State v. Alonzo

Decision Date08 May 2023
Docket NumberA21-1567
PartiesState of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David NMN Alonzo, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Redwood County District Court File No. 64-CR-19-343

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Jenna M Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota and Travis J. Smith, William C. Lundy, Special Assistant County Attorneys, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Barry S. Edwards, Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.

OPINION

BJORKMAN, JUDGE

Appellant was convicted of three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct following a jury trial. He challenges his convictions and sentence, arguing that (1) the prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct; (2) the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte dismissing a juror for cause; (3) the district court plainly erred by permitting a police chief to offer expert testimony; (4) the district court abused its discretion by allowing relationship evidence without cautioning the jury on its use each time it was offered; (5) the district court erred by not sua sponte granting him a durational sentencing departure; and (6) the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

FACTS

In January 2018, 17-year-old C.A. was admitted to the hospital after attempting suicide. At the hospital, C.A. reported that, when he was in eighth grade, his father, appellant David Alonzo, struck him on the butt with a belt for "making fun of somebody" in school. In a subsequent forensic interview, C.A. disclosed that Alonzo sexually abused him starting when he was six years old and ending when he was 12. During this period of time, Alonzo regularly grabbed C.A.'s "groin" over and under his clothes.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Alonzo with three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Before trial, the state moved to admit relationship evidence of Alonzo's domestic conduct against other family or household members. The evidence included several instances of domestic assault by Alonzo against his ex-wife (C.A.'s mother) and two of C.A.'s siblings. Over Alonzo's objection, the district court allowed the state to offer four instances of this relationship evidence. The district court advised the prosecutor to request a cautionary instruction each time they introduced this evidence.

During voir dire, the district court asked prospective juror T.Q., who was the mayor of Redwood Falls, if anything about his relationship with state witnesses from the Redwood Falls Police Department would make it difficult to evaluate their testimony. T.Q. responded that he would evaluate the testimony of both the police chief and assistant police chief "[t]o the best of [his] ability." He explained that he was not responsible for hiring them and that he did not feel that his participation on the jury would impact future negotiations with the police department. At the end of voir dire, defense counsel passed on challenging any juror for cause, including T.Q.

C.A., his sister M.A., his brother D.A., and the police chief testified for the state. C.A. testified that Alonzo "shoved a shampoo bottle up our, up my butt" but that the bottle did not penetrate him. He testified that Alonzo hit him multiple times, including on his bare butt. He also testified that Alonzo once told him "mine's bigger than yours," and made him expose his penis to "measure [it] basically." M.A. testified that she once saw Alonzo "flick" C.A.'s penis while C.A. was naked. The police chief testified about things that "trigger" memories of sexual abuse, and how they are different with each victim.

The jury found Alonzo guilty as charged. Alonzo moved for a downward dispositional sentencing departure, asserting that he was particularly amenable to probation. The district court denied the motion and imposed a 234-month guidelines sentence and 10 years of conditional release.

Alonzo appealed. At his request, this court stayed the appeal to permit him to seek postconviction relief. Alonzo's postconviction petition asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied the right to an impartial jury. After the district court denied the petition, we reinstated the appeal.

DECISION
I. Alonzo is not entitled to relief based on plain error.

Alonzo makes three arguments on appeal that he did not raise in the district court. Because he did not object to the alleged errors at trial, we review his arguments for plain error. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). Generally, "to meet the plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights." Id. An error is plain if it contravenes caselaw or a rule. State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 2010). Even if the first three requirements are met, "an appellate court may correct the error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).

A. The prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct.

Prosecutors commit misconduct when they "violate[] clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state's case law." State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). One of these rules is the prohibition against appealing to the passions of the jury. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 786-87 (Minn. 2006). If credibility is a central issue in a case, an appellate court "pays special attention to statements that may inflame or prejudice the jury." Id. at 787.

Alonzo contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by appealing to the passions of the jury during voir dire, direct examination, and closing argument. He concedes that his trial counsel did not object to any of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, we apply the modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standard, if the defendant establishes error that is plain, the burden shifts to the state to prove that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct would have significantly affected the jury's verdict. Id. To determine whether misconduct significantly impacted a jury verdict, we consider "the pervasiveness of improper suggestions and the strength of evidence against the defendant." State v. Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

1. Voir Dire

A criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6; State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. 2001). "The purpose of voir dire is to probe the jury for bias or partiality to enable counsel to exercise informed peremptory challenges and challenges for cause." State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d 289, 295 (Minn.App. 2006) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 4(1)), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2006). A prosecutor's questioning that goes beyond this purpose may constitute misconduct. State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 543 (Minn. 2004) (expressing concern about questions implicitly asking jurors to "identify with the victim").

Alonzo challenges a series of the prosecutor's voir dire questions, including questions about "mean drunks," whether the jurors "think a child needs to say no to being sexually touched," whether a child's failure to say no "make[s] the sexual touching okay," and whether any of the jurors had been through a traumatic event. He cites Bolstad, where the jury returned a guilty verdict based on evidence that Bolstad had offered a friend money to kill his father. Id. at 536, 538. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked potential jurors whether they had ever paid someone to have their parents killed and immediately followed up with questions regarding the jurors' relationship with their parents. Id. at 543. The supreme court noted that "this type of blunt questioning could inflame the passions of jurors" but concluded that, based on the record as a whole, the questioning was not unduly prejudicial. Id.

We are not convinced that the challenged voir dire questions here impermissibly influenced the jury. Like in Bolstad, the prosecutor's questions were based on evidence the jurors would encounter during the trial. There was evidence that Alonzo was often drunk and abusive and that he had physically and sexually abused C.A. and others while drunk. Voir dire questions that reveal jurors' ability to hear and impartially weigh such evidence are critical. See Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d at 295 (stating a "defendant's right to an impartial jury is guaranteed, in part, by an adequate voir dire that permits the identification of unqualified jurors"); State v. Anderson, 603 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn.App. 1999) (stating that "[c]rime victim status is not one of the proper causes for challenge"), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 2000). The challenged statements elicited potential bias and were in line with the purposes of voir dire. See Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d at 295 ("The purpose of voir dire is to probe the jury for bias or partiality ...."). Alonzo has not demonstrated misconduct based on the prosecutor's voir dire questions.

2. Direct Examination

Alonzo next contends that the prosecutor's references to "the sexual abuse" and "the abuse" during direct examination of its witnesses, including C.A., assumed guilt, "subvert[ed] the presumption of innocence," "...

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