State v. Adams

• Citation: 347 N.C. 48,490 S.E.2d 220
• Decision Date: 05 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 3A89-2,3A89-2
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Thomas Mark ADAMS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Page 220

490 S.E.2d 220

347 N.C. 48

STATE of North Carolina v. Thomas Mark ADAMS.

No. 3A89-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 5, 1997.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Thomas J. Ziko and Ellen Scouten, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for the State.

Rudolf & Maher, P.A. by Thomas K. Maher, for defendant-appellant.

ORR, Justice.

On 14 March 1988, defendant was indicted for first-degree burglary, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree murder. Defendant pled guilty to the burglary and robbery charges against him. At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on the theory of premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder theory and recommended a sentence of death. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to consecutive forty-year sentences for the burglary and robbery convictions and to death for the first-degree murder conviction. On appeal, this Court found no error in the convictions. However, the Court ordered a new sentencing proceeding on the first-degree murder conviction based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990). State v. Adams, 335 N.C. 401, 439 S.E.2d 760 (1994). At the new capital sentencing proceeding, the jurors once again returned a recommendation of death. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, Judge Judson D. DeRamus imposed a sentence of death. Defendant appeals as of right from this sentence.

A detailed summary of the evidence introduced during defendant's original trial is set forth in our prior opinion on defendant's direct appeal, in which the majority of this Court found no error in defendant's trial. Id. Except where necessary to develop and to determine the issues presented to this Court arising from defendant's resentencing proceeding, we will not repeat the evidence supporting defendant's conviction.

After consideration of the assignments of error brought forward on appeal by defendant and a thorough review of the transcript of the proceedings, the record on appeal, the briefs, and oral arguments, we conclude that defendant received a fair sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm his sentence.

I.

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to disregard a factual stipulation and pursue aggravating circumstances not found at defendant's first sentencing proceeding. Defendant argues that this ruling violated his constitutional right to due process and right to confront the witnesses against him. Defendant also argues that his right not to be subjected to double jeopardy precluded the submission of aggravating circumstances not submitted or supported at the first sentencing proceeding.

A.

We will first address defendant's contention that the trial court erred by allowing the State to disregard a factual stipulation entered into at defendant's prior sentencing hearing. Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling was based on an erroneous At defendant's first trial, defendant made a motion to prohibit the prosecutor from making any references to rape or attempted rape. Judge John B. Lewis subsequently made a ruling which prohibited the prosecutor from mentioning rape or attempted rape of the victim during jury selection, but reserved a final ruling for a later stage of the trial. At the conclusion of jury selection, the prosecutor and counsel for defense announced that they had agreed to a stipulation which would eliminate the need for the trial court to rule on defendant's motion. The parties stipulated as to the time of death and manner of death and also that there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendant had an intent to rape the victim when he entered the building or that he actually raped her. Further, over the State's objection, the words "sex" and "rape" were deleted from a handwritten note which was introduced at trial. Pursuant to the stipulation and Judge Lewis' ruling, no evidence of defendant's intent to rape the victim was introduced at trial.

application of this Court's holding in State v. Case, 330 N.C. 161, 410 S.E.2d 57 (1991). We disagree.

Prior to defendant's resentencing proceeding, defense counsel filed a motion to prevent the prosecutor from alluding to rape or attempted rape at the resentencing proceeding. At a hearing on this motion, the prosecutor stated that there was evidence of attempted rape and that it was her duty, consistent with this Court's holding in State v. Case, 330 N.C. 161, 410 S.E.2d 57, to present such evidence to the jury at the resentencing because it would support an aggravating circumstance. The trial judge at the resentencing proceeding, Judge DeRamus, denied defendant's motion and ruled that the stipulation, entered into at defendant's previous trial, appeared to be against public policy as stated in Case and that the trial court did not consider any of the parties to be bound by this stipulation.

Based on the trial court's ruling, the State introduced the note, written by defendant several days before the murder, in which defendant stated that he intended to rape the victim. The note was introduced without the deletion of the words "sex" and "rape." Based on that evidence, along with the evidence of the position of the victim's body and clothing found at the crime scene, the trial court submitted the aggravating circumstance that the murder occurred during the commission of a burglary with intent to commit rape. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (Supp.1996).

This Court was asked to determine a similar issue in State v. Case. In that case, the prosecutor agreed to present evidence of only one aggravating circumstance as part of a plea bargain. This Court held that it was error for the State to agree not to submit aggravating circumstances which could be supported by the evidence. Case, 330 N.C. at 163, 410 S.E.2d at 59. We stated that

[i]f our law permitted the district attorney to exercise discretion as to when an aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence would or would not be submitted, our death penalty scheme would be arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional. Where there is no evidence of an aggravating circumstance, the prosecutor may so announce, but this announcement must be based upon a genuine lack of evidence of any aggravating circumstance.

Id. at 163, 410 S.E.2d at 58-59. Accordingly, this Court ordered a new trial and stated that "neither the State nor the defendant will be bound by the plea bargain previously made." Id. at 164, 410 S.E.2d at 59.

In the present case, the prosecutor at defendant's first sentencing hearing stipulated that there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendant had an intent to rape the victim when he entered the building or that he actually raped her. Defendant contends that because the stipulation was based upon the prosecutor's belief that there was a genuine lack of evidence, the stipulation should be enforceable. However, the genuine belief of the previous prosecutor that there was a lack of evidence to support an aggravating circumstance cannot bind the State at a resentencing proceeding where the prosecutor at the resentencing has evidence to support the aggravating circumstance previously withheld. This Court has held that a concession by the State that facts it was asserting did

not support an aggravating circumstance "cannot prevail if the evidence before the court does in fact support that aggravating circumstance." State v. Gaines, 332 N.C. 461, 475, 421 S.E.2d 569, 576 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1038, 113 S.Ct. 1866, 123 L.Ed.2d 486 (1993). Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the district attorney should not be bound by the stipulation entered into at defendant's previous trial.

B.

We next address defendant's contention that the trial court's ruling deprived defendant of his right to confront the witnesses against him. In his brief, defendant notes that the State could have called Dr. Scharyj, who performed the autopsy on the victim, to testify during defendant's trial. Defendant then would have had the opportunity to cross-examine him to establish that the victim died quickly. Instead, the State stipulated to the facts and circumstances of the victim's death, and defendant waived his right to confront the witness against him. Defendant argues that because Dr. Scharyj, who performed the autopsy on the victim, was deceased at the time of the resentencing and could not be cross-examined, defendant's due process rights were violated by allowing testimony concerning the results of the autopsy report.

During defendant's resentencing hearing, the results of the autopsy report were admitted through the testimony of Dr. Lantz. Dr. Lantz's testimony was based on the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Scharyj and on the autopsy photographs. Defendant was able to fully cross-examine Dr. Lantz and bring out opinions favorable to him. Additionally, certain evidence contained in the stipulation pertaining to the circumstances of the victim's death was not accurate. For example, the stipulation provided that the victim had a "cut on the throat," while Dr. Lantz testified, based on Dr. Scharyj's report and the autopsy photographs, that there were multiple cuts to the throat. Further, there was some disagreement concerning when loss of consciousness would have occurred. As previously noted, defendant was not entitled to rely on this stipulation because it was not supported by the evidence and because the prosecutor cannot be precluded from presenting evidence that supports an aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by permitting Dr. Lantz to testify.

C.

Next, we address defendant's contention that defendant's right not to be subjected to double jeopardy precluded the submission of aggravating circumstances not submitted or supported at the first capital sentencing...