State v. Anspach
Decision Date | 31 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00-0304.,00-0304. |
Citation | 627 N.W.2d 227 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Edward Jerome ANSPACH, Jr., Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Clarke, Jr., of Isaacson & Clarke, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jeffrey Noble and John Judish, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
This is a case about a defendant who did several foolish things. Whether his imprudent actions amount to child endangerment is the question before us today. Our determination necessarily turns on the interpretation of a statute as it applies to the actions of the defendant as well as the constitutional implications of the statute. See Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(a) (1999). Because we agree with the district court that the defendant's actions constitute the crime of child endangerment, we affirm the district court's decision.
Edward Jerome Anspach, Jr. was stopped by police for speeding. He was traveling at a rate of fifty-three miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone. Police signaled by flashing lights for Anspach to stop. Police testimony indicated that rather than slow down and stop, Anspach actually sped up. Anspach then made two sharp turns onto a side street and then into an alley before finally coming to an abrupt stop. In his hastiness, Anspach left approximately thirty-foot skid marks on the road. When later asked by police why he did not immediately stop, Anspach told the officer he was losing his license in three days and did not want to get caught again. The weight of these facts indicate Anspach was trying to elude police.
Anspach was driving a truck containing several passengers. The open truck bed held two women, Ida and Carla Wallace. Police characterized the position of these women during the "chase" as one of "hanging on for dear life" "to keep from being thrown out." Anspach was reportedly taking Ida and Carla on errands.
The truck cab contained four small children — one was lying on the floor and three were sitting or lying on the seat. The ages of the children were one, two, two, and three. The youngest lay on the floor of the truck on top of garbage and debris, the two-year-olds were fastened with the same belt, and the three-year-old was completely unrestrained. No child was protected by a car seat or properly secured by a seat belt. The officer speculated that the children must have been thrown about in the cab when the car skidded around the corner and went into a slide before coming to rest in the alley. Ida was the mother of two of the children. Carla was babysitting the other two children for a friend. None of the children had a relationship with Anspach.
Anspach was immediately cited for four counts of failing to use a child restraint system under Des Moines City Ordinance section 27-446 (now section 114-446), failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, failure to have insurance, and speeding. See Iowa Code § 321.446 ( ). Anspach was later charged with four counts of child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), (3), which are aggravated misdemeanors. These new charges carried the threat of incarceration. Neither Ida nor Carla were charged with any misconduct for their part in this situation.
Prior to trial, Anspach made a motion to dismiss the child endangerment charges against him based on several constitutional arguments. This motion was denied. Anspach then waived his right to a jury and the case went to bench trial. Anspach was convicted on all counts and sentenced to four indeterminate terms of two years to be served concurrently. The court then suspended his sentence and placed him on probation for a period of twenty-four months. Anspach appeals this conviction. On appeal, he makes three arguments: (1) Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague by its undefined "substantial risk" requirement because it does not reasonably give fair warning to those who fall under it and enables arbitrary enforcement; (2) Evidence was insufficient to show that Anspach committed acts constituting a substantial risk to the children's safety; and (3) Anspach was erroneously charged with child endangerment because he had no custody or control over the children.
overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000)). "This presumption places a heavy burden on one challenging the constitutionality of the statute." Osmundson, 546 N.W.2d at 909. Accordingly, a contender must destroy any reasonable basis for the statute to secure a reversal. Wettach v. Iowa Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 524 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1994).
To the extent our review also requires us to interpret the meaning and scope of a particular statute, our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; State v. Orozco, 573 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1997). "When reviewing such issues we are not bound by the trial court's determinations of law." State v. Eickelberg, 574 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1997). Where the defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under the statute, "we review the evidence to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the offense charged" beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, our review of all the evidence in the record is made in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997).
The State maintains that Anspach failed to preserve error on his claim that section 726.6(1)(a) cannot apply to him because of the custody and control requirement. Anspach alleges he was erroneously charged with child endangerment because he did not have custody or control over the children in this situation. This issue questions the meaning of the term control and suggests that Anspach's circumstances were insufficient to show control. Anspach does not phrase his argument in terms of a constitutional void for vagueness challenge. Rather, he maintains that his conduct cannot be defined as control. We choose to interpret this issue as a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. When such a claim is made on appeal from a criminal bench trial, error preservation is no barrier. State v. Abbas, 561 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Iowa 1997) ( ).
The child endangerment statute in question is provided below:
Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(a), (3).
We will only address the issue of vagueness as it applies to Anspach's circumstances. In this regard, a criminal statute must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983). Thus, we will "consider whether [the defendant's] conduct clearly falls within the proscription of the statute under any construction." Hunter, 550 N.W.2d at 465 (citation omitted). Further, we recognize:
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...have held that the term "substantial risk" does not render a child endangerment statute unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Anspach , 627 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2001) (rejecting vagueness claim regarding endangerment statute prohibiting knowingly acting "in a manner that creates a substan......
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...context of child endangerment” means “[t]he very real possibility of danger to a child's physical health or safety.” State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Iowa 2001). The risk does not have to be likely, just real or identifiable. Id. at 232–33. The evidence offered by the State at trial t......
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...us to interpret the meaning and scope of a particular statute, our review is for correction of errors at law." State v. Anspach , 627 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). Further, claims of ineffective assistance are grounded in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and ar......
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Myers v. State
...have held that the term "substantial risk" does not render a child endangerment statute unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Anspach, 627 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2001) (rejecting vagueness claim regarding endangerment statute prohibiting knowingly acting "in a manner that creates a substant......