State v. Baker

• Decision Date: 13 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-346,96-346
• Citation: 78 Ohio St.3d 108,676 N.E.2d 883
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BAKER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 108

78 Ohio St.3d 108

676 N.E.2d 883

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BAKER, Appellee.

No. 96-346.

Supreme Court of Ohio Submitted at the Urbana Session

Nov. 13, 1996.

Decided April 2, 1997.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

In issuing a subsequent indictment, the state is not subject to the speedy-trial timetable of the initial indictment, when additional criminal charges arise from facts different from the original charges, or the state did not know of these facts at the time of the initial indictment.

On June 10, 1993, Dale Baker, defendant-appellee, a pharmacist, was arrested at his home by Montgomery County Sheriff's Deputies after an investigation revealed that he had made several illegal sales of prescription drugs to police informants. That same day, after arresting Baker, deputies and other law enforcement agents, working in connection with the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy, executed search warrants for two pharmacies that Baker owned. As a result of these warrants, state agents seized numerous business and financial records from the pharmacies, which the state began analyzing to determine if there was additional criminal conduct.

One week after his arrest, Baker was indicted by a Montgomery County Grand Jury and charged with two counts of trafficking in drugs, and five counts of aggravated trafficking. These charges stemmed from the original controlled buys that occurred before Baker's arrest and the search of his pharmacies.

While these original charges were being brought against Baker, state agents and sheriff's detectives were auditing the records seized at Baker's pharmacies. This process involved analyzing prescription records and purchase reports to determine possible drug shortages, which would indicate criminal or administrative violations of law. The audits for the pharmacies, Baker's Northridge Drug Store and Baker's Dixie Drugs, were completed by August 18, 1993 and September 15, 1993, respectively. As a result of these audits, a second indictment was filed, charging Baker with eight additional counts of drug trafficking, one count of aggravated trafficking, and one count of Medicaid fraud. This subsequent indictment was filed on June 1, 1994, almost a year after the arrest and the original filing of the indictment against Baker, and nine months after the audits of Baker's pharmacy records were both completed.

On July 27, 1994, Baker filed a motion to dismiss the second indictment, alleging that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Baker argued that the statute required the state to bring him to trial on the second indictment within the same period as the first, that is, 270 days from Baker's arrest on June 10, 1993. However, in upholding the second indictment, the trial court held that the allegations and proof for the two indictments were different from each other, and the state was justified in delaying the second indictment until it was able to analyze Baker's extensive pharmaceutical records for evidence of additional criminal misconduct. Baker agreed to enter negotiated pleas on both cases, and plead no contest to one count of trafficking in drugs and one count of Medicaid fraud on the second indictment. On the original indictment, the state reduced the five counts of aggravated trafficking to trafficking in drugs, and Baker pleaded no contest to seven counts of trafficking in drugs.

On appeal, Baker challenged his convictions arising from the second indictment, arguing his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated. The court of appeals affirmed his judgment of conviction on the original indictment, but agreed that Baker's statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated as to the second indictment. The appellate court held that the speedy-trial clock as to the second indictment began to run on the date of Baker's arrest on June 10, 1993; however, the state was entitled to have time tolled from that date until September 15, 1993, the date when both audits were completed by the state concerning Baker's pharmacy records. Despite this tolled period, the court established that the state had failed to bring Baker to trial within the 270-day period, and the court reversed Baker's judgment of conviction under the second indictment. The state appealed, arguing that the 270-day time period concerning the additional charges should commence from the date the second indictment was returned on June 1, 1994.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Lawrence W. Henke, III and Kelly M. Young, Dayton, for appellee.

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., Justice.

At issue in this case is whether Ohio's Constitution or speedy-trial statute requires additional criminal charges filed in a subsequent indictment to run from the date of defendant's original arrest, with time tolled during the state's audits of seized evidence, or whether the statute allows the state a new time period from the date of the subsequent indictment. For the following reasons, we hold that in issuing a subsequent indictment, the state is not subject to the speedy-trial timetable of the initial indictment,...