State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 05 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 389A96.,389A96.
• Citation: 350 N.C. 1,510 S.E.2d 626
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. David Kent WILLIAMS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

510 S.E.2d 626

350 N.C. 1

STATE of North Carolina v. David Kent WILLIAMS.

No. 389A96.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February 5, 1999.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Thomas J. Ziko, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Marilyn G. Ozer and William F.W. Massengale, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

MITCHELL, Chief Justice.

On 20 December 1995, defendant David Kent Williams was indicted for first-degree murder, first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree burglary, misdemeanor assault on a female, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant was tried capitally at the 24 June 1996 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Bertie County. Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder under the theory of premeditated and deliberate murder and the felony murder rule. Defendant also pled guilty to all of the other charges against him.

After a separate capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder of Etta Plunkett, and the trial court sentenced defendant accordingly. In addition, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of imprisonment for defendant's other convictions.

The State's evidence tended to show inter alia that around 4:30 a.m. on 28 October 1995, defendant broke into the Lewiston, North Carolina, home of Stella Whitney and went into the living room where Ms. Whitney; her grandson; and her sixteen-year-old daughter, Jereline, were sleeping. Defendant assaulted Jereline and Ms. Whitney and then fled after the Whitneys managed to escape to their landlord's home for help.

After fleeing the Whitney home, defendant broke into the home of Etta Plunkett, a neighbor of Ms. Whitney's. Defendant brutally beat Ms. Plunkett, an eighty-three-year-old woman, in the course of robbing and raping her. When police and family members entered Ms. Plunkett's home around 5:25 a.m., they found her in her bedroom, unconscious and struggling to breathe. Ms. Plunkett died four days later, without regaining consciousness, due to extensive blunt force injuries to her head which resulted in a large blood clot compressing her brain.

An autopsy revealed that Ms. Plunkett's face, neck, and chest had been severely beaten. She had suffered at least six severe blows to the head and four broken ribs. In addition, there were tears or cuts both to the vulva as well as deep within her vagina.

Defendant was arrested on the morning of 28 October 1995 and admitted breaking into the Whitney and Plunkett homes. Defendant said that he had consumed a lot of crack cocaine and alcohol during the preceding night and that while he remembered breaking into the Whitney and Plunkett homes, he did not remember the assaults which followed.

In reviewing this case on appeal, we note at the outset that many of defendant's assignments of error raise multiple issues of law and include argumentation. These assignments of error are subject to dismissal, as they violate the mandate of Rule 10(c)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure that "[e]ach assignment of error shall, so far as practicable, be confined to a single issue of law; and shall state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned." N.C. R.App. P. 10(c)(1). Further, the numbered arguments contained in defendant's brief fail to comply with the rules. Rule 28(b)(5) requires that each question raised by the appellant "shall be separately stated. Immediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments of error pertinent to the question, identified by their numbers and by the pages at which they appear in the printed record on appeal." N.C. R.App. P. 28(b)(5). Defendant in the present case has set forth several arguments in his brief with a cluster of assignments referred to after each such argument. However, each of those arguments includes many subheadings in which separate questions are stated without reference to any assignment of error. This violates the rule that a reference to the assignments of error pertinent to each question be referred to immediately following such question. Therefore, these questions are not properly before this Court and are subject to dismissal. Nevertheless, because we are able with considerable difficulty to determine which assignments may be pertinent to most of the questions presented, and as this is a capital case, we elect in our discretion under Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to review the questions raised.

Defendant first argues that in his capital sentencing proceeding, the trial court erroneously allowed into evidence details of his prior criminal activity. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in this regard because it believed that once evidence of prior criminal activity by defendant had been admitted into evidence, it had no choice but to submit to the jury for its consideration the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance that defendant had "no significant history of prior criminal activity." N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (1997).

The statute governing capital sentencing proceedings mandates that:

In all cases in which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall include in his instructions to the jury that it must consider any aggravating circumstance or circumstances or mitigating circumstance or circumstances from the lists provided in subsections (e) and (f) which may be supported by the evidence....

N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) (emphasis added). This Court has explained the law regarding submission of the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance as follows:

"The trial court is required to determine whether the evidence will support a rational jury finding that a defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 367 S.E.2d 589 (1988). If so, the trial court has no discretion; the statutory mitigating circumstance must be submitted to the jury, without regard to the wishes of the State or the defendant. State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 364 S.E.2d 316, vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807 , 102 L.Ed.2d 18 (1988)."

State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 469, 496 S.E.2d 357, 366 (quoting State v. Mahaley, 332 N.C. 583, 597, 423 S.E.2d 58, 66 (1992),cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 115 S.Ct. 749, 130 L.Ed.2d 649 (1995)), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 119 S.Ct. 113, 142 L.Ed.2d 91, 67 U.S.L.W. 3232 (1998). "Significant" means that the defendant's prior criminal activity is likely to influence the jury's sentencing recommendation. State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 371, 471 S.E.2d 379, 393 (1996),cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 117 S.Ct. 695, 136 L.Ed.2d 618 (1997). The determination of whether a defendant's criminal history is or is not significant requires a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of his criminal activity. State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 27, 316 S.E.2d 197, 212,cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 363, 83 L.Ed.2d 299 (1984). "`[I]t is not merely the number of prior criminal activities, but the nature and age of such acts that the trial court considers in determining whether ... a rational juror could conclude that this mitigating circumstance exists.'" State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 310, 474 S.E.2d 345, 357 (1996) (quoting State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 314, 384 S.E.2d 470, 490 (1989),sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 110 S.Ct. 1466, 108 L.Ed.2d 604 (1990)), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 117 S.Ct. 1457, 137 L.Ed.2d 561 (1997).

Once a defendant introduces evidence which would support submission of the (f)(1) mitigator, the State is entitled to cross-examine defendant regarding the details of defendant's prior criminal activity and to introduce evidence to fully show the nature of defendant's history of prior criminal activity. Maynard, 311 N.C. at 27-31, 316 S.E.2d at 212-14. Defendant testified, in his case in chief, that he had been convicted of several assaults on his wife and girlfriends including two assaults with a deadly weapon (his fists), communicating threats, trespassing, possession of stolen property, and traffic offenses. Defendant testified that this criminal activity resulted in convictions for misdemeanors only. Defendant also admitted to a history of buying, possessing, and selling drugs and that his problems with drugs and alcohol were contributing factors to his past criminal activity. The trial court determined that defendant's testimony would support a rational juror's finding of no significant criminal history. The trial court stated, after reading Maynard, that it was clear that the prosecutor could delve into the details of defendant's prior criminal history by cross-examination of defendant in order to rebut defendant's evidence which tended to support the (f)(1) mitigator.

Defendant argues that before allowing the State to present its rebuttal evidence, the trial court was obligated to first determine that a rational juror could find from the evidence that defendant had no significant history of criminal activity. While the trial court is obligated to make this determination before submitting the (f)(1) mitigator, there is no requirement that it be made prior to admitting the State's rebuttal evidence. Defendant also complains that the trial court erred because it made no findings of fact to explain its decision to submit the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance. There is no such finding requirement.

The State questioned defendant on cross-examination about the details of his criminal history. The State also questioned several witnesses, including defendant's ex-wife and her parents and defendant's former and current girlfriends, about defendant's assaults and his other criminal activity. Once any evidence is introduced in a capital sentencing proceeding tending to show a history of prior criminal activity by defendant, defendant and the State are free to present all evidence available concerning the extent and significance of that history. A...