State v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 09 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | A10-470 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alicia Venette Anderson, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Minnesota |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. §480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).
Affirmed
Anoka County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Lynne Torgerson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Wright, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges her conviction of attempted second-degree murder, arguing that the district court erred by denying her request to present evidence of the victim's prior bad act and that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict.Appellant also challenges the district court's imposition of a sentence of 90 months' imprisonment, contending that there are substantial and compelling reasons for a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.
Appellant Alicia Venette Anderson and J.B. were friends. While still married to M.B., J.B. began a romantic relationship with L.E., who she met through Anderson. As a result, M.B. had a confrontational relationship with L.E. and J.B., which included a history of arguments and property damage.
J.B.'s sister planned to be married on October 18, 2008. On October 17, Anderson drove L.E., J.B., and J.B.'s grandchildren to a church in Columbia Heights for the wedding rehearsal. When they arrived, J.B. and the grandchildren exited Anderson's minivan. But when J.B. saw M.B. waiting outside the church, J.B. decided to leave with Anderson and L.E. in the minivan. As Anderson began to drive away from the church, M.B. and L.E. exchanged vulgar hand gestures. Immediately thereafter, L.E. left the minivan, smashed M.B.'s car window, and returned to the minivan. As Anderson drove away, M.B. retaliated by smashing the rear window of Anderson's minivan. L.E. got out of the minivan again and fought with M.B.
Believing that M.B. had shot through the rear window of her minivan with a gun, Anderson loaded her handgun, exited the minivan, walked over to L.E. and M.B., who were fighting each other, and fired her handgun three times. M.B. fled. A bystander called 911, and the 911 recording contains the sound of a gunshot. Columbia Heights Police Officer Paul Bonesteel arrived at the church within a few minutes of the 911 call.He stopped Anderson's minivan as it exited the church parking lot, and he found Anderson and L.E. inside the minivan. Anderson advised the police that she had fired the gun, and the police recovered an empty shell casing from her minivan.
Anderson was charged with one count of attempted second-degree murder, a violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.19, subd. 1(1), 609.17 (2008), and one count of second-degree assault, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2008). Anderson filed a pretrial motion to admit prior-bad-acts evidence to establish that she had reason to fear M.B. and that she acted in reasonable defense of herself and of others. The district court granted the motion in part, admitting evidence of several incidents during which M.B. threatened or assaulted L.E., J.B., and Anderson's son. But the district court excluded testimonial evidence that M.B. allegedly sexually assaulted J.B. during their marriage on the grounds that the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of this evidence and that this evidence is cumulative.
The jury found Anderson guilty of attempted second-degree murder and not guilty of second-degree assault. At the sentencing hearing, Anderson moved for a downward durational or dispositional departure on the grounds that M.B. was the aggressor, Anderson's offense is not as serious as a typical attempted second-degree murder, and she is amenable to probation. The state opposed the motion and urged the district court to impose the presumptive guidelines sentence of 153 months' imprisonment. The district court granted Anderson's motion and imposed a sentence of 90 months' imprisonment, which is a downward durational departure from the presumptive sentence. This appeal followed.
Anderson argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence of an alleged sexual assault committed by M.B. She contends that M.B.'s past violent conduct is relevant and probative evidence supporting her self-defense theory and that the exclusion of this evidence violated her right to due process because it prevented her from explaining her conduct to the jury.
The constitutional right to due process requires a person accused of an offense to "be treated with fundamental fairness" and to be "afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 712 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted) . Criminal defendants have a fundamental due-process right to explain their conduct to the jury, even if it is not a valid defense. State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 751 (Minn. 1984); State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 719 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992). "However, a defendant has no right to introduce evidence that either is irrelevant, or whose prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value." State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996). We review the district court's evidentiary ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard even when it is claimed that excluding the evidence deprived the defendant of the constitutional right to present a complete defense. State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006). But if we determine that the district court's evidentiary ruling denied the defendant the rightto present a complete defense, reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn. 2003).
Anderson moved the district court to admit evidence that M.B. sexually assaulted J.B. at knifepoint during their marriage and that, because Anderson was aware of this incident, she reasonably feared M.B. When the defendant has knowledge of the victim's prior violent or bad acts, evidence of these acts can be relevant to establish the defendant's reasonable apprehension of fear. State v. Robinson, 539 N.W.2d 231, 240 (Minn. 1995). But relevant evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Minn. R. Evid. 403; State v. Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 925 (Minn. 1994). Here, the district court excluded the evidence under rule 403, 1 concluding that the probative value of this evidence substantially outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Because this evidence is unsupported by police reports and there is no indication that Anderson feared being sexually assaulted at the time of the shooting, the district court concluded, and we agree, that the jury likely would place undue emphasis on this evidence, which would unfairly prejudice the state's case.
The district court also reasoned that this evidence is cumulative because M.B.'s other prior bad acts that were admitted in evidence would adequately establish M.B.'s propensity for violence. In State v. Bland, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of evidence of two of the victim's prior bad acts because the district court admitted a "wealth of reputation evidence and evidence concerning specific past acts of violence by the victim." 337 N.W.2d 378, 383-84 (Minn. 1983). Here, as in Bland, the record contains ample evidence establishing M.B.'s violent character: M.B. was arrested for domestic assault against J.B. and vandalized her property; L.E. had a restraining order against M.B., who broke windows on L.E.'s car and slashed L.E.'s tires on five separate occasions; M.B. once held a knife to J.B.'s throat and bruised her chest; M.B. threatened to kill J.B., L.E., and L.E.'s dog; while intoxicated, M.B. went to the home of Anderson's son and threatened him; and on the morning of the offense, M.B. kicked in the front door of J.B.'s home, threatened her nephew, poured oil around the house, and intended to ignite it. Because the district court admitted a wealth of evidence establishing M.B.'s prior violent conduct, the proffered, but excluded, evidence of the sexual assault is cumulative and of limited probative value. And its exclusion did not prejudice Anderson.
Accordingly, the district court did not violate Anderson's constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding the proffered evidence.
Anderson next argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because the evidence does not establish that she committed the offense and it fails to prove that she did not act in self-defense or in defense of others. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct a thorough analysis to determine whether the jury reasonably could find the defendant guilty of the charged offense based on the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts. State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Minn. 1999). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict and assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the guilty verdict and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. Id. We will not disturb the guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, reasonably could conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988).
A conviction of second-degree murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "cause[d] the...
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