State v. Anderson, No. 4-075/03-0458 (Iowa App. 4/14/2004), 4-075/03-0458
| Decision Date | 14 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-075/03-0458,4-075/03-0458 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY LARRY ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County, Timothy O'Grady and Charles Smith, III, Judges.
Jeffrey Larry Anderson appeals following his guilty plea to manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine, five grams or less. AFFIRMED.
Heather Turner-Graves of Dunahoo Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, and Francine Anderson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan, J. and Brown, S.J.*
Although the defendant-appellant, Jeffery Larry Anderson, pleaded guilty in open court, with the assistance of counsel, to a plea-bargained felony, he now challenges that guilty plea in this direct appeal, claiming it was not voluntary. He also claims he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We have carefully reviewed Anderson's contentions and disagree with his conclusions. We therefore affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court.
On April 2, 2002, a search of Anderson's home, pursuant to a warrant, resulted in criminal charges of possession of marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2001), possession of methamphetamine in violation of section 124.401(5), manufacture of marijuana in violation of section 124.401(1)(d), possessing or tampering with anhydrous ammonia in violation of section 124.401F(1), and child endangerment in violation of section 726.6. The most serious charge, manufacturing marijuana, was a class "D" felony. His wife, Jennifer, was charged with manufacture of marijuana, possession of methamphetamine, and child endangerment.
On May 13, 2002, the State moved to amend the trial information against Anderson to include Count VI, manufacture or delivery of methamphetamine, five grams or less, a class "C" felony. Following an unresisted hearing on June 17, 2002, the court approved the amendment. A calendar entry on June 24, 2002 indicated a written arraignment to the new charge would be filed, but it was not. No formal arraignment on the amended count was held. On July 29, 2002, Anderson's motion to continue the trial date was granted.
On December 10, 2002, the day of trial, following jury selection, Anderson pleaded guilty to the added Count VI, the "C" felony. In return, the plea bargain provided all other counts were dismissed as were all the charges against his wife, except that she would plead guilty to the simple misdemeanor charge of possession of paraphernalia and pay a fine. There was no agreement as to Anderson's sentence. The court accepted Anderson's Alford1 plea to the "C" felony. In February 2003, Anderson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of ten years in prison and fined $1,000.
Anderson has now appealed claiming his guilty plea was not voluntary. His direct appeal asserts (1) he was never arraigned and given an opportunity to assess the charges against him, (2) the factual basis supporting his plea to the felony drug delivery charge was inadequate, (3) the court did not advise him of the mandatory minimum sentence involved in the crime to which he pleaded guilty, (4) the court misadvised him in the plea colloquy, (5) the benefit he received by his plea bargain was inadequate, and (6) he was coerced by his attorney to plead guilty. He asserts these shortcomings in the proceedings should suffice to invalidate his guilty plea and allow him a trial.
Anderson also has asserted his counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to assure he was properly arraigned on the amended charge, (2) failing to object to the inadequate factual basis for the guilty plea, (3) failing to correct the court in its recitation of prior probation violations at sentencing, and (4) failing to request substance abuse treatment for Anderson prior to sentencing.
We believe his plea of guilty and subsequent failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment preclude asserting the alleged errors on direct appeal. The rules which lead to this result are designed to further the quite commendable notion that an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea puts an end to criminal litigation.
"A guilty plea is normally understood as a lid on the box, whatever is in it, not a platform from which to explore further possibilities." United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir 1975); Zacek v. Brewer, 241 N.W.2d [41], 49 [(Iowa1976)].
Kyle v. State, 322 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Iowa 1982).
The fact Anderson was not arraigned on the amended charge was clearly waived by his plea of guilty. E.g., Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000) (); State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Iowa1998) (); State v. Davis, 581 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Iowa,1998) (); State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805-806, 129 N.W.2d 88, 91 (1964) (); State v. Fortunski, 200 Iowa 406, 407-08, 204 N.W. 401, 401 (1925) ().
The alleged defects in the guilty plea process itself do not survive Anderson's failure to move in arrest of judgment as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3). E.g., State v. Carter, 582 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Iowa 1998) (); State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996) (); State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Iowa1982) (). Anderson has not alleged he was not properly advised of the necessity and effect of filing a motion in arrest of judgment, and indeed the record would not support such a claim.
Therefore we will not consider Anderson's direct appeal, except as those allegations are reasserted in his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Kyle, 322 N.W.2d at 303-04) ( only challenge permitted to voluntary and intelligent character of guilty plea, absent motion in arrest of judgment, is that the advice he received from counsel did not meet applicable standards). Although Anderson does not reassert his direct appeal claim of coercion by counsel under the ineffective-assistance umbrella, because it is a direct attack on counsel's competence and performance we will address it now despite the error preservation problem. See State v. Scalise, 660 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Iowa 2003).
The principles of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims may be summarized as follows:
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [Anderson] carries the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) [he] experienced prejudice as a result of the counsel's performance. To establish the first element of the test, [Anderson] must overcome the presumption that the counsel was competent and demonstrate that, when considering the totality of the circumstances, the counsel's performance was not within the normal range of competency. In order to demonstrate prejudice, [Anderson] must show counsel's failure worked to [his] actual and substantial disadvantage so that a reasonable probability exists that but for the counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. `A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' In the context of guilty pleas, [Anderson] may establish the occurrence of prejudice by showing "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Irving v State, 533 N.W.2d 538, 540-41 (Iowa 1995) (). Although we often defer ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to postconviction relief actions, where, as here, the record is adequate to resolve the issues on direct appeal we will do so. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003).
Anderson urges his plea of guilty was defective because it was not voluntary which in turn was based in part on his attorney's failure to assure certain things were done or not done in district court which reasonably competent counsel should have done or prevented. We will consider each of these contentions.
The record does not show Anderson was ever formally arraigned following the amendment to the trial information adding the class "C" felony. However, the amendment was properly served on him, along with extensive amended minutes of testimony. Anderson then successfully moved to continue the trial date, alleging he needed additional time to respond to the amended charge. He later pleaded guilty to the amended charge, therefore at least tacitly agreeing to the amendment. As noted before, this waived any procedural error.
In the context of his ineffective-assistance claim we do not recognize counsel's failure to insist on a formal arraignment in these circumstances as a dereliction of an essential duty. Anderson and his attorney, at their request, had several months in which to address the amended charge. See Davis, 581 N.W.2d at 616 (). At all times everyone concerned acted as if he had pleaded not...
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