State v. Arthur, Docket No. 31470 (ID 5/12/2006)
| Decision Date | 12 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 31470. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WILLIAM ARTHUR, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
Order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed; order granting I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Courtney E. Beebe, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
William Arthur appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Arthur also appeals from the district court's order granting his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Arthur was arrested for stealing jewelry from the home of his aunt and uncle when he was living as a guest in their home. The state charged Arthur with grand theft, I.C. § 18-2403, 18-2407; burglary, I.C. § 18-1401; and resisting and obstructing officers, I.C. § 18-705. Part two of the charging information alleged that Arthur was a persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514, based on four prior Washington State felony convictions for first degree rape of a child, second degree robbery, second degree assault, and taking a motor vehicle without permission. On the day the case was set for trial, Arthur entered an Alford1 plea to grand theft and admitted to being a persistent violator in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. Prior to sentencing, Arthur moved the district court to withdraw his plea after seeing his presentence investigation report (PSI) indicating he had been convicted of or charged with numerous other felonies and misdemeanors. Arthur's motion to withdraw plea originally sought to withdraw the entire plea. At the hearing on the motion, Arthur informed the district court that he only sought to withdraw his plea as to the admittance of being a persistent violator. The district court denied the motion after hearing testimony and oral argument. The district court sentenced Arthur to a unified term of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of two years. Arthur filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, presenting new information to the district court that he was seriously ill. The district court granted the motion, reducing Arthur's term to a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of one year and ten months. Arthur appeals.
Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. Id. Also of importance is whether the motion to withdraw a plea is made before or after sentence is imposed. When moving for a withdrawal of guilty plea prior to sentencing, the defendant bears the burden of proving a just reason for withdrawing the plea, whereas the district court may allow withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing only to correct a manifest injustice. I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). Even when the motion is presented before sentencing, if it occurs after the defendant has learned the content of the PSI or has received other information about the probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive. Id. In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, and voluntariness requires that the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he or she is pleading guilty. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583.
During the hearing on Arthur's motion to withdraw his plea, he sought only to withdraw his admission to being a persistent violator. On appeal, Arthur argues that he felt pressured to agree to admit being a persistent violator, that he wanted only to plead guilty to grand theft, and that he was confused and did not make an informed choice when admitting to being a persistent violator.
At the withdrawal of guilty plea hearing, the district court found that Arthur, his counsel, counsel for the state, and the district court had a lengthy discussion regarding the persistent violator portion of the plea just prior to the scheduled jury trial and that Arthur's potential sentence, with the inclusion of the persistent violator charge, was fully discussed at that time. The district court went on to find that at the time Arthur's guilty plea was entered, he was fully informed on what he was pleading guilty to and the consequences of that plea, all of which he agreed with and stated on the record that he understood. The district court then found that Arthur provided no evidence that the prior convictions that formed the basis for his persistent violator admission were invalid. Based on these findings, the district court denied Arthur's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as Arthur failed to demonstrate just cause to withdraw his plea.
Upon review of the record, Arthur has failed to show that he did not understand what charges he was pleading guilty to or the potential length of sentence that could be imposed for those charges. The district court's denial of the motion to withdraw Arthur's guilty plea was not arbitrary in view of Arthur's failure to show just cause for withdrawal and his knowledge of the contents of his PSI. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Arthur's motion.
Arthur asserts the district court abused its discretion in not reducing his sentence further than it did when the district court granted Arthur's Rule 35 motion. Arthur urges this Court to review both the determinate and indeterminate portions of his sentence. Arthur argues review of the indeterminate portion of his sentence is appropriate because the disparity between the respective lengths of the determinate and indeterminate portions of his sentence is a special circumstance. Alternatively, Arthur argues the fact that he has served the determinate portion of his sentence, and has been denied parole, is also a special circumstance. Finally, Arthur contends the district court abused its discretion in not further reducing his sentence given his grave medical condition.
Initially, we note that a lower court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 35 motion will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Villarreal, 126 Idaho 277, 281, 882 P.2d 444, 448 (Ct. App. 1994). Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). Since the district court later modified Arthur's sentence, pursuant to his Rule 35 motion, we will only review his modified sentence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939, 940-41, 842 P.2d 275, 276-77 (1992). If the sentence is found to be reasonable at the time of pronouncement, the defendant must then show that it is excessive in view of the additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Hernandez, 121 Idaho at 117, 822 P.2d at 1014.
When reviewing a sentence imposed under the Uniform Sentencing Act, we treat the minimum period of incarceration as the probable duration of confinement. I.C. § 19-2513; State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). By focusing on this period, we do not wholly disregard the aggregate length of the sentence, but we recognize that a defendant will be eligible for parole at that time. Id. The indeterminate portion of a sentence will be examined on appeal only if the defendant shows that special circumstances require consideration of more than the fixed period of confinement. State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 628, 962 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Herrera, 130 Idaho 839, 840, 949 P.2d 226, 227 (Ct. App. 1997).
Arthur argues that, because the determinate portion of his sentence is so short and the indeterminate portion is much longer, any meaningful review of the sentence must include both the determinate and indeterminate portions of his sentence. As stated above, when reviewing a sentence we do not wholly disregard the entire aggregate length of the sentence. Sanchez, 115 Idaho at 777, 769 P.2d at 1149. However, the fact that the indeterminate portion is significantly longer then the determinate portion of his sentence does not rebut the presumption that the determinate portion is the probable term of confinement.
Upon motion by Arthur, this Court took judicial notice of the fact that Arthur was denied parole by the parole commission and received a full term release date. Arthur contends that, having been denied parole, he is subject to life imprisonment with no realistic possibility for review, providing a special circumstance requiring this Court to review the indeterminate portion of his sentence. This Court has previously ruled that serving the determinate portion of a defendant's sentence, and being denied parole, rebuts the presumption that the determinate term is the probable measure of confinement. See Casper, __ Idaho __, __ P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2006); Huffman, __ Idaho __, ___ P.3d __ (Ct. App. 2006). In Casper, we determined that when an appellant has served his or her determinate term, but has not yet been denied...
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