State v. Ali, A10–1737.

• Decision Date: 12 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. A10–1737.,A10–1737.
• Citation: 806 N.W.2d 45
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mahdi Hassan ALI, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

806 N.W.2d 45

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Mahdi Hassan ALI, Appellant.

No. A10–1737.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 12, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment for first-degree murder for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable as of right.

2. It is the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the age of the defendant when the defendant's age is determinative of the court's jurisdiction.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Frederick J. Goetz, Goetz & Eckland, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

Two questions are presented in this appeal: (1) whether the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment for murder for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable as of right; and (2) the appropriate evidentiary standard to be applied to the question of a defendant's age on the date of the alleged offense. We conclude that the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is immediately appealable as of right. We further conclude that the State bears the burden of proving the defendant's age by a preponderance of the evidence.

This case arises out of the shooting deaths of three individuals at the Seward Market in Minneapolis on January 6, 2010. On February 4, 2010, appellant Mahdi Hassan Ali was indicted on three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2010) (premeditated murder) and three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2010) (murder committed in the course of a felony) in connection with the deaths. The indictment alleges that Ali was born on January 1, 1993, which would make him 17 years old on the date of the alleged offense and therefore automatically subject to trial in the district court under Minn.Stat. §§ 260B.101, subd. 2, and 260B.007, subd. 6(b) (2010).

Ali moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ¹ based on his contention that he was only 15 years old on the date of the alleged offenses and that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Minn.Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2010), is therefore exclusive.

The district court issued an order providing:

1. The initial burden of proving [Ali]'s age falls on the State. The State must make a prima facie showing that [Ali] was 16 years of age or older at the time of the alleged incident.

2. To meet the State's prima facie showing that [Ali] was over 16 years of age at the time of the alleged incident, [Ali] must come forth with evidence that [Ali] was not over 16 years of age at the time of the alleged incident. If [Ali] comes forward with such evidence, the State will have an opportunity to rebut with any additional evidence. After receiving all evidence the Court must determine from the preponderance of the evidence whether [Ali] was over 16 years of age at the time of the offense.

State v. Ali, No. 27–CR–10–2076, Order at 2–3 (Henn. Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed July 6, 2010). After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Ali's motion to dismiss the indictment, concluding that “[t]he evidence establishes by a clear preponderance that [Ali] had reached his sixteenth birthday before January 6, 2010.” State v. Ali, No. 27–CR–10–2076, Order at 10–11, 2010 WL 7810583 (Henn. Cnty. Dist. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 2010).

Ali filed a timely notice of appeal. The court of appeals concluded that the district court's September 13 order denying Ali's motion to dismiss the indictment was not appealable because the order was neither a final judgment nor one of the types of orders from which a pretrial appeal is expressly authorized by Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2. State v. Ali, No. A10–1737, Order at 3 (Minn.App. filed Nov. 4, 2010). The court also noted that our court has not applied the collateral order doctrine, under which certain orders are immediately appealable notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment on the merits, to criminal appeals. Id.; see Kastner v. Star Trails Ass'n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn.2002) (adopting the collateral order doctrine in civil cases).

We reversed the decision of the court of appeals and exercised our authority to accelerate review under Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 118 to consider the merits of the appeal without remand for a decision by the court of appeals. State v. Ali, No. A10–1737, Order at 2 (Minn. filed Apr. 27, 2011). After additional briefing and oral argument, we issued an order affirming the district court's July 6 order establishing the standard of proof on the jurisdictional question of age as well as the district court's September 13 order denying Ali's motion to dismiss the indictment. State v. Ali, No. A10–1737, Order at 2 (Minn. filed June 8, 2011). We now address the issues decided in our earlier orders that were issued with opinion to follow so that the trial could proceed without further delay.

I.

We first address the appealability of the district court's order denying Ali's motion to dismiss the indictment against him. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.02, subdivision 2(2), sets forth a list of orders from which a criminal defendant may immediately appeal as of right:

A defendant cannot appeal until the district court enters an adverse final judgment, but may appeal:

(a) from an order refusing or imposing conditions of release; or

(b) in felony and gross misdemeanor cases from an order:

1. granting a new trial, and the defendant claims that the district court should have entered a final judgment in the defendant's favor; 2. not on the defendant's motion, finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial; or

3. denying a motion to dismiss a complaint following a mistrial, and the defendant claims retrial would violate double jeopardy.

Ali concedes that the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment does not fall within the orders listed in Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2(2), but argues that the order is nonetheless immediately appealable. We agree.

We have long recognized that, in the civil context, an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is immediately appealable as of right. In Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, we held that an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is appealable as of right. 285 Minn. 77, 88, 172 N.W.2d 292, 300 (1969). In so holding, we stated that “[i]t is more realistic to view such an order not merely as a retention of an action for trial, but as a determination of right, for a defendant is compelled thereby to take up the burden of litigation in this state that might otherwise be avoided.” Id. at 89, 172 N.W.2d at 300.

In Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 363 (Minn.1986), we considered whether an order denying a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) was appealable as of right. We recognized that the Supreme Court has held such an order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) because it falls within that small class of orders that finally determines claims of right “separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Anderson, 393 N.W.2d at 363 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–25, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Relying on the reasoning in Mitchell, we concluded that the district court's order in Anderson was appealable because, with respect to qualified immunity, the issue is independent of the merits of the action—“immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense”—and too important to be denied review because “the immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” See id. at 364 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525–30, 105 S.Ct. 2806).

Most recently, we considered the appealability of a district court order that denied a church's motion for summary judgment in a negligence action brought by an employee. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Minn.1995). The church sought dismissal of the action based on its contention that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id.; see Minn.Stat. § 175A.01, subd. 5 (2010) (establishing the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals as “the sole, exclusive, and final authority for the hearing and determination of all questions of law and fact arising under the workers' compensation laws of the state” in all cases appealed or transferred to that court). We acknowledged that “[g]enerally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable unless the district court certifies the question presented as important and doubtful,” and that in McGowan, the district court had not certified the question presented. 527 N.W.2d at 832 (citing Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03).

But we also acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule when a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss is based on governmental immunity or lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Based on the rationale from Anderson and Hunt, we held in McGowan that an order denying a motion based on the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is immediately appealable. Id. at 833. Like the determination of governmental immunity or personal jurisdiction, we recognized that “[i]f the district court here lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, no purpose is served by putting the parties or the court through the rigors of trial before that determination is made.” Id.; see id. at 832 (“Government officials entitled to...