State Of Minn. v. Larson, No. A05-0031.

• Decision Date: 02 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. A05-0031.
• Citation: 787 N.W.2d 592
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.Jamie Leigh LARSON, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

787 N.W.2d 592

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.Jamie Leigh LARSON, Appellant.

No. A05-0031.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 2, 2010.

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Syllabus by the Court

1. The district court did not make evidentiary errors that deprived appellant of her right to present a complete defense.

2. Any error by the district court in instructing the jury was harmless.

3. The evidence at trial was sufficient to convict appellant of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General; and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

Craig E. Cascarano, Cascarano Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, and Jennifer M. Macaulay, Macaulay Law Offices, LLC, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Jamie Leigh Larson, appeals her conviction under Minn.Stat. §§ 609.05 and 609.185 (2008) of aiding and abetting the first-degree premeditated murder of Thomas John Cady.¹ Larson's brother, Robert Larson, was convicted in a separate trial of the first-degree premeditated murder of Cady.² Larson argues that she is entitled to a new trial based on several evidentiary and jury-instruction errors. She also argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm Larson's conviction.

The evidence at trial established the following facts. Ramsey County Sheriff's deputies found Cady's body just before 9:00 a.m. on the day after Thanksgiving, November 28, 2003, beside Edgerton Street in Little Canada. Cady had been strangled using a zip strip ³ and had been dragged into a ditch by the side of the road.

During their investigation into Cady's death, the police learned that, earlier in the morning of November 28, Larson and her brother, Robert, were at the Travelodge hotel in St. Paul, visiting acquaintances who were staying in two rooms at the hotel and using drugs. Larson's cousin, Dan Iacarella, and Larson's friends, D.G. and J.S., were in room 208. Everyone in this room had been using either methamphetamine or painkillers that morning. Larson and Robert, who had both also been using methamphetamine, entered the room and began complaining about Larson's boyfriend, Cady, having abused Larson. Witnesses at trial testified that the two discussed getting back at Cady, who was then sleeping in his truck in the parking lot of the hotel, by tying him up with zip-strips, possibly shooting him, and taking him north to Pine City to bury his body. Larson then left room 208 while Robert went to get some zip-strips from Iacarella who used them for his job.

Larson next went to room 206 where Ramon Andujar, and two others, T.O. and R.A., were. According to Andujar's testimony, Larson made more threats against Cady, and again complained that he had abused her. Larson asked Andujar to come with her to take revenge on Cady. Andujar refused. Larson then left room 206.

Andujar followed Larson a few minutes after she left. He claimed he followed to try to stop her from hurting Cady. Andujar testified that when he left his room he saw Larson and Robert walking down the stairs towards the parking lot where Cady was sleeping in his parked truck. Andujar said that he saw Robert carrying a zip strip and that he then went to get Iacarella to come with him to stop Larson and Robert.

According to trial testimony, once in the parking lot, Larson got into the driver's seat of Cady's truck, and Robert sat behind the front passenger seat where Cady was still sleeping. Larson then drove out of the parking lot, and Andujar and Iacarella followed shortly thereafter in Andujar's SUV. Andujar followed Larson west on I-94 then north on I-35 and then off the exit for Little Canada Road. Larson next took a right onto Edgerton Street, but Andujar lost sight of the truck and did not immediately follow. Andujar turned the SUV around and eventually spotted Cady's truck again on Edgerton Street.

Andujar testified that soon after he located Cady's truck, he saw Larson coming towards his SUV and stopped for her. Andujar then followed Larson's directions to pick up Robert, who was close by.

Andujar said that he next drove to a White Castle in Blaine where Robert's car was parked. At the White Castle, Larson got out of the SUV and into Robert's car. According to trial testimony, Larson then drove to the apartment of J.H., a man with whom she had recently become romantically involved. With Robert and Iacarella still in his SUV, Andujar drove to a gas station near the Travelodge. Robert got out at the gas station and apparently walked back to the hotel.

D.G. testified at trial that when Robert arrived at the hotel he washed his bleeding hands and changed his clothes. Someone at the hotel eventually gave Robert a ride to J.H.'s apartment where Robert and Larson told J.H. what had happened to Cady. Based on what Larson and Robert told him, J.H. testified that during the period when Andujar had lost sight of Cady's truck, Robert fastened a zip-strip around Cady's neck and Cady awoke. Robert and Cady struggled inside and then outside the truck, and eventually Robert choked Cady to death.

After an investigation by the Ramsey County Sheriff's office, a grand jury indicted Robert on charges of first-degree premeditated murder as well as second-degree murder. The grand jury indicted Larson on charges of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder as well as aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

After a jury trial, Larson was convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder. She was sentenced the same day to life imprisonment. Larson appealed her conviction to this court.⁴ In this appeal, Larson argues that the district court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings that deprived her of her right to present a complete defense. She also argues that the district court made several errors in its instructions to the jury. Finally, Larson argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction.

I.

We first address Larson's contention that the district court made erroneous evidentiary rulings, the cumulative effect of which was to deprive her of the opportunity to present a complete defense. A district court's exclusion of evidence is error if the exclusion is based on an abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Minn.2003). Even if a district court abuses its discretion in excluding evidence, any error is harmless unless there is a “reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted.” State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994).

Larson argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding certain alternative perpetrator evidence. She further argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Andujar's immigration status and deportation hearing as well as by excluding extrinsic evidence of Andujar's alleged criminal conduct. Finally, Larson contends that the district court abused its discretion by limiting her use of unauthenticated transcripts of law-enforcement witness interviews. Larson asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived her of the opportunity to present a complete defense. We address each of Larson's arguments in turn.

A.

In response to a pretrial defense motion, the district court ruled that Larson would not be able to present alternative perpetrator evidence that B.E. and J.H. had motive to murder Cady. Larson wanted to introduce evidence that Cady had possibly burglarized B.E.'s house and had threatened to kill B.E. when confronted about it. Larson also wanted to introduce evidence that shortly before Cady's murder, Cady had found Larson and J.H. together in J.H.'s apartment in some state of undress, that Cady had then threatened J.H. and J.H.'s children, and that J.H. responded by leaving a voicemail on Cady's phone threatening to kill Cady. When J.H. testified at trial, Larson's counsel tried to question J.H. about the alleged threats, but the district court sustained the State's objection because the court had already ruled the evidence inadmissible.

Larson argues that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of B.E.'s and J.H.'s possible motives to kill Cady. The State argues, as the district court concluded, that Larson did not proffer sufficient evidence that had the inherent tendency to connect either B.E. or J.H. to Cady's murder as alternative perpetrators.

Larson, like all defendants accused of criminal behavior, “has the constitutional right to present a complete defense.” State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn.2009). Included within this right is “the right to present evidence showing that an alternative perpetrator committed the crime with which the defendant is charged.” Id. Such evidence is generally not admitted “for the purpose of establishing the alternative perpetrator's guilt, but to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.” Id. at 590.

Alternative perpetrator evidence is admissible only if the defendant lays a proper foundation by proffering evidence that has an “inherent tendency” to connect the alleged alternative perpetrator with the commission of the crime. Id. We require “proper foundation” in order “to ‘avoid[ ] the use of bare suspicion and safeguard[ ] the third person from indiscriminate use of past differences with the deceased.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn.1977)) (alterations in original). The foundation requirement also avoids “the consideration of matters collateral to the crime.” Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d at 159.

Here, Cady's threat against B.E. does not have an inherent tendency to connect B.E. with Cady's murder. Larson proffered no evidence that B.E. was anywhere near the crime scene or even made threats against Cady. A threat by a murder victim against a third party does not have the inherent tendency to...