State v. Adcock

Decision Date24 August 2020
Docket NumberNO. CAAP-19-0000508,CAAP-19-0000508
Citation473 P.3d 769
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian D. ADCOCK, Defendant-Appellant
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

On the briefs:

Benjamin E. Lowenthal, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.

Richard B. Rost, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, County of Maui, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

LEONARD, PRESIDING JUDGE, CHAN and HIRAOKA, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHAN, J.

Defendant-Appellant Brian D. Adcock (Adcock) appeals from the May 31, 2019 Judgment; Conviction and Sentence; Notice of Entry (Judgment) entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court).1 We hold that the Circuit Court did not err in determining that Adcock validly waived his right to testify and that any error by the Circuit Court in failing to obtain a verbal confirmation of Adcock's understanding of his right not to testify was harmless. We further hold that the Crime Victim Compensation (CVC) fee and Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) fee do not amount to unconstitutional taxes and the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the fees against Adcock. However, we conclude that the Circuit Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on merger. For that reason, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 15, 2018, Adcock was charged with two counts of Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-716(1)(e) (2014).2 In both counts, it was alleged that on October 10, 2018, Adcock threatened Bert Kamaka (Kamaka) and/or Billy Tagay (Tagay) with a knife. Count 1 further alleged that Adcock acted with the intent to terrorize, or in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing Kamaka. Count 2 alleged that Adcock acted with the intent to terrorize, or in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing Tagay.

During the jury trial, Kamaka testified that on the morning of October 10, 2018, he arrived at Kalama Park with his janitorial crew, which included Tagay, to clean the restrooms. Kamaka and Tagay testified that they noticed Adcock pacing back and forth about twenty feet from their location, making stabbing-type motions with a kitchen knife. Kamaka testified that Adcock then approached them and said "I'm going to stab you mother fuckers," while continuing to make the stabbing-type motions with the knife.

On February 7, 2019, after the State rested its case, the Circuit Court initiated the following Tachibana 3 colloquy with Adcock:

THE COURT: Okay.
So as I discussed with you at the beginning of the trial, Mr. Adcock, you have a constitutional right to testify in your own defense. Although you should consult with your lawyers regarding the decision to testify, it is your decision, and no one can prevent you from testifying should you choose to do so.
If you decide to testify, the prosecution will be allowed to cross-examine you. That means ask questions of you. You also have a constitutional right not to testify and to remain silent. If you choose not to testify, the jury will be instructed that it cannot hold your silence against you in deciding your case.
It is the understanding of the Court that you intend to testify tomorrow. Is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Okay. Is anyone forcing you or making you do this?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Anyone putting any pressure on you?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Are you doing this voluntarily of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And have you spoken to your attorneys and discussed this matter with them regarding your decision to testify?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Regardless of their advice and having discussed the matter with them, is it still your decision to testify in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And you've had a chance to consult with your lawyers about this decision. Is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: I did.
THE COURT: Okay. So the Court finds the defendant intends to testify tomorrow.

The next morning, on February 8, 2019, Adcock's counsel informed the Circuit Court that Adcock would no longer be testifying and wanted the Circuit Court to re- Tachibana him. The Circuit Court engaged Adcock in the following colloquy:

THE COURT: So, Mr. Adcock, as I discussed with you yesterday and at the beginning of the trial, you have a constitutional right to testify in your own defense. Although you should consult with your lawyers regarding the decision to testify, it is your decision and no one can prevent you from testifying should you choose to do so.
If you decide to testify, the prosecutor will be allowed to cross-examine you, in other words, ask you questions. Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: I do.
THE COURT: Okay. You also have a constitutional right not to testify and to remain silent. If you choose not to testify, the jury will be instructed that it cannot hold your silence against you in deciding the case.
It is the understanding of myself, the Court, that you do not intend to testify. Is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
THE COURT: Okay. Is anyone forcing you or making you do this?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Is anyone putting any pressure on you?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Anyone—are you doing this voluntarily, of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: I know you have two attorneys and you probably discussed this matter in some detail yesterday and probably again today. Is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
THE COURT: And you slept on it. Is that a good way to put it? Okay. I just want to make sure, regardless of your attorneys' advice, it is your decision and your decision alone not to testify. Is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: That's correct.
THE COURT: Okay. The Court, after questioning the defendant, finds that he has voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly decided not to testify in front of the jury.

The defense then rested without calling any witnesses or presenting any evidence.

During the settling of jury instructions, Adcock's counsel argued: "[W]e are dealing with two counts of the identical offense, and the record shows, in our view, a scintilla of evidence that this was a continuous course of conduct on October 10th, done with one intention or impulse. We believe that a merger instruction[4 ] must be given." The Circuit Court refused to provide the instruction. The jury ultimately found Adcock guilty as charged for both counts of Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree.

The Circuit Court entered its Judgment on May 31, 2019,5 sentencing Adcock on each count to five years in prison, to be served concurrently, with credit for time served, and ordered him to pay a $105 CVC fee and a $100 ICAC fee, for a total of $410. On the same day, Adcock moved to strike the imposition of the fees as being unconstitutional taxes. The Circuit Court denied Adcock's motion to strike the imposition of the fees on June 26, 2019.

II. POINTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Adcock raises three points of error, contending that the Circuit Court erred by: (1) failing to conduct a "true colloquy" with him about his constitutional right to testify; (2) not providing the jury with a merger instruction under HRS § 701-109(1)(e) (2014); and (3) levying the $410.00 in fees, which he asserts "[wa]s an [u]nconstitutional [d]elegation of the [l]egislature's [t]axation [p]ower[.]"

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Waiver of Right to Testify

We review whether a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her right to testify under the right/wrong standard. State v. Eduwensuyi, 141 Hawai‘i 328, 332-33, 409 P.3d 732, 736-37 (2018).

B. Jury Instructions

In reviewing a trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction, we examine

whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial. In other words, error is not to be viewed in isolation and considered purely in the abstract.

State v. Matuu, 144 Hawai‘i 510, 516, 445 P.3d 91, 97 (2019) (quoting State v. Kassebeer, 118 Hawai‘i 493, 504, 193 P.3d 409, 420 (2008) ).

C. Constitutionality of Statutes
[T]he constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which is reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Additionally, where it is alleged that the legislature has acted unconstitutionally, this court has consistently held that every enactment of the legislature is presumptively constitutional, and a party challenging the statute has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. The infraction should be plain, clear, manifest, and unmistakable.

State v. Calaycay, 145 Hawai‘i 186, 197, 449 P.3d 1184, 1195 (2019) (quoting State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai‘i 127, 137, 890 P.2d 1167, 1177 (1995) ).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Waiver of Right to Testify

Adcock first alleges that the Circuit Court failed to engage in a "true colloquy" with him prior to the waiving of his right to testify at trial.

Under Tachibana v. State, "trial courts must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and must obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the defendant does not testify." 79 Hawai‘i at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303. This colloquy is also required where the defendant does testify, "effectively making such a colloquy necessary in every trial." State v. Torres, 144 Hawai‘i 282, 285, 439 P.3d 234, 237 (2019).

A Tachibana colloquy has two components: an apprisal of the "fundamental principles pertaining to the right to testify and the right not to testify[,]" State v. Celestine, 142 Hawai‘i 165, 170, 415 P.3d 907, 912 (2018) (citing Tachibana, 79 Hawai‘i at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7 ), and "a verbal exchange between the judge and the defendant ‘in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of the proceedings and of the...

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    • Hawaii Supreme Court
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    ...ICA found that the CVC fee and DDR assessment were constitutional criminal fines, citing its decision in State v. Adcock, 148 Hawai‘i 308, 320–21, 473 P.3d 769, 781–82 (App. 2020), where it held that "the CVC fee is a fine, not a tax," because (1) "it is a penalty imposed after a criminal c......
  • State v. Chacon
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    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • August 31, 2023
    ... ...          In this ... case, Chacon did not testify, and thus waived his right ... to testify. Accordingly, we review the adequacy of ... the district court's ultimate Tachibana colloquy ... concerning the right to testify. See State v ... Adcock, 148 Hawai'i 308, 316, 473 P.3d 769, 777 ... (App. 2020) (noting that "when the deficiency in a ... Tachibana colloquy is not related to the right ... waived, the error appears harmless") ... When a defendant in a criminal case indicates an intention ... not to ... ...
  • State v. Taylor
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    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • August 8, 2023
    ... ...          Taylor ... didn't testify, and thus waived his right to ... testify. Accordingly, we review the adequacy of the district ... court's advisement and colloquy concerning the right ... to testify. See State v. Adcock, 148 ... Hawai'i 308, 316, 473 P.3d 769, 777 (App. 2020) (noting ... that "when the deficiency in a Tachibana ... colloquy is not related to the right waived, the error ... appears harmless").[4] ... When a defendant in a criminal case indicates an intention ... ...

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