During the course of the evening, Diann became intoxicated, so Bernie and his wife took Diann to a guest bedroom to sleep off the effects of the alcohol. Diann testified that later Carl entered the bedroom and that she told him to leave her alone. She further testified that she did not remember anything else after telling Carl to leave. Bernie testified in a deposition that he saw Carl go into the bedroom where he and his wife had placed Diann.

The next morning upon waking, Diann discovered that her underwear was on the floor. She became alarmed and asked Bernie to ask Carl if anything had happened between her and Carl. Bernie spoke with Carl and stated that Carl told him that nothing had occurred. Bernie reported Carl's response to Diann.

A couple of weeks after the party Diann saw Carl and asked him whether anything had occurred on the night of the party while she was in the bedroom. She stated that Carl informed her that nothing had occurred. Carl testified that he does not recall this conversation taking place.

Soon thereafter, Diann discovered that she was pregnant, and she eventually gave birth to Jason on February 11, 1979. In April of 1979 Diann instituted a paternity suit against Alvin, the only man with whom she knew she had sexual relations during the time Jason was conceived. However, the suit was dismissed after the blood test results revealed that Alvin was not Jason's father. In or about 1985, Diann brought a second paternity action against Alvin, and again, the blood test results revealed that Alvin was not Jason's father.

Thus, in 1987 Diann went to the Child Advocate Office in Boone County seeking to bring a paternity action against Carl. ² The Child Advocate Office declined to pursue the action at that time. Almost five years later, in February of 1992, Diann went to the Child Advocate Office in Charleston again seeking to pursue a paternity action against Carl. ³ The action was filed, and it was determined that Carl was Jason's father.

The family law master ordered Carl to pay $381.74 per month in child support, which he has been paying. The family law master also ordered Carl to pay $79,687.52, plus interest, in reimbursement child support after finding that "[Diann] upon pursuing the matter of paternity against [Carl] acted timely and diligently ..." and is without negligence. Furthermore, the family law master found that Carl was "not entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of latches [sic], as he misrepresented the facts to [Diann]."

The circuit court rejected the family law master's Recommended Order of reimbursement child support upon finding that the doctrine of laches barred Diann's claim for such support:

[I]t has been fourteen (14) years since [Diann's] child was born and the time she filed suit against [Carl], and, whereas, [Diann] failed to file suit within a reasonable period of time even though she admits knowledge that suggests that she and [Carl] had sexual intercourse, this Court finds that [Diann] had knowledge that [Carl] might have been the father of her child and, yet, did not file suit against [him] for fourteen (14) years.

It is this conclusion of the circuit court that the WVDHHR appeals.

II

The issue before us is whether the circuit court correctly set aside the family law master's determination that laches did not bar Diann from collecting reimbursement child support from Carl. In syllabus points 1, 3 and 4 of Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d 841 (1995) this Court outlined the standard of review the circuit court should use when reviewing a recommended order of a family law master:

1. A circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family law master only under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should review the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard.

3. Under the clearly erroneous standard, if the findings of fact and the inferences drawn by a family law master are supported by substantial evidence, such findings and inferences may not be overturned even if a circuit court may be inclined to make different findings or draw contrary inferences.

4. If a circuit court believes a family law master failed to make findings of fact essential to the proper resolution of a legal question, it should remand the case to the family law master to make those findings. If it is of the view that the findings of fact of a family law...