State of Cal. Dept. of M. Hyg. v. Bank of S.W. Nat. Ass'n
| Citation | 163 Tex. 314,354 S.W.2d 576 |
| Decision Date | 21 February 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. A-8640,A-8640 |
| Parties | The STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Petitioner, v. BANK OF the SOUTHWEST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dillingham, Schleider & Lewis (Ben H. Schleider, Jr., and John S. Brunson, Houston, with firm), Sam L. Sterrett, Jr., Houston, for petitioner.
Baker, Botts, Andrews & Shepherd, Houston (Wm. R. Choate, Houston, with firm), for respondents.
This is a suit to recover moneys expended in caring for the beneficiary of a support trust. The case turns upon the construction of the trust instrument. The State of California Department of Mental Hygiene sued the Bank of the Southwest, as trustee, and the heirs of Henrietta Cargill Adkins, a beneficiary of the trust, claiming some $5,000 was due the department under the terms of a testamentary trust established by Ennis Cargill. The trial court rendered a summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing and the Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed. 348 S.W.2d 731.
Ennis Cargill died testate on November 26, 1938. His will created a testamentary trust for the benefit of his two daughters, Ruby Tennie Cargill and Henrietta Cargill Adkins. Pertinent portions of the trust instrument are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. The provisions having a particular bearing upon our holdings are as follows:
'(b) My daughter Ruby Tennie Cargill (born 4 Dec. 1898) is at the time of the execution of this will confined in a state hospital of the State of California; * * * having been committed to said institution on December 22, 1932. I have been called upon to make payment sin amounts not exceeding $25. per month for the purpose of maintaining her in said institution and defraying additional incidental expenses. So long as my said daughter is confined in said institution, or in any other institution, I direct the Trustee to pay to the proper authorities of such institution for the use and benefit of my said daughter and to defray the expense of her maintenance therein a like sum of money each month, unless a greater or lesser amount is required, in which event the Trustee shall pay the amount so required, provided, however, that in no event shall the amounts so paid exceed the maximum amount required by such institution from time to time for persons confined under such circumstances and for reasons similar to those which brought about the commitment of my said daughter. In any event the amounts so to be paid and expended by the Rustee shall be determined in its unlimited judgment and discretion taking into consideration all facts and circumstances attendant upon my said daughter's condition and requirements. In lieu of payments to said institution the Trustee may make payments in like amounts to the mother of my said daughter in reimbursement of sums paid out by her for such purposes.
'In the event that my said daughter has been released from said institution prior to my death, or should she be released by due, proper and legal proceedings after my death, by reason of the cessation of the cause of her commitment thereto, then and in either of such events, I direct that the Trustee shall pay to her out of the net income $150. per month for and during the term of her natural life, or until such time as she may again be committed to the same or a similar institution, in which event the provisions set forth in the next preceding paragraph of this sub-paragraph (b) shall become applicable. * * *
'(d) When my daughter Henrietta Cargill reaches the age of 40 years, or upon her death prior thereto, if my daughter Ruby Tennie Cargill, be then living, the Trustee shall, subject to the further provisions hereof, set apart and hold under the further provisions hereof such portion of the Trust Estate as shall at time thereof yield at the then reasonable rate of return on investments the sum of $1800. per annum net over and above the then reasonable expenses of administering said fund hereunder, including the compensation of the Trustee. Such fund so set apart shall be held during the natural life of my daughter, Ruby Tennie Cargill, and the net income therefrom shall be utilized, expended and paid to or for her as provided in sub-paragraph (b) above. The balance of the Trust Estate then remaining, or if my daughter Ruby Tennie Cargill be then dead, the entire Trust Estae shall be paid and delivered, free of the Trust, to my daughter Henrietta Cargill, and the Trust shall terminate with respect thereto. Upon the death of my daughter, Ruby Tennie Cargill, the portion of the Trust Estate set apart and held for her as above provided shall be paid and delivered, free of the Trust, to my daughter, Henrietta Cargill, and the Trust shall terminate with respect thereto. * * *
'(g) * * * During the time that my daughter Ruby Tennie Cargill is confined in an institution, or thereafter, the Trustee may make from time to time disbursements from the excess net income and/or principal of the Trust Estate, or from the portion set apart for her, as above provided, to meet any emergency or necessity arising, in like manner and for like purposes as specified in the next preceding paragraph, the amount, time, and desirability of and the necessity for such disbursements to be determined wholly in the discretion of the Trustee.' (Italics added)
Henrietta Cargill Adkins became forty years of age in 1952, whereupon the trustee partitioned the estate in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument. A portion calculated to yield a net sum of $1800 per year was retained for the benefit of Ruby Tennie Cargill, and the balance distributed to Henrietta Cargill Adkins free of trust. The latter died in 1956, and her surviving husband and children are respondents here.
Ruby Tennie Cargill is incurably insane and has been a patient in the state hospitals of California at all times material to this suit. Upon the testator's death in 1938, the trustee made payments of $25.00 monthly to Mrs. Ruby Cargill, mother of Ruby Tennie Cargill, as reimbursement for pay ments made by her to the California agency. When Mrs. Cargill died in 1952, the trustee sent the $25.00 payment directly to petitioner. These monthly payments continued through 1956.
In February, 1957, petitioner wrote the trustee that the current charge for care and treatment of Ruby Tennie Cargill was $134.00 per month. Petitioner also demanded $5100.00 as reimbursement for past support, claiming that this sum, together with the $25.00 per month which had been paid represented the reasonable and actual expense of maintaining Ruby Tennie Cargill from 1952 to 1957. This letter was the first advice which the trustee received that a charge in excess of $25.00 per month was due and payable for the support of Ruby Tennie Cargill.
Shortly after receipt of this letter, the trustee commenced making payments of $134.00 per month. It refused however to pay the additional $5100.00 demanded for back support and that sum is the subject matter of this litigation. 1
In affirming the trial court's summary judgment against petitioner, the Court of Civil Appeals held that under the trust instrument, it was necessary for petitioner to demand in advance an increase in support payments before the trustee would be liable therefor. Section (b) of the trust instrument, above quoted, directs the trustee to pay $25.00 per month to petitioner 'unless a greater or lesser amount is required, in which event the Trustee shall pay the amount so required * * *.'
Petitioner urges that the word 'required', as used by this testator, should be construed as synonymous with 'needed', rather than with 'demanded', as held by the courts below. It is said that the trust instrument requires the trustee to pay all reasonable and necessary support charges regardless of whether or not there was an advance demand therefor. In support of this contention, petitioner cites a number of cases in which the courts have defined 'required' to mean 'needed' under various factual situations. Boyce v. Stringfellow, 52 Tex.Civ.App. 504, 114 S.W. 652, no wr. hist., and cases cited therein; Hull v. Holloway, Sup.Ct. of Errors, 58 Conn. 210, 20 A. 445; In re Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 199 N.E. 491.
There are also cases which announce the definition sought by respondents. See Bain v. Coats, Tex.Com.App., 244 S.W. 130. Webster's Third New...
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