State v. Anderson, 2010 Ohio 2085 (Ohio App. 5/13/2010)
| Decision Date | 13 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 92576.,92576. |
| Citation | 2010 Ohio 2085 |
| Parties | State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Latangia Anderson, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
John P. Parker, Esq., 988 East 185th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44119, Attorney for Appellant.
William D. Mason, Esq., Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, By: Katherine Mullin, Esq., Assistant County Prosecutor, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before: Dyke, J., Gallagher, A.J., and Sweeney, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant LaTangia Anderson appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to vacate her guilty plea to one count of murder. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant's conviction but remand for correction of her sentence to delete the imposition of postrelease control.
{¶ 2} On May 8, 2008, defendant was indicted in connection with the death of Charles Gooden for one count of aggravated murder, one count of murder, and one count of felonious assault. On October 14, 2008, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the state of Ohio whereby the charges of aggravated murder and felonious assault were dismissed in exchange for defendant's guilty plea to the charge of murder. During these proceedings, her counsel stated:
{¶ 3} "I believe that, if she's released at some point in the future, she would be subject to postrelease control of up to five years." In addition, after outlining the pertinent constitutional rights, the trial court stated:
{¶ 4} "You're pleading guilty to count two, which is a — it's a felony of the first degree, and its subject to a sentence of 15 years to life. Do you understand that?
{¶ 9} Thereafter, on October 30, 2008, prior to sentencing, defendant moved to vacate the guilty plea, contending that she did not understand the consequences of the plea, that exculpatory evidence was produced that she could not review, that her attorney forced her to plead guilty, and that she was innocent.
{¶ 10} The trial court held a hearing on the matter on November 21, 2008. At this time, defendant's counsel stated that the reference to postrelease control during the plea proceedings
{¶ 11} Defendant's trial counsel also stated that the trial court did not inquire further after defendant indicated in the plea proceedings that she takes prescription medication. Counsel additionally noted that during the plea hearing, defendant stated that she was not satisfied with the representation that her trial counsel had provided, then later said that she was satisfied with the representation. Finally, defendant's trial counsel noted that defendant stated on the record that she said "Some things I don't understand but they don't need to go —[.]"
{¶ 12} The trial court denied the motion to vacate the guilty plea and
sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years to life, plus five years of postrelease control. Defendant now appeals and assigns three errors for our review.
{¶ 13} For her first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11, and that her guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given because the trial court erroneously identified that offense of murder as a first degree felony, rather than an unclassified offense, and erroneously informed her that she would be subject to a term of postrelease control.
{¶ 14} Both the Ohio and the United States Constitutions require that a defendant entering a guilty plea must do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450, 1996-Ohio-179. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires that the trial court engage in oral dialogue with the defendant to determine that the plea is voluntary, that defendant understands the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved, and to personally inform the defendant of the constitutional guarantees he waives by entering a guilty plea.
{¶ 15} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) states:
{¶ 16} "In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
{¶ 17} "(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
{¶ 18} "(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
{¶ 19} "(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself."
{¶ 20} In determining whether the trial court has satisfied its duties under Crim.R. 11 in taking a plea, reviewing courts have distinguished between constitutional and non-constitutional rights. See State v. Higgs (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 400, 704 N.E.2d 308; State v. Gibson (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 146, 517 N.E.2d 990. The trial court must strictly comply with those provisions of Crim.R. 11(C) that relate to the waiver of constitutional rights. See State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 88-89, 364 N.E.2d 1163; State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E .2d 115, paragraph one of the syllabus. "Strict
compliance" does not require an exact recitation of the precise language of the rule but instead focuses on whether the trial court explained or referred to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant. Id.
{¶ 21} For non-constitutional rights, scrupulous adherence to Crim.R. 11(C) is not required; the trial court must substantially comply. State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163. "Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implication of his plea and the rights he is waiving." State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. Moreover, there must be some showing of prejudicial effect before a guilty plea may be vacated. State v. Stewart, supra.
{¶ 22} If the trial judge imperfectly explained non-constitutional rights such as the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea, a substantial-compliance rule applies. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462. In Clark, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that defendants who are sentenced for unclassified felonies are not subject to postrelease control, pursuant to R.C. 2967.28. Such defendants are either ineligible for parole or become eligible for parole after serving a period of 20, 25, or 30 years in prison. Id., citing R.C. 2929.03(A)(1) and R.C. 2967.13(A).
{¶ 23} The Clark Court additionally explained that because parole is not certain to occur, trial courts are not required to explain it as part of the maximum possible penalty in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy. The Court stated:
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} The Clark Court further held that, because the defendant who is sentenced to an unclassified felony is not eligible for postrelease control, the trial court is not required to discuss postrelease control or parole in the defendant's plea colloquy under Crim.R. 11(C)(2). State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d at 246, 893 N.E.2d at 471. The Clark Court then noted that, during the plea colloquy, the trial court provided Clark with an incorrect recitation of the law because it informed him of a "hybrid system that combined the mandatory term of years and the maximum possible sentences associated with postrelease control with the uncertainty of release associated with parole." The Clark Court then reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's misinformation.
{¶ 26} In this matter, the trial court erroneously indicated that defendant would be subject to five years of postrelease control but postrelease control is not applicable since murder is an unclassified felony. In State v. Douglass, Butler App. Nos. CA2008-08-199 and CA2008-07-168, 2009-Ohio-3826, the court
considered whether the trial court substantially complied with its duties under Crim.R. 11(C) where it erroneously advised a defendant who plead guilty to an unclassified felony that he would be subject to five years of postrelease control. The Douglass Court stated:
{¶ 27} "[B]ased on the facts of this case, we fi...
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State v. Anderson
...2010 Ohio 2085Statev.Anderson2010-1194Supreme Court of OhioDate: September 29, 2010 Per Curiam Cuyahoga App. No. 92576,...