State of Ohio
| Decision Date | 08 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | C-920672,C-920673,93-LW-2058 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES THIERBACH, Defendant-Appellant. APPEAL |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Fay D Dupuis, City Solicitor, No. 0020782, Terrence R. Cosgrove Esq., No. 0012497, and Jennifer Bishop, Esq., No. 0014934 230 East Ninth Street, Suite 200, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Firooz T. Namei, Esq., No. 0018615, 441 Vine Street, Suite 435, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant-appellant, James Thierbach, appeals his conviction in the Hamilton County Municipal Court for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.[1] He contends that: (1) the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because of his warrantless extraterritorial arrest in Kentucky; and (2) evidence gathered during that arrest should have been suppressed. The assignments of error are not well taken.[2]
On September 11, 1991, Thierbach spent the evening with friends in a bar. Just after midnight, a Cincinnati police officer saw him driving erratically in Ohio on Interstate 71. After several unsuccessful attempts to pull Thierbach's automobile over, the officer continued across the Interstate 471 bridge into Kentucky, where she finally stopped him and administered psycho-motor tests. When Thierbach did not perform the tests satisfacto-rily, the officer arrested him for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor, and cited him to appear in Ohio in the Hamilton County Municipal Court. The trial court overruled Thierbach's motion to suppress the evidence obtained in Kentucky. In a subsequent bench trial, the court found Thierbach guilty and imposed a sentence of ten days' imprisonment, a $200 fine, and a ninety-day driver's license suspension.
In his second assignment of error, Thierbach argues that the Ohio police officer violated "Ohio law, the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Kentucky," and therefore, that the evidence obtained during his arrest should have been suppressed.
Thierbach's federal constitutional argument is a misconception of the scope of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary remedy. Evidence gathered by state officers during arrests that violate the warrant or probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used against an accused at trial to prove guilt and must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (exclusion); United States v. Havens (1980), 446 U.S. 620, 627-28, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916-17 (guilt). An illegal arrest, however, does not taint an otherwise valid conviction. United States v. Crews (1980), 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1251. Even when a suspect is arrested illegally, evidence obtained without violations of the warrant or probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment will not be suppressed. New York v. Harris (1990), 495 U.S. 14, 17-19, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1642-44; Crews, supra at 470-73, 100 S.Ct. 1249-51.
The validity of extraterritorial arrests is specifically controlled by the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, not the Fourth Amendment. Ker v. Illinois (1886), 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225; Frisbie v. Collins (1952), 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509; 1 LaFave, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (2d Ed. 1987) Section 1.9-1.9(a), 220-26 (Ker-Frisbie rule and personal jurisdiction); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Leading Cases (1993), 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 318-21, (Ker-Frisbie doctrine affirmed in United States v. Alvarez-Machain [1992], __ U.S. __, __, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2192-93). In both Ker and Frisbie, criminal defendants escaped from the state where they had allegedly committed crimes. Subsequently, law enforcement officers abducted them and forcibly returned them to the jurisdictions in which the offenses occurred. Ker, supra at 442, 7 S.Ct. at 228; Frisbie, supra at 520, 72 S.Ct. at 510. The United States Supreme Court held only that the out-of-state arrests did not violate the defendants' due-process rights. Ker, supra at 440, 7 S.Ct. at 227; Frisbie, supra at 522, 72 S.Ct. at 511. Because neither defendant claimed the officers lacked probable cause to arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule was not an issue. See, generally, Crews, supra at 473-74, 100 S.Ct. at 1251 (citing Ker and Frisbie).[3]
As in Ker and Frisbie, Thierbach has never claimed that the Cincinnati officer lacked probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. Therefore, he cannot validly argue that his extrater-ritorial arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the evi-dence in connection with his arrest in Kentucky was not obtained in violation of a federal constitutional right.
Because the Fourth Amendment provides only a floor for constitutional protections, states are free to develop search-and-seizure standards under their own constitutions which guarantee greater protections than the United States Constitution. Califor-nia v. Greenwood (1988), 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630;Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469; Arnold v. City of Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163. The Ohio Supreme Court originally used an interstitial approach when construing individual rights pursuant to search-and-seizure violations under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. See, generally, Utter & Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Practice (1987), 20 Ind. L. Rev. 635.[4] Under the interstitial approach, a state court examines its own constitution for protections not first found in its Fourth Amendment analysis. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Lindway (1936), 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 ( fewer protections).
Following Mapp v. Ohio, however, the Ohio Supreme Court turned to a "lock-step" approach, concluding that Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution protects "the same interests and in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment." State v. Andrew s (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 86, 565 N.E.2d 1271, fn. 1; see, e.g., State v. Halczyszak (1986), 25 Ohio St. 3d 301, 302, 496 N.E.2d 925, 929. Recently, however, after testing primacy analysis, the court apparently revived its appetite for the interstitial approach. See, generally, State v. Penn (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 720, 576 N.E.2d 790 (primacy); State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 349, 352, 582 N.E.2d 113, 115 (interstitial); State v. Storch (1993), 66 Ohio St. 3d 280, 612 N.E.2d 305 (interstitial). In Brown the court noted hypothetically that, if the United States Constitution allowed detailed drug searches of automobiles after stops for unrelated traffic offenses, the Ohio Constitution will not. Brown, supra at 352, 588 N.E.2d at 115 ().
In the case of extraterritorial arrests, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically has declined to grant greater protection to the accused under the Ohio Constitution than that granted under the federal constitution. An illegal extraterritorial abduction or arrest does not affect Ohio's right to try a defendant for a crime committed by that person in Ohio. Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 232, 416 N.E.2d 598, syllabus (intrastate); Tomkalski v. Maxwell (1963), 175 Ohio St. 377, 378, 194 N.E.2d 845, 846 (interstate); see, also, State v. Henderson (1990), 51 Ohio St. 3d 54, 55-56, 554 N.E.2d 104, 106, (citing Ker and Frisbie with approval). Therefore, Thierbach has no basis to support a claim that his Ohio constitutional rights were violated by the Kentucky arrest.[5]
Thierbach also argues that the Cincinnati police officer exceeded her statutory power by making the extraterritorial arrest. He concedes that R.C. 2935.03(D) allows an Ohio police officer to pursue and arrest a suspect in another political subdivision in Ohio, but he contends that this section does not apply to pursuits into an adjacent state.
Municipal police officers, within their jurisdiction, are empowered to make warrantless arrests for Ohio crimes. R.C. 2935.-03(A). R.C. 2935.03(D) enlarges that arrest power through the authority of "fresh pursuit," stating in pertinent part:
In R.C. 2935.03(D), the General Assembly did not by express terms limit extraterritorial arrests to political subdivisions in Ohio or authorize them in neighboring states. If silence suggests an ambiguity, the court must then look to the legislative intent. R.C. 1.49; Meeks v. Papadopulo s (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 187, 190-91, 404 N.E.2d 159 162. There does exist legislative history which demonstrates that the General Assembly sought to create a legisla-tive "fresh-pursuit" exception to the general common-law rule that previously limited arrests to the officer's jurisdiction. It was a reflex to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 248, 375 N.E.2d 1241. Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Summary of Enactments (Aug. 1979-Dec. 1980), Am. Sub. S.B. 355, p.120. ...
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