State v. Adams
| Decision Date | 26 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | A20A0050 |
| Parties | The STATE v. ADAMS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Malachi Reid Peacock, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellant.
Kelly Virginia Wegel, for Appellee.
The question presented in this case is whether OCGA § 16-1-8 (c), Georgia's statutory law governing successive prosecutions for crimes that violate both state and federal law, prohibits the State of Georgia from prosecuting Samuel Carlton Adams for trafficking methamphetamine after Adams, who was also indicted in federal court on crimes stemming from the same set of facts, reached a plea agreement in federal court pursuant to which he pled guilty to a weapons charge in exchange for the dismissal of the drug charges pending against him. We conclude that it does not. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting his plea in bar on the charge of trafficking methamphetamine. In so doing, we take the time to clarify our case law and to disapprove of the holding in State v. Smith , 185 Ga. App. 694, 365 S.E.2d 846 (1988), upon which the trial court relied, and similar cases that unnecessarily conflate the constitutional protection of double jeopardy with the statutory protections against successive prosecution offered by OCGA § 16-1-8.1
The evidence in this case is uncontroverted and witness credibility is not an issue; accordingly, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts when it granted the plea in bar pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-8 (c). See State v. Pruiett , 324 Ga. App. 789, 790, 751 S.E.2d 579 (2013).
The procedural history is as follows. In August 2017, Adams was arrested and subsequently indicted in the Athens-Clarke County Superior Court on, among other things, one count of trafficking methamphetamine (more than 400 grams)2 (the "State Case"). Adams pled not guilty, and the State Case was placed on the December 2018 jury calendar.
Meanwhile, in March 2018, based on the same conduct underlying the state charges, Adams was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on, among other things, one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine3 and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon4 (the "Federal Case").
In November 2018, Adams pled guilty in the Federal Case to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The plea was given "in full satisfaction of all possible federal criminal charges, known to the United States Attorney at the time of [Adams's] guilty plea," and the remaining charges, including the charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, were dismissed.
Adams then filed a plea in bar in the State Case, asserting that OCGA § 16-1-8 barred the State from prosecuting him for trafficking methamphetamine because the drug charge had been dismissed by federal prosecutors in exchange for his guilty plea in the Federal Case. The trial court granted the motion after concluding that the federal prosecutor's dismissal of the drug charge in accordance with a plea agreement "acts as an acquittal and bars further prosecution" under OCGA § 16-1-8 (c).
The State appeals the trial court's grant of the plea in bar,5 contending that the trial court erred by holding that its prosecution of Adams for trafficking methamphetamine is precluded by the statutory protections contained within OCGA § 16-1-8 (c). We agree.
Our analysis begins by recognizing that there is more than one potential bar to successive prosecutions in the State of Georgia. The first is constitutional double jeopardy.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same [offense] to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Likewise, the Georgia Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense[.]" Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII.
States are sovereigns separate from the federal government, however, "and a state's power to undertake criminal prosecutions is derived from its own inherent sovereignty." Calloway v. State , 303 Ga. 48, 52 (2), 810 S.E.2d 105 (2018). "Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, where a single act violates the law of two sovereigns (e.g., the United States and a state), an individual may be prosecuted and punished by each sovereign without violating double jeopardy." Id. No one disputes in this case that the State was not constitutionally barred under the dual sovereignty doctrine from prosecuting Adams for trafficking methamphetamine merely because the federal government elected not to do so in accordance with the terms of a plea agreement. See id.
Nevertheless, Georgia statutory law provides protection against successive prosecutions that extends beyond that of the protection offered by constitutional double jeopardy. See OCGA §§ 16-1-6, 16-1-7,6 16-1-8 ; see generally Prater v. State , 273 Ga. 477, 480 (4), 545 S.E.2d 864 (2001). Those that involve successive federal and state prosecutions are governed by OCGA § 16-1-8 (c), which provides:
A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted in a district court of the United States for a crime which is within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state if such former prosecution resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal and the subsequent prosecution is for the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution or unless the crime was not consummated when the former trial began.
See also Thorpe v. State , 251 Ga. App. 334, 334, 553 S.E.2d 171 (2001). Thus, in order for subsection (c) to act as a bar to a state prosecution, three elements must be met: (1) the crime must be within the State's concurrent jurisdiction; (2) the federal prosecution must have resulted in a conviction or acquittal; and (3) the state and federal prosecutions must be for the same conduct and must not require proof of a fact not required by the other (or the state crime must not have been complete at the time of the federal trial). See Calloway , 303 Ga. at 52 (2), 810 S.E.2d 105.
The State concedes that the first and third statutory elements have been met. The only issue here is whether, as the trial court held, the federal government's dismissal of the drug charge resulting from the plea agreement in the Federal Case amounted to an "acquittal" of that charge within the context of subsection (c).
As always, when construing the meaning of a statute, "we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). "To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 172-73 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337. "[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337.
The plain language of subsection (c) bars the State from prosecuting Adams if the drug crime in the Federal Case "resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal." It did not.
Although "acquittal" is not defined in the statute itself, its dictionary definition is "[t]he legal certification, [usually] by jury verdict, that an accused person is not guilty of the charged offense; an official statement in a court of law that a criminal defendant is not guilty." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A prosecutor's agreement to dismiss a criminal charge in exchange for a guilty plea on a different charge is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the government. See generally Syms v. State , 331 Ga. App. 225, 227, 770 S.E.2d 305 (2015). But that dismissal alone in no way amounts to a legal determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence on the dismissed charge and, thus, does not amount to an "acquittal" for the purposes of OCGA § 16-1-8. Cf. Arnold v. State , 352 Ga. App. 777, 779-780, 835 S.E.2d 759 (2019) (); see also Sample v. State , 232 Ga. App. 690, 692 (2), 503 S.E.2d 576 (1998) ().
In holding otherwise, the trial court relied on State v. Smith , 185 Ga. App. 694, 365 S.E.2d 846 (1988). Smith did not involve successive prosecutions by federal and state governments under subsection (c), which is the only subsection governing prosecutions by different sovereigns. See Thorpe , 251 Ga. App. at 334, 553 S.E.2d 171. Rather, Smith invoked the "rule of criminal res judicata" contained in paragraph (b) (1), involving successive prosecutions by the same sovereign, i.e., the State. See Smith , 185 Ga. App. at 695-696, 365 S.E.2d 846 ; Drinkard v. Walker , 281 Ga. 211, 214, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006). Regardless, like subsection (c), paragraph (b) (1) bars a second prosecution when, among other things, the first prosecution "[r]esulted in either a conviction or an acquittal."7 Because the relevant language of paragraph (b) (1) mirrors that of subsection (c), and because the trial court's reliance on Smith was reasonable, we will take the time to address its faulty reasoning.
Smith involved a defendant who was charged in state court under a four-count accusation related to her driving...
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