State v. Arradondo
| Decision Date | 04 August 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 38181,38181 |
| Citation | 110 N.W.2d 469,260 Minn. 512 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Booker ARRADONDO, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where defendant voluntarily signed typewritten statement admitting his guilt of crime with which he was charged; where such statement was obtained from him without threats or promises to induce it after he had been advised he was under no compulsion to give it and that it might be used against him; and where copy of statement was delivered to him in accordance with Minn. St. 611.033, Held that based upon such foundation statement properly received in evidence.
2. Where it is claimed jury panel was drawn contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions, it is incumbent upon party challenging panel on such ground to do so in writing before jury is sworn, and to specify facts upon which such challenge is based. In absence of fraud or collusion, objection to jury panel made subsequent to its verdict is too late.
3. Examination of record, including testimony adduced at trial, fails to reveal any testimony, statements, instructions, arguments, or proceedings throughout trial prejudicial to defendant because of his race, or that any claim to such effect or any objection based upon such a claim was made by defendant or his counsel throughout trial.
4. In criminal proceedings, testimony of witnesses as to criminal actions of defendant, similar to and occurring at about the same time as those with which defendant is charged in indictment or information, is admissible as tending to establish a common plan, scheme, or pattern of defendant to commit acts of the same nature and at about the same time.
5. Contrary to defendant's assertions here, record establishes that warrant for his arrest, dated November 4, 1959, and based upon complaint signed by father of prosecutrix charging defendant with crime of carnal knowledge of his daughter, then under age of 18 years, was issued by municipal court of Minneapolis and filed with clerk of said court on November 5, 1959, and with clerk of District Court of Hennepin County on November 18, 1959.
6. Affidavit of prosecutrix recanting her testimony has no basis for consideration in these proceedings, and in any event would be without merit in view of defendant's admission of guilt, both before trial and after his conviction by jury. Only in extraordinary and unusual cases will new trial be allowed because of recanting statements of witness.
John B. Arradondo, in pro. per.
Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, George Scott, County Atty., Chester Durda, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Defendant appeals from his conviction of the crime of carnal knowledge and abuse of a female child under the age of 18 years. On appeal he asserts that (1) the court erred in receiving a confession made by him to a police officer after his arrest; (2) the court erred in 'excluding all members of the petitioner's race (Negro) from the jury' and that statements to the jury that there should be no prejudice because of defendant's color or because the girls involved were white deprived him of a fair trial; (3) the court erred in allowing testimony of two girls as to other acts of defendant which had no relation to the charge upon which he was being held; and (4) no warrant was issued for his arrest.
The evidence indicates that sometime during March or April of 1957 defendant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, then 14 years of age, in an apartment in north Minneapolis. This girl testified that this was her first act of this kind and that defendant had accomplished it by using force upon her. She testified further that for 16 months she was sent to the Home of the Good Shepherd as a juvenile delinquent; that on September 23, 1959, and on October 5, 1959, she again had sexual intercourse with defendant at his brother's home in Minneapolis; that she was then 16 years of age; that defendant at times had discussed marriage with her; that he had talked about getting girls to 'hustle' for him; and that she had talked with defendant sometime in October 1959 and had then told him that she thought she might be 'sent up again' and that he would be involved, but that defendant had not seemed worried about it and had said that the law 'couldn't do anything to him.'
Two other girls, each 16 years of age, testified against defendant. Testimony of one of these girls was that defendant had had sexual intercourse with her in the months of March, April, May, June, July, and August of 1959, mostly at the homes of his cousin and his mother in Minneapolis; that he had discussed the subject of marriage with her and had said that he needed money and wanted her to go on the streets working for him as a prostitute. The other girl testified that about the middle of October 1959 she had had sexual intercourse with defendant at her apartment in Minneapolis; that he had talked about their getting married; and that he had told her she should go out on the streets for herself so that she could get the things she wanted.
In a written statement signed by defendant made to the police on November 3, 1959, shortly after his arrest, defendant admitted that he had had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix on October 5, 1959, in Minneapolis; that at about that time he had had sexual intercourse with one of the other two girls testifying; and that he knew at the time that each of these girls was of the age of 16 years. 1 The police officer also testified that before he took the written statement from defendant he had asked defendant similar questions and received similar answers to those included in the statement. Defendant did not take the stand nor deny any of the testimony outlined above.
Defendant's trial in district court commenced and was completed on November 23, 1959. After a short deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on that date. On January 20, 1960, after a presentence investigation, 2 the court sentenced defendant as follows:
'The Court: It is the sentence of this Court that you, John Booker Arradondo, for the crime of Carnal Knowledge and Abuse of a Female Child, of which you have been found and adjudged by a verdict of the jury of guilty heretofore entered herein, and of which you are hereby adjudged guilty, be sentenced to the Youth Conservation Commission of the State of Minnesota until by them discharged under due process of law.
1. We find no error in the court's reception of the typewritten statement signed by defendant wherein he confessed his guilt. It was made voluntarily to a police officer shortly after defendant's arrest. It was not taken until after he had been advised that he was under no compulsion to give it and that it might be used against him at his trial. He acknowledged receipt of a copy thereof by endorsement thereon to such effect pursuant to Minn. St. 611.033. It is well established that a confession not induced by threats of harm or promise of favor or reward is admissible in evidence. State v. Potoniec, 117 Minn. 80, 134 N.W. 305; State v. Nordstrom, 146 Minn. 136, 178 N.W. 164; 5 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 2462. Whether a confession was given under such circumstances ordinarily is for the trial court, and its determination in this respect will not be reversed unless it is manifestly contrary to the evidence submitted to establish that the confession was obtained without threats or compulsion and after defendant had been fully advised as to his rights with respect thereto. State v. Nelson, 199 Minn. 86, 271 N.W. 114; State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N.W.2d 585. Examination of the record here clearly establishes that the court's action in receiving defendant's confession in evidence was proper under the principles above set forth.
2. There is nothing which even slightly suggests that the jury panel, from which the jurors selected to try defendant were drawn, was impaneled contrary to constitutional or statutory requirements; or that prejudicial statements to the jury deprived defendant of a fair trial because of his race. But even if there were evidence that constitutional or statutory provisions had been violated in drawing the panel, it would have been incumbent upon defendant to challenge in writing before it was sworn and to specify the facts upon which the challenge was based. § 631.23; State ex rel. Passer v. Renville County Board, 171 Minn. 177, 213 N.W. 545, 52 A.L.R. 916. 10 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 5248. It is well established that in the absence of fraud or collusion an objection to a jury panel made subsequent to its verdict comes too late. State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 112 N.W. 409.
Here, the absence of evidence that defendant's jury was not properly...
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