State v. Baird

Decision Date05 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. C1-01-894.,C1-01-894.
Citation654 N.W.2d 105
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Jeffrey Warren BAIRD, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, Kelly O'Neill Moller, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Glasrud, Stevens County Attorney, Morris, for Appellant.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Marie Wolf, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

We are asked in this case if our holding in State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn.2001)—that when acting in self-defense there is no duty to retreat from one's own home even if the aggressor is a co-resident—is to be given retroactive application. We hold that the Glowacki rule applies retroactively. Further, we hold that the district court's erroneous instruction that respondent had a duty to retreat constitutes plain error and requires a new trial.

Respondent Jeffrey Warren Baird was charged with disorderly conduct, fifth-degree assault, and third-degree assault, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1 (1998), § 609.224, subd. 1 (1998), and § 609.223, subd. 1 (1998), respectively, in connection with an altercation with a co-resident at Baird's home. Baird asserted at trial that he was acting in self-defense, and the district court instructed the jury that Baird had a duty to retreat. Baird was found guilty on all charges. Baird appealed the third-degree assault conviction, contending that the district court committed plain error by instructing the jury that he had a duty to retreat when the assault occurred inside his home. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that the district court had erred by instructing the jury that Baird had a duty to retreat, and remanded to the district court for a new trial. We affirm the court of appeals.

Baird and James Nelson resided together in Baird's motor home at a campground. At about 1:30 a.m. on June 16, 2000, Nelson, Baird, and Jolene Bedel, Baird's ex-wife, returned to the campground from a local bar. All three had been drinking.1 Nelson's girlfriend Alicia Bergs was at the motor home at that time. Bedel wanted to leave the campground in her vehicle, but Baird thought she was too drunk to drive and confronted her, taking away her keys. Nelson offered to let Bedel use his vehicle, but Baird blocked the door to Nelson's vehicle. Those who testified dispute what happened next.

Nelson testified that he tried to push Baird away from the vehicle's door but did not threaten or punch Baird. Baird became hostile and egged Nelson on, saying "let's go" and "come on" before tackling Nelson and pinning him face-down to the ground. Nelson did not strike back. Bergs added that when she tried to break up the fight, Baird stood up and elbowed her in the chin. Nelson told Baird to leave Bergs alone, and Baird resumed attacking Nelson, telling him to get his things from inside the motor home and leave. Finally Baird and Nelson stood up. Nelson and Bergs went inside the motor home to collect Nelson's belongings. Baird followed them. He attacked Nelson again, this time pinning Nelson face down on the bed and punching him. Nelson admitted that he may have had a screwdriver in his hand while inside the motor home and that someone had taken it away from him. Bergs' testimony was consistent with Nelson's.

Baird testified that Nelson tried to push him away from the vehicle door. Eventually, Baird swung at Nelson, who fell to the ground. Baird admitted that he continued to punch Nelson in the back and that he went "a little overboard" in attacking Nelson. After Nelson and Bergs went into the motor home, Baird heard a loud "kaboom." He went inside to investigate. Inside he saw his television set "all over the floor" and Nelson approaching him with a screwdriver in his hand. Afraid that Nelson was going to stab him with the screwdriver, Baird hit Nelson in the face and wrenched his arm so that someone could take the screwdriver away from him. Baird admitted that he was nearest the motor home door and could have left at any time.

After the altercation, Nelson reported the incident to police. Baird was charged with disorderly conduct, fifth-degree assault, and third-degree assault. He claimed self-defense. The district court instructed the jury that the excuse of self-defense imposes a duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible:

The legal excuse of self defense [sic] is only available to those who act honestly and in good faith. This includes the duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible.

Baird did not object to the instruction at trial.2 The jury found Baird guilty on all counts.3

Baird appealed from the judgment of conviction of third-degree assault. State v. Baird, 640 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.App. 2002). He argued that the district court committed plain error by instructing the jury that he had a duty to retreat when the assault took place inside his own home. Id. at 366. Because Baird did not make an objection at trial or make a motion for a new trial based on the instruction, the court of appeals applied the plain error test. Id. Under the first prong of the plain error test, the court of appeals considered whether the duty-to-retreat instruction was error. Id. at 367. The court noted that State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 800 n. 5 (Minn.1989), and State v. Morrison, 351 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. 1984),4 seemed to approve of jury instructions that imposed a duty to retreat within one's home when the aggressor is a co-resident. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 367. Looking to State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 902-04 (Minn.1999), and our decision in Glowacki, however, the court of appeals concluded that the duty-to-retreat instructions had been summarily upheld in Hennum and Morrison and that self-defense in the home should not include a duty to retreat. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 367.

The court of appeals acknowledged the general rule under Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn.1982), that absent special circumstances or specific pronouncements of prospectivity, a decision is given retroactive effect. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 367. Recognizing that this court did not specifically indicate that Glowacki should apply only prospectively, the court of appeals continued its analysis under the special circumstances test. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 367-68. The court determined that Glowacki failed under the first factor of the special circumstances test because the Glowacki decision did not establish a new principle of law by overruling clear past precedent. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 368. Because special circumstances did not exist, the court of appeals held that Glowacki would be given retroactive effect. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 368.

The court of appeals then returned to the plain error test. Id. at 368. The court determined that the district court erred and that the error was plain because, under Glowacki, the district court should not have instructed the jury that Baird had a duty to retreat. Baird, 640 N.W.2d at 368. The court then examined the third prong of the plain error test—whether "`the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case'" — and decided that the error was prejudicial. Id. at 369 (quoting State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn.1998)). The court concluded that all three prongs of the plain error test were satisfied and that the error was not harmless, warranting reversal and remand for a new trial. Id. at 369-70.

I.

Whether a decision applies retroactively or nonretroactively is a legal question we review de novo. State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.2002).5 Generally, our rulings are given retroactive effect. Baker v. State, 590 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn.1999). We have followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court, however, in making certain limited exceptions to the general rule. Thus, in State v. Hamm, we adopted a test developed by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), for determining whether a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be applied prospectively. State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn.1988) (holding that the Minnesota Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's right to a 12-person jury in misdemeanor prosecutions and, adopting the Supreme Court's clear break exception, applying rule prospectively), superseded on other grounds by Minn. Const. art. I, § 4; see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)

(discussing Linkletter); see also State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 906-07 (Minn.1977) (adopting procedural rule in dual-representation situation for defendants to be advised of their right to counsel and, citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629,

85 S.Ct. 1731 and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), holding new rule is prospective).6 Similarly, in Hoff v. Kempton, we adopted the special circumstances test for dealing with the retroactivity question as announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Hoff, 317 N.W.2d at 363-65 (applying Chevron Oil and holding that the rule of Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980), that the attachment-of-insurance-policy method of establishing quasi-in-rem jurisdiction denies an out-of-state defendant's due process rights, applies retroactively).

In this case, the parties have assumed the applicability of the Chevron Oil special circumstances test and have asked us to give Glowacki retroactive or nonretroactive effect on the basis of whether a special circumstances exception exists. The special circumstances test requires that three factors be satisfied for a decision to apply nonretroactively:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law,
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