State v. Ammons
| Decision Date | 30 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 51550-6,51580-8 and 51587-5,s. 51550-6 |
| Citation | 105 Wn.2d 175,713 P.2d 719 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Roy Lee AMMONS, Dale R. Barton, and Eugene Garrett, Appellants. En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n, Raymond H. Thoenig, Julie A. Kesler, Seattle, for appellants Ammons and Barton.
Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Michael Filipovic, Seattle, for appellant Garrett.
Norm Maleng, Pros. Atty., Deborah J. Phillips, Sr. Appellate Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
University of Puget Sound School of Law, David Boerner, Tacoma, amicus curiae, for respondent.
The appellants, Roy Lee Ammons, Dale R. Barton, and Eugene Garrett, challenge the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, RCW 9.94A (), pursuant to which they were sentenced. We hold the SRA is constitutional and affirm their sentences.
The SRA became effective on July 1, 1984. The SRA is a comprehensive sentencing system which establishes a standard presumptive sentencing range for most criminal offenses. The presence and nature of prior convictions determine, in part, the presumptive sentence range. RCW 9.94A.360 and .370.
Because the cases were consolidated on appeal, the factual settings of each appellant must be outlined.
Ammons: Roy Lee Ammons was found guilty of second degree burglary by a King County Superior Court jury on September 13, 1984, the Honorable Terrence A. Carroll presiding. The sentencing hearings were held on October 23 and 29, 1984. The standard sentence range for second degree burglary as a first offense is 0-90 days. The State presented to the court certified copies of four prior convictions: all from Skagit County, all for second degree burglary- ; three of them based on guilty pleas and one based on a jury verdict. Inclusion of the four prior convictions elevated the sentence range to 33 to 43 months.
Ammons asked the court to rule that before any prior conviction can be used to enhance a sentence, the State must prove the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing court ruled the State need only establish the prior convictions by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ammons also asked the court to rule that the State must prove the constitutional validity of any prior conviction, whether it is based on a guilty plea or a jury verdict. Ammons offered specific evidence of jury instructions which called into question the constitutional validity of his prior jury verdict conviction. The sentencing court found the State did not have to prove the constitutional validity of the prior convictions.
The sentencing court further found that the defendant did not have the right to remain silent with regard to the existence of prior convictions. Ammons was sentenced to 40 months in prison.
Barton: Dale R. Barton pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the charge of second degree burglary on September 18, 1984 in King County Superior Court before the Honorable Stephen M. Reilly. The sentencing hearing was held on October 25, 1984. The standard sentence range for second degree burglary as a first offense is 0-90 days. The State presented to the court certified copies of four prior convictions: two for theft, one for forgery and one for burglary. Inclusion of the four prior convictions elevated the sentence range to 12 to 14 months. The court sentenced Barton to 14 months in prison.
Barton on appeal makes several constitutional challenges which will be addressed in the analysis section. He also argues that this court should not consider the certified copies of the four prior convictions which were discussed and reviewed at the sentencing but which were not included in the Superior Court's Clerk's Papers. RCW 9.94A.210(5). On June 4, 1985, the State moved to supplement the record. On June 24, 1985, we ordered that the record be supplemented.
Garrett: Eugene Garrett pleaded guilty to charges of second degree robbery and first degree theft on August 20, 1984 in King County Superior Court before the Honorable Donald D. Haley. At the plea proceeding, Garrett disputed the prosecutor's statement of his criminal history, arguing he knew of no prior convictions which the State could prove the existence, identity, and constitutional validity of beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing hearing was held on November 6, 1984. The standard sentence range for second degree robbery as a first offense is 6 to 12 months and for first degree theft as a first offense is 2 to 6 months. The State offered a certified copy of a judgment and sentence for second degree burglary. Inclusion of the prior conviction elevated the sentence range to 12 to 14 months for second degree robbery and 3 to 9 months for first degree theft.
Garrett objected to the use of the prior conviction, but submitted a certified copy of the statement on plea of guilty in order to challenge the constitutional validity of the plea. The court found the State's presentation of the judgment met the burden of preponderance of the evidence. The court imposed a sentence of 14 months for the second degree robbery and 3 months for the first degree theft.
To the extent possible, the overlapping issues raised by the appellants have been grouped together. The issues will be examined in the order deemed most sensible to the court.
The first challenge, made by Barton, is that the SRA violates the separation of powers doctrine. Barton presents three different theories. We find all three theories without merit.
The first theory is that the SRA is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature's enactment of the SRA impinges on the judicial power to sentence. This theory begins with a faulty premise because the Legislature, not the judiciary, has the authority to determine the sentencing process.
This court has consistently held that the fixing of legal punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function.
As early as 1909, the court stated:
The spirit of the law is in keeping with the acknowledged power of the legislature to provide a minimum and maximum term within which the trial court may exercise its discretion in fixing sentence ...
State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 169, 103 P. 27 (1909).
In State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360 (1937), the court stated: "Fixing of penalties or punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function, and the power of the legislature in that respect is plenary and subject only to constitutional provisions against excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishment."
The court in 1975 recognized that "it is the function of the legislature and not of the judiciary to alter the sentencing process." State v. Monday, 85 Wash.2d 906, 909-10, 540 P.2d 416 (1975). Recently, the court again reiterated that sentencing is within the Legislature's power. State v. Bryan, 93 Wash.2d 177, 181, 606 P.2d 1228 (1980).
Barton offers as support for his position our decision in State ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade Dist. Court, 94 Wash.2d 772, 621 P.2d 115 (1980). It does not support his position. Cascade Dist. Court determined that the decision to refer an accused for diagnostic evaluation of amenability for a deferred prosecution is essentially a sentencing alternative and, therefore, at least partially a judicial act which does not infringe upon the prosecutor's charging function. The court recognized that the prosecutor could have input if the Legislature provided guidelines but, as written, the statute gave the prosecutor the ability to arbitrarily veto a partial judicial decision and therefore violated the separation of powers doctrine. We stated: "If the legislature wishes to make the initial eligibility decision one for the prosecutor ... then standards for guiding decision making are necessary to prevent an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative authority to alter the sentencing process." (italics ours.) Cascade Dist. Court, at 781, 621 P.2d 115.
We find no violation of the separation of powers doctrine by the Legislature's enactment of the SRA because it is within the Legislature's power.
The second theory is that the SRA is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the SRA's limitation on the trial court's discretion in sentencing infringes upon a judicial power.
Barton argues that alteration of a judge's discretion, by requiring a sentence within a certain range unless there are substantial and compelling reasons, violates judicial authority. This argument fails to recognize that the trial court does not have absolute discretion to do whatever it pleases. The trial court's discretion in sentencing is that which is given by the Legislature.
The SRA by its language still gives the trial court discretion in sentencing but it changes the parameters in which the discretion can be exercised. RCW 9.94A.010 specifically states that the SRA "structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentences ..." The court continues to have discretion. The SRA allows "[t]he court [to] impose any sentence within the [presumptive sentence] range that it deems appropriate." RCW 9.94A.370. The court is allowed to impose a sentence outside the standard range, either higher or lower, as long as it finds "considering the purpose of [the SRA] that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." RCW 9.94A.120(2). The Legislature's structuring of the trial court's discretion does not infringe upon a judicial power.
The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40, in which the Legislature gave trial courts new guidelines for the sentencing of juveniles has been upheld. State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979); State v. Adcock, 36 Wash.App. 699, 676 P.2d 1040 (1984).
The third theory is that the SRA is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of...
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... ... Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 479-80, 973 P.2d 452 ; RCW 9.94A.110; see also State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175, 186, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986) ... The State must provide reliable evidence establishing the accuracy of the offender score calculation. Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 482, 973 P.2d 452 ... Thus, the best evidence of a prior conviction is a certified copy of ... ...
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