State v. Barnett

• Decision Date: 14 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC 98268,SC 98268
• Citation: 598 S.W.3d 127
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. David M. BARNETT, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

598 S.W.3d 127

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.David M. BARNETT, Appellant.

No. SC 98268

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued April 14, 2020

Barnett was represented by Rosemary E. Percival of the public defender’s office in Kansas City, (816) 889-7699.

The state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Chief Justice

David M. Barnett (hereinafter, "Barnett") appeals from the circuit court’s judgment sentencing him to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to section 565.020¹ for the first-degree murders of his grandparents. Barnett argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to declare section 565.020 unconstitutional as applied to him and sentencing him to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for offenses he committed when he was 19 years old because the sentences violate the federal and state prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. This Court holds section 565.020 is constitutional as applied to Barnett. The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History²

On February 4, 1996, Barnett walked to his grandparents’ home and entered through a bedroom window. Barnett’s grandparents were attending Sunday school and church services. When Barnett’s grandparents returned home, Barnett confronted them. He pushed his grandmother down a hallway and pushed his grandfather to the floor. Barnett grabbed a knife from the nearby kitchen table and proceeded to inflict ten stab wounds and numerous cuts to his grandfather’s neck, face, and hands. Barnett retrieved another knife and began stabbing his grandmother in her neck. Barnett returned to the kitchen to obtain two additional knives and inflicted a total of twelve stab wounds to his grandmother’s neck and numerous cuts to her face.

Barnett concealed one of the knives between two mattress pads in a bedroom and washed the blood from his hands. Barnett took approximately $120 from his grandmother’s purse and the keys to their vehicle. Before leaving the home, Barnett stood silently over his grandparents to ascertain whether they were still breathing. After determining they were dead, Barnett lowered two window shades, locked the home, and drove away in their vehicle. Police apprehended Barnett the next day, and he confessed to the murders. Barnett was 19 years old.

A jury found Barnett guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action. Barnett was sentenced to death for each murder count and consecutive life sentences for the robbery and armed criminal action counts. This Court affirmed Barnett’s convictions. State v. Barnett , 980 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. banc 1998).

Barnett sought post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to investigate and provide the jury with information about his biological mother, her family, and the environmental and genetic factors affecting his development. This Court declined relief on this claim and affirmed the motion court’s judgment denying relief. Barnett v. State , 103 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Mo. banc 2003).

Beginning in 2004, Barnett embarked on a long course of federal habeas corpus litigation regarding trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating family history evidence during the penalty phase of his trial. Barnett’s claims were denied repeatedly until 2013, when the federal district court granted Barnett an evidentiary hearing. After a nine-day hearing, the federal district court issued a 189-page judgment granting Barnett relief from his death sentence. The federal district court ordered the state of Missouri to either sentence Barnett to life without the possibility of probation or parole or grant him a new penalty phase trial. The state appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s judgment. Barnett v. Roper , 904 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 2018).

On remand, the state declined to seek the death penalty. Barnett submitted a sentencing memorandum arguing section 565.020 was unconstitutional as applied to him. Barnett contended the principles applied by the United States Supreme Court in its recent criminal jurisprudence concerning juveniles younger than 18 years old applied with equal force to his offenses that occurred when he was 19 years old. The circuit court held a sentencing hearing, rejected Barnett’s claims, and sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole on both murder counts. Barnett filed his notice of appeal in the court of appeals, challenging section 565.020’s constitutional validity. The court of appeals transferred Barnett’s appeal to this Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.

Standard of Review

All statutes are presumed constitutional. Lopez-Matias v. State , 504 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Mo. banc 2016). "Challenges to the constitutional validity of a state statute are subject to de novo review." State v. Shanklin , 534 S.W.3d 240, 241 (Mo. banc 2017). This Court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it clearly and unambiguously contravenes a constitutional provision. State v. Pribble , 285 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Mo. banc 2009). The parties dispute whether Barnett preserved his constitutional claim for review. This Court need not resolve this question because Barnett’s claim fails regardless of which standard of review is applied.

Constitutional Validity of Section 565.020

At the time of Barnett’s offenses, section 565.020.2 provided that first-degree murder shall be punishable by "either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole...." Barnett argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to declare section 565.020 unconstitutional as applied to him and in sentencing him to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for offenses he committed when he was 19 years old. Barnett argues section 565.020 mandating this sentence violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution. Barnett further argues newly available scientific evidence indicates the justifications the United States Supreme Court relied upon to ban imposing the death sentence and mandatory life without the possibility of parole sentences for offenders younger than 18 years old apply with equal force to offenders who commit crimes at 19 years old because those offenders also display the transient, hallmark features of adolescence affecting risk and impulse control.

The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." In determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, "courts must look beyond historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ " Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 58, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ). "In addition to categorically prohibiting cruel and unusual methods of punishment, the United States Supreme Court has construed the Eighth Amendment to prohibit punishments disproportionate to the offense because ‘[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.’ " State v. Wood , 580 S.W.3d 566, 589 (Mo. banc 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Graham , 560 U.S. at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011 ).

This Court succinctly summarized United States Supreme Court precedent concerning punishments for offenders who were younger than 18 years old when the offenses occurred as follows:

In the last decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions concerning the constitutional validity of punishments for offenders who were younger than 18 years of age at the time they committed crimes. In Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the Supreme Court affirmed a holding from this Court that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments barred the execution of juvenile offenders. Five years later in Graham , the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred courts from sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole. 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S. Ct. 2011. Graham was expanded to prohibit homicide juvenile offenders from being subject to a mandatory sentence of life without parole in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled in Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), that Miller ’s new substantive rule must be applied retroactively on collateral review for juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory life without parole.

Willbanks v. Dep't of Corr. , 522 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Mo. banc 2017).

In Roper , the Supreme Court based its holding in part on the fact juveniles younger than 18 years old differ from adults in three general ways. Roper , 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183. First, juveniles lack maturity and possess "an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," resulting in "impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions." Id. Second, "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure." Id. Third, a juvenile’s character is not as well-formed as an adult, meaning their personality traits are "more transitory, less fixed." Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. 1183. The Supreme Court recognized these traits allowed for the "greater possibility ... that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed" and, "as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) ). Roper then defined a juvenile as an offender younger than 18,...