State v. Astello

• Decision Date: 27 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-0734.,98-0734.
• Citation: 602 N.W.2d 190
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Juan Carlos ASTELLO, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

602 N.W.2d 190

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Juan Carlos ASTELLO, Appellant.

No. 98-0734.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

August 27, 1999.

Shawn Wehde of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson, P.C., Waterloo, for Appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Michael L. Zenor, County Attorney, and Richard J. Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, for Appellee.

Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and STREIT and VOGEL, JJ.

HUITINK, P.J.

Juan Astello appeals from his convictions for second-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit a forcible felony. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Juan Carlos Astello was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to commit a forcible felony, and criminal gang participation in the shooting death of Gregory "Sky" Erickson. Under the State's theory, Erickson was kidnapped and murdered by members of the Los Krazy Boyz, an Estherville Gang, over a disputed drug debt.

According to the State's evidence, Luis Lua and other gang members assaulted and abducted Erickson in Spencer on June 6, 1997. Although not present at the time Erickson was abducted, Astello joined Lua and others later that evening in Estherville. Astello was seen leaving Lua's Estherville residence with Erickson and Ramiro Astello. This group met Ryan Wedebrand and Thomas Mann at a rural Iowa park where Erickson was bound, gagged, and repeatedly beaten by Juan Astello and other gang members present. Although Lua pointed a gun at Erickson, he did not shoot Erickson following a "not here" admonition by another member of the group. Erickson was then placed in the trunk of the car by Astello and others, covered by a garbage bag, and driven to an abandoned Minnesota farmstead where he was shot to death by Lua. While en route to Minnesota, Lua told the others he had enough ammunition for each of them to shoot Erickson. Wedebrand shot Erickson in the hip after Lua fatally shot Erickson in the head. Although others attempted to shoot Erickson after Wedebrand, Lua's gun jammed, and they were unsuccessful.

Astello was first interviewed by police officers on June 15, 1997, as part of an investigation into the suspected disappearance of Shawn Knakmuhs. On that date police stopped Astello's car because it matched the description of a car in which Knakmuhs was last seen. Astello and his passenger, Luis Lua, were asked by authorities to go to the Emmet County Law Enforcement Center for an interview with an investigator from Minnesota. While there, Astello was asked if he knew Knakmuhs or what may have happened to him. Astello denied knowing Knakmuhs or anything about his disappearance.

On June 18, 1998, Astello's car was seized by authorities as part of an investigation into Erickson's death. Astello was told he could obtain a copy of the relevant search warrant at the Emmet County Law Enforcement Center. While there, Astello was again asked to submit to an interview by authorities. Because Astello was only sixteen years of age, authorities obtained written consent from Astello's father to question Astello. Astello also signed a "Waiver for Juveniles—Sixteen and Over" form consenting to the interview and waiving a number of specified constitutional rights. During this interview Astello was asked about his relationship with Erickson, the last time he saw Erickson, and Astello's activities on June 5 and 6, 1997. Astello denied Erickson was in his car on June 6 or that he was in any way involved in Erickson's murder.

Astello moved to suppress both of these statements and a third statement obtained from him later on June 18, 1997. The district court declined to suppress the June 15 and first June 18 statement after determining both were noncustodial and voluntarily made. The second June 18 statement was suppressed because it resulted from questioning after Astello asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Transcripts of the June 15 and first June 18 statements were offered and admitted at trial.

The State's evidence also included photographs, slides, and a videotape depicting Erickson's body at the crime scene and during an autopsy. These exhibits were admitted over Astello's objection to their relevance and inflammatory depictions.

Following trial, the jury found Astello guilty of second-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit a forcible felony. Astello was sentenced to an indeterminate fifty-year term of incarceration for second-degree murder and a life sentence without the possibility of parole for first-degree kidnapping. The conspiracy count was dismissed.

On appeal, Astello claims: (1) the district court erred in the admission of the photograph and videotape exhibits depicting Erickson's decomposing remains; (2) there is not sufficient evidence supporting the kidnapping conviction; (3) Iowa lacks territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him for murder; (4) the district court erred in failing to suppress his June 15 and June 18, 1997, statements he made to authorities; and (5) he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.

II. Territorial Jurisdiction.

We review Astello's jurisdictional claims for errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 4.

Astello's jurisdictional claims are premised on the fact Erickson was killed in Minnesota. We rejected a similar claim in State v. Wedebrand, 602 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa App.1999), a companion case, citing Iowa's jurisdiction to prosecute offenses committed partly within this state. See Iowa Code §§ 803.1(a), .2 (1997). We find it sufficient to note substantial evidence in the record indicating Astello's participation in Erickson's abduction, beating, and transportation to Minnesota. We affirm on this issue.

III. Motion to Suppress.

Astello's motion to suppress the statements made on June 15 and June 18 were premised on investigating officers' failure to comply with mandatory constitutional and statutory procedures concerning custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials. Specifically, Astello cites failure of investigators to administer Miranda warnings and consult his parents before the June 15 interview.¹ Astello also claims investigators' failure to terminate the June 18 interrogation following assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent necessitates suppression of any subsequent statements made.

Because Astello's constitutional rights are implicated, our review is de novo. State v. Thomas, 540 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1995). We make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Iowa 1982) (citations omitted).

June 15 Statement.

A person questioned by law enforcement after being "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" must first "be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966). Miranda only applies when a defendant is interrogated while in custody. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977); State v. Cook, 330 N.W.2d 306, 311-13 (Iowa 1983).

The fact that police officers are involved in questioning does not make it a custodial interrogation. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714.

[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a "coercive environment." Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.

Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719.

Iowa has adopted a four-factor test to guide courts in making this determination: (1) the language used to summon a person for question; (2) the purpose, place and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to which a person is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; and (4) whether the person is free to leave the place of questioning. See State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994) (citations omitted). A fifth factor, age of the person, was subsequently added based on a perceived "danger of overwhelming a minor defendant" in this situation. See State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 922-23 (Iowa 1996).

The record indicates Astello was asked rather than directed to go to the Emmet County Law Enforcement Center for questioning. Investigators expressly informed Astello that he was not under arrest and was free to leave the law enforcement center at any time. The resulting questioning was brief, and the interview promptly ended when investigators learned Astello's car was not implicated in their investigation of Shawn Knakmuhs's disappearance.

We, on these facts, find Astello's June 15 interrogation was noncustodial. Neither the obligation to administer Miranda warnings or procedures for custodial interrogation of a juvenile were implicated. We affirm on this issue. June 18 Statement.

Unlike Astello's June 15 encounter with investigators, his interrogation on ...