State Of Mo. v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 13 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | WD70167 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI,Respondent, v. HOWARD D. JOHNSON,Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Daviess County, Missouri
The Honorable Warren L. McElwain, Judge
Before Mark D. Pfeiffer, P.J., James Edward Welsh, and Karen King Mitchell, JJ.
Howard D. Johnson appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial. He was convicted of the class A misdemeanor of operating a motor vehicle upon a highway without a valid license, in violation of section 302.020, RSMo 2000, and the class C felony of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of section 195.202, RSMo 2000. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On July 14, 2007, Deputy Larry Todd Watson stopped a van that was travelling on I-35 in Daviess County because the van did not display proper license plates. Watson made contact with the driver of the van, who identified himself as Johnson. Johnson gave Watson a bill of sale forthe van, the title to the van, and proof of insurance, but explained to the deputy that he had just recently purchased the van and had not yet had an opportunity to get the van registered. Johnson told Watson that he had already been pulled over once that day for not having the van properly licensed.
Johnson also gave Watson his temporary Missouri driver's permit. Although Johnson had held a valid driver's license in Texas, when he recently moved to Missouri, he was issued a temporary permit. Johnson had a passenger in the van with him, Joyce Washington, but Washington's Kansas driver's license had been revoked. Watson instructed Johnson to exit the van and come with him to his patrol car. Washington remained in the van while the deputy questioned Johnson.
Once in the patrol car, Watson attempted to verify whether Johnson's temporary driver's permit required the presence of a licensed driver, as would be the case with a typical learner's permit. Johnson apparently told Watson that he was aware that he was in violation of the permit's terms. Deputy Watson then informed Johnson that he was under arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a license and that he was going to search the van incident to Johnson's arrest. Watson told Johnson that, if the search did not yield anything illegal, then Johnson could make bond of $150 at the scene and he would be allowed to go. Watson asked Johnson whether he had anything illegal on his person or in the van, and Johnson responded that he did not. Watson had Johnson step out of the patrol car. Watson patted down Johnson and placed him back in the patrol car.
While Watson was questioning Johnson in the patrol car, Highway Patrol Trooper Maudlin appeared on the scene. Maudlin had heard Watson on the police radio and stopped at the scene to inform Watson that he was the trooper who had stopped the van earlier in the day.
At the first stop, a third occupant, who was a licensed driver, was operating the van. Maudlin told Watson that, during the earlier stop, he had suspected that drugs were being transported, but because the occupants of the van had refused to consent to a search of the van, he let them go. Maudlin had Washington exit the van, and he stayed with her while Watson searched the vehicle.
Watson began his search on the passenger side of the van. He immediately noticed small pieces of a white rock-type substance on the dash console area and in a cup holder on the passenger side of the console. Watson believed the substance to be either cocaine or methamphetamine. A later lab report confirmed that the substance was.08 grams of cocaine.
When Watson asked Johnson about the substance, Johnson denied any knowledge of its identity or presence in the van. Maudlin questioned Washington, who also denied any knowledge of the substance. Both Johnson and Washington were then read the Miranda1warnings and were handcuffed and placed back in the patrol vehicle. Maudlin and Watson continued to search the van. They found a broken piece of car antenna inside a cigarette box in a pocket on the passenger door. They also found a Pepsi can, both ends of which had been cut off, and the can had been rolled into a tube. A burnt residue was on both the antenna and the Pepsi can.
Johnson was charged with driving without a valid license, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Johnson filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that it was unlawfully obtained. The circuit court denied the motion after a hearing. At trial, defense counsel renewed the objections to the admissibility of the evidence found during the search. The evidence was admitted. The jury found Johnson guilty of drivingwithout a valid license and possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced, respectively, to two weeks and one year of imprisonment in the county jail, with the sentences to run consecutively. Johnson appeals.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence to determine whether substantial evidence supports the denial. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc 1998). When the circuit court denies a motion to suppress evidence and the defendant properly objects to the admission of the evidence at trial, we consider the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial to determine whether the motion was properly denied. State v. Reed, 157 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Mo. App. 2005). We review the evidence and any inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, accepting the jury's determinations as to the credibility of witnesses. State v. Brashier, 301 S.W.3d 598, 599 (Mo. App. 2010). "The ultimate issue of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated is a question of law, however, which this court reviews de novo." State v. Ramires, 152 S.W.3d 385, 391 (Mo. App. 2004). Similarly, the retroactivity of a constitutional decision and the scope of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule are questions of law that we review de novo.
Johnson's first point on appeal is that the circuit court improperly admitted the evidence found during the search of the van because the search violated his rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution.2 Specifically, Johnson argues that Watson was not entitled to perform the vehicle search incident to his arrest for driving without a valid license because Johnson was secured in the patrol car at the time of the search, and it was not reasonable for Watson to believe that the vehicle would contain evidence relevant to the offense for which Johnson had been arrested--driving without a valid license.
Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a law enforcement officer from conducting a search unless he has "first convince[d] a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981). The courts have recognized, however, that "the exigencies of the situation may sometimes make exemption from the warrant requirement imperative." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Chimel v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that police may, incident to a person's arrest, search the arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's "immediate control" without a warrant. 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). The Court articulated two reasons why a warrantless search was permitted incident to arrest: (1) to prevent the arrestee from gaining access to a weapon, which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape; or (2) to prevent the arrestee from destroying or concealing evidence of his crime. Id. at 763-64. The Court extended this rule to the passenger compartment of a vehicle when the arrestee is arrested in or around the vehicle. Belton, 453 U.S.at 460.
Noting the need for a "workable rule" to guide law enforcement officers in applying Chimel, the Supreme Court in Belton held that, "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. (footnote omitted). While the facts of Belton clearly supported at least one of the two rationales articulated in Chimel as justifying a search incident to arrest, 3 the Supreme Court in Belton used broad language in describing the circumstances under which the search of a vehicle incident to an arrest may occur.
Because of its broad language and express intent to provide a bright-line rule to aid police officers, Belton was generally interpreted to allow the search of the passenger compartment incident to arrest even when the arrestee did not have access to the compartment. Although legal commentators questioned the wisdom of the Belton rule, they acknowledged that "clearly it is unnecessary that [the arrestee] have continuing access to the car." 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 3.7(a), at 270 (3rd ed. 2007). "Thus, a search of a vehicle under Belton is permissible even after [the arrestee] has been removed from the car, handcuffed and placed in a squad car, and even if he is in the custody of several officers." Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, most courts interpreted Belton as allowing searches of the entire passenger compartment of vehicles whenever an occupant was arrested, as long as the search was "roughly contemporaneous with the arrest." United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825 (11th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court acknowledged that Belton was "widely understood to allow a vehiclesearch incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there [were] no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at...
To continue reading
Request your trial