State v. Balderrama
Decision Date | 23 December 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 1303,1303 |
Citation | 97 Ariz. 134,397 P.2d 632 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ruben BALDERRAMA, Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Samuel J. Macaluso, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles N. Ronan, Maricopa County Atty., for appellee.
Peterson, Estrada & Matz, Phoenix, for appellant.
Appellant was convicted in a trial by a jury in Maricopa County Superior Court of the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon, A.R.S. § 13-249, and leaving the scene of an accident, A.R.S. § 28-661. Appellant appeals from the conviction of assault with a deadly weapon but does not appeal from the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.
Appellant's automobile struck a 10 year old boy at the intersection of 18th Street and Hadley Street in the City of Phoenix at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The boy had just left a school bus, and was crossing the street. There is some dispute in the evidence as to whether he was actually struck by appellant's car, or tripped in an effort to avoid being hit by appellant's car. In any event, his injuries consisted of cuts he received when he struck the pavement. After being treated at the hospital he was immediately released. The testimony of state witnesses was that appellant was drunk. He was driving between 35 and 40 miles per hour, and the State contends that this was an imprudent speed under the circumstances of this case.
The issue raised by this appeal is whether a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, A.R.S. § 13-249, can be sustained in a case involving a motor vehicle where the State relies on allegations of wilful and gross negligence as a substitute for the specific intent to do harm as required under the statute. The statute provides:
' § 13-249. Assault with deadly weapon or force; punishment
'A person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means or force likely to produce great bodily injury, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one nor more than ten years, by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.'
Appellant was sentenced to from 2 to 5 years for assault with a deadly weapon.
In previous cases in this court the 'deadly weapon' involved has been some sort of instrument intended to be used as a weapon. In State v. Cumbo, 96 Ariz. 385, 396 P.2d 11, it appears that the victim was struck by a gun. The gun was actually fired in Gonzalez v. State, 21 Ariz. 385, 188 P. 872; Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 P. 869, L.R.A.1918D, 373; Hann v. State, 30 Ariz. 366, 247 P. 129; Tamborino v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 194, 246, 62 P. 693, 64 P. 492; Riley v. State, 50 Ariz. 442, 73 P.2d 96; Bellamack v. State, 37 Ariz. 344, 294 P. 622; West v. Territory, 4 Ariz. 212, 36 P. 207; Richardson v. State, 34 Ariz. 139, 268 P. 615; Lee v. State, 27 Ariz. 52, 229 P. 939; State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972. The assault was made with guns which were not fired in Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 P. 702, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 975; Ryan v. Territory, 12 Ariz. 208, 100 P. 770; State v. Aldrich, 75 Ariz. 53, 251 P.2d 653. In State v. Mace, 86 Ariz. 85, 340 P.2d 994, a razor was used. In Midkiff v. State, 29 Ariz. 523, 243 P. 601; Dunn v. State, 50 Ariz. 473, 73 P.2d 107, and Caston v. State, 24 Ariz. 593, 211 P. 866, a knife was used.
The Arizona deadly weapon statute is derived from California. The only change since territorial days has been to increase the maximum penalty from five to ten years. The corresponding statute in California is West's Ann.Pen.Code § 245. An examination of the cases cited in the annotation to that section shows that California also has, in practice, with a few possible exceptions, restricted the meaning of 'deadly weapon' to its traditional and obvious one.
People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 P.2d 464, cited by the State was a case in which the defendant shot and seriously wounded his daughter and her husband with a shotgun during a family dispute over the attempted removal of furniture they owned from a house owned by defendant. No automobile was involved. The reasoning of the opinion must be read in the light of the facts before the court.
The situation in which an automobile is properly considered a deadly weapon is illustrated by People v. Flummerfelt, 153 Cal.App.2d 104, 313 P.2d 912. In upholding a conviction under Calif.Pen.Code § 245, (the equivalent of A.R.S. § 13-249), the court after stating facts showing an argument between the parties, said at page 913:
People v. Goolsby, 284 Mich. 375, 279 N.W. 867, involved a 'dangerous weapon' statute rather than a 'deadly weapon' statute. The agreed facts were:
These facts would constitute an assault under any form of statute. The situation is similar to that in the most recent California case, People v. Claborn, Cal.App., 36 Cal.Rptr. 132, where:
In all such situations referred to above a prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-249 would be proper. There was evidence of an actual intent to harm, and the vehicles were aimed, just as a shotgun is aimed. The element of actual intent to use the automobile as a deadly weapon, absent in this case, was the essential element in all of the above referred to cases.
It is true that some states use the assault with a deadly weapon statute to try automobile accidents, especially those involving drunken driving or other serious offenses. Among these is Florida, Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 980, 111 So. 124, 53 A.L.R. 250. Williamson was influenced by the fact that Florida held automobiles generally to be 'dangerous instrumentalities', Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R. 255. We do not regard Williamson as controlling in states which do not class automobiles as 'dangerous instrumentalities'. Florida classes automobiles with loaded firearms for all purposes. Southern Cotton Oil Co., supra.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has approved the use of that state's assault with a dangerous weapon statute in drunken driving cases. Beck v. State, 73 Okl.Cr. 229, 119 P.2d 865. The Oklahoma dangerous weapon statute is broader in scope than the Arizona deadly weapon statute, though like the Arizona statute it was adopted in territorial days before the invention of the automobile. The Oklahoma court also classified the automobile as a 'dangerous instrumentality', and relied on Williamson, supra. The Oklahoma rule is not applicable under our statute.
In North Carolina, evidence of speeding or of driving on the wrong side of the road will support a conviction for an assault with a deadly weapon. State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828, 27 A.L.R. 1180. The North Carolina rule is based upon the assumption that '[w]here the facts of a case of homicide constitute the crime of manslaughter, the same state of facts will make an assault if no killing ensues.' This view disregards the fact that historically,...
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