State Of North Carolina v. Lacy
| Decision Date | 15 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 08 CRS 258520,NO. COA10-755,No. 08 CRS 258521,No. 08 CRS 258522,08 CRS 258520,08 CRS 258521,08 CRS 258522,COA10-755 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. RICHARD C. LACY. |
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 26 January 2010 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2011.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by L. Michael Dodd, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Janet Moore, Attorney at Law, LLC, by Janet Moore, for Defendant.
Richard C. Lacy ("Defendant") stabbed Janine Renee McCorey ("Decedent") twenty-three times after an argument and also stabbed a second person seven times. Defendant was convicted of first degree deliberate and premeditated murder, felony murder1 andattempted first degree murder.2 This case requires us to decide whether Defendant's trial was prejudiced by the admission of evidence of a prior juvenile sex offense, the admission of evidence that Defendant may have engaged in plea negotiations prior to trial, and the exclusion of Decedent's mental health records. After careful review of the record, we find no reversible error.
The evidence of record tends to show that on 13 December 2007 in Charlotte, North Carolina, Defendant, driving a silver Malibu, picked up Decedent and asked Decedent, who was a prostitute and drug user, if "she was working." Decedent agreed to have sex with Defendant for twenty dollars and suggested that she and Defendant go to a nearby house where her friend Robert Mitchell Howard ("Howard") lived. When Defendant and Decedent arrived at Howard's home, Howard and Darlene Brooks ("Brooks") were present. At Decedent's suggestion, Defendant purchased one gram of crack cocaine for $40.00 for Defendant and Decedent's consumption, and Defendant gave half of the crack cocaine to Howard for use of a room. Defendant and Decedent then went into a bedroom to have sex.
Afterwards, Decedent asked to use Defendant's phone, and Decedent took the phone outside of the bedroom. After Decedent left the room, Defendant believed that Decedent had taken his money. Defendant confronted Decedent about his missing money, and the two argued violently. Defendant pulled out a knife and attacked Decedent, stabbing her twenty-three times. Decedent escaped Defendant's attack and ran out of the house. Defendant followed, but Howard stopped Defendant, asking him, "[W]hat's going on?" Defendant stabbed Howard seven times, after which Defendant ran out of the house. Defendant got into the silver Malibu and sped away.
Decedent was found at the steps of a house down the street in the same neighborhood, bleeding from a wound to her heart and multiple other lacerations. Police and medics were called. After being taken to Carolinas Medical Center, Decedent died as a result of the wound to her heart.
Howard was found at his house, also bleeding from wounds to his abdomen and groin. Howard received medical treatment and survived.
Almost one year later, on 11 December 2008, Defendant consented to be interviewed by police, and during the interview, he admitted to his presence at Howard's home on 13 December 2007. Defendant also admitted to stabbing both Decedent and Howard multiple times, and to fleeing the home afterwards.
On 5 January 2009, Defendant was indicted on counts of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The case was tried on 11 January 2010, and a jury found Defendant guilty of all charges. On 26 January 2010 the trial court entered judgments consistent with the jury's verdicts but arresting judgment on the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury offense.
In Defendant's first argument on appeal, he contends the trial court erred by allowing evidence of Defendant's juvenile sex offense, which was fourteen years old. Although it was error to admit this evidence, we hold it was not prejudicial to Defendant's trial.
"We review a trial court's determination to admit evidence under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403, for an abuse of discretion." State v. Summers, 177 N.C. App. 691, 697, 629 S.E.2d 902, 907, app'l dismissed, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 653, 637 S.E.2d 192(2006) (citations omitted). "To receive a new trial based upon a violation of the Rules of Evidence, a defendant must show that the trial court erred and that there is a 'reasonable possibility' that without the error 'a different result would have been reached at the trial.'" State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 278, 697 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2010) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2009)).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2009), states that
"[I]n order for evidence relating to the prior crime to be admissible under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), it must have some relevance to the issue of the defendant's guilt of the crime for which he or she is on trial." State v. Ward, _ N.C. App. _, _, 681 S.E.2d 354, 361, aff'd, 364 N.C. 133, 694 S.E.2d 738 (2010) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2009)). The evidence in question must be relevant to some issue other than the defendant's "propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged." State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 279, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).
"[P]rior offenses are not admissible to prove that a person acted in conformity therewith." State v. Emery, 91 N.C. App. 24, 33, 370 S.E.2d 456, 461, disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 627, 374S.E.2d 594 (1988); see also State v. Smith, 152 N.C. App. 514, 521, 568 S.E.2d 289, 294, app'l dismissed, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 623, 575 S.E.2d 757 (2002) (). "[S]ubstantive evidence of a defendant's past, and distinctly separate, criminal activities or misconduct is generally excluded when its only logical relevancy is to suggest defendant's propensity or predisposition to commit the type of offense with which he is presently charged." State v. Maxwell, 96 N.C. App. 19, 25, 384 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 53, 389 S.E.2d 83 (1990) (quotation omitted).
In this case, Defendant's prior juvenile sex offense ultimately came into evidence through the cross-examination of Defendant's expert witness. The evidence in question was included in Defendant's 2006 mental health records, which stated "that [Defendant] had sex offender treatment at Port Smith, Virginia, as a juvenile." These records were provided to the State in discovery, and Defendant filed a pretrial motion stating that Defendant "voluntarily turn[ed] over certain records of the Defendant to the State that refer to this conviction" and seeking to prevent any reference during trial to the sex offense. Defendant argued in his pretrial motion that any reference to the juvenile sex offense would be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The court provisionally granted Defendant's pretrial motion:
Defendant called the expert witness who had reviewed Defendant's 2006 mental health records. During the voir dire examination of the expert witness by the State, the Court made the following determination:
The State, upon cross-examination, asked the following questions in front of the jury:
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