State v. Adams

• Decision Date: 20 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 08–0513.,08–0513.
• Citation: 810 N.W.2d 365
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jonathan Q. ADAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

810 N.W.2d 365

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Jonathan Q. ADAMS, Appellant.

No. 08–0513.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 20, 2012.

Alfredo G. Parrish and Andrew J. Dunn of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble Parrish Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, Karen Doland (until withdrawal), Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and James P. Ward, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

After his vehicle collided with and killed a bicyclist, the defendant was convicted of homicide by vehicle, operating while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. He appealed on several grounds, and the court of appeals concluded his convictions were supported by sufficient evidence but remanded for a sentencing correction. We granted further review to determine whether the State must prove in a prosecution under Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (2007) that the defendant's intoxication was a proximate cause of the victim's death and, if so, whether the defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue below. We conclude the State must prove the defendant's intoxicated driving caused the victim's death to sustain a conviction for homicide by vehicle. As we conclude the record is not adequate to determine whether defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the causation issue, we affirm the conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A reasonable fact finder could find the following facts from the testimony at trial. On the evening of December 8, 2006, Jonathan Adams attended a party at a friend's house in Des Moines. By his own admission, he consumed between three and five beers over a five-hour period and may have drunk twice that much. At about 10:45 p.m., he and an acquaintance, Sean Erickson, left the party in Adams' car with Adams driving. The right headlight on Adams' car was not functioning. As they traveled westbound on Park Avenue, Adams' car struck Tina Marie Brown, who was bicycling in the right hand lane, also heading west. Brown was propelled onto the hood of the car, and her head struck the windshield, shattering the passenger side. Her body came to rest eighty-six feet from the initial site of impact. Brown died from her injuries.

Adams and Erickson were the only witnesses to the accident. Adams testified he was looking down at his radio when the impact occurred, and therefore he did not know what he had hit. Erickson also could not tell what they had hit. He initially thought it was a trash can, and then later told Adams he thought it might have been a bicycle. Adams did not stop to investigate but instead continued driving home. The next day, after hearing news reports about a hit and run causing Brown's death, he purchased a tarp and covered his car. After several days, he turned himself in.

In January, Adams was charged with murder by vehicle, operating while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. At trial, although he admitted drinking several beers on the night in question, he denied being intoxicated. Several witnesses who had been with Adams at the party testified specifically about whether Adams appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Five of these witnesses testified that Adams did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol, but the sixth, who had been smoking marijuana throughout the evening, testified to the contrary. The investigating officers conceded on cross-examination that the evidence gathered from the accident scene did not tend to establish Adams was driving recklessly or at an excessive rate of speed at the time of the accident.

Adams was convicted on all three counts. He appealed, and the court of appeals concluded his convictions were supported by sufficient evidence but remanded the case for resentencing.¹ Adams sought further review, which we granted for the determination of whether, in a prosecution for a violation of section 707.6A, the State must prove the defendant's intoxication was a proximate cause of the victim's death and whether Adams' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing a causal connection between Adams' intoxication and Brown's death.²

II. Scope of Review.

Our review of the interpretation of statutes is for correction of errors at law. State v. Sluyter, 763 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Iowa 2009). We review constitutional claims, however, de novo. Collins v. State, 588 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1998).

III. Discussion.

A. The State's Burden to Prove Causation Under Section 707.6A(1). Iowa Code section 707.6A provides:

1. A person commits a class “B” felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, as prohibited by section 321J.2.³ ...

....

2. A person commits a class “C” felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by any of the following means:

a. Driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, in violation of section 321.277.

b. Eluding or attempting to elude a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, in violation of section 321.279, if the death of the other person directly or indirectly results from the violation.

3. A person commits a class “D” felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another while drag racing, in violation of section 321.278.

4. A person commits a class “D” felony when the person unintentionally causes a serious injury, as defined in section 321J.1, by any of the means described in subsection 1 or 2.

Iowa Code § 707.6A.

Adams contends the word “by” in section 707.6A(1) expresses a legislative intent that a conviction may be had under the statute only upon proof that the defendant's intoxication was the proximate cause of another's death. Adams posits that a comparison of the language of subsection (1) with subsection (3) demonstrates an intent to treat operating while intoxicated and drag racing differently. Subsection (1) addresses the unintentional death of another “ by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,” but subsection (3) addresses unintentionally causing the death of another “ while drag racing.” Id. (emphasis added). This difference, according to Adams, demonstrates the legislature knew how to distinguish between language of causation (“by”) and language indicating a temporal relationship (“while”).

The State, however, asserts the plain language of subsection (1) demonstrates the legislature did not intend to require a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication and the victim's death. Rather, the State contends the causal language “by” only applies to “operating a motor vehicle.” Thus the death must be caused by the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle, and the defendant must be operating a motor vehicle while he is intoxicated, but the State need not prove the victim's death was caused by the defendant's intoxication to sustain a conviction under the interpretation favored by the State. The State further contends a comparison of the language in the different subsections does not support Adams' interpretation because the operative word in both subsection (1) and subsection (3) is “while.”

Because we think there is more than one plausible interpretation of the statute, we must look beyond the plain language of the statute to resolve the ambiguity. See State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006). Our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the true legislative intent.” State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Iowa 2000). We examine the language of the statute, its underlying purpose and policies, and the consequences stemming from different interpretations. Id. In doing so, we must construe the statute in its entirety. Id. “If more than one statute relating to the subject matter at issue is relevant to the inquiry, we consider all the statutes together in an effort to harmonize them.” Id.

In determining the intent of the legislature, we will not construe the language of a statute to produce an absurd or impractical result. Id. “We presume the legislature intends a reasonable result when it enacts a statute.” Id. Additionally, “ ‘we strictly construe criminal statutes' and resolve doubts in favor of the accused.” State v. McCullah, 787 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa 2010) (citation omitted).

Prior to the enactment of section 707.6A explicitly addressing homicide by vehicle, vehicular homicide cases were prosecuted under a manslaughter statute according to common law principles. See State v. Rullestad, 259 Iowa 209, 212, 143 N.W.2d 278, 280 (1966); State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 1277, 11 N.W.2d 371, 373 (1943). Kellison and Rullestad both addressed the evidence required to establish a manslaughter conviction when the defendant was accused of unintentionally killing another person by driving while intoxicated. In Kellison, the defendant was charged with and tried for manslaughter “by operating an automobile while intoxicated” when he struck and killed a pedestrian with his car while he was “badly intoxicated.” 233 Iowa at 1275, 11 N.W.2d at 372. At the close of the State's evidence, he moved for a directed verdict, arguing the evidence did not show he drove recklessly or with wanton abandon other than that he drove while intoxicated. Id. at 1276, 11 N.W.2d at 372. The district court granted his motion, and the State appealed. Id. Reversing the district court's ruling, we held a conviction for “death of another caused by drunken driving” could be sustained without proof that the defendant drove recklessly. Id. at 1278, 11 N.W.2d at 373. ⁴

Although Kellison did not explicitly contend the district court's directed verdict should be upheld because the State had not proven his “drunken driving” was the cause of the victim's death, we considered whether the evidence was sufficient to establish such a...