State v. Beard

• Decision Date: 21 June 1954
• Docket Number: No. A--157,A--157
• Citation: 16 N.J. 50,106 A.2d 265
• Parties: STATE v. BEARD.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 50

16 N.J. 50

106 A.2d 265

STATE v. BEARD.

No. A--157.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued June 7, 1954.

Decided June 21, 1954.

Warren C. Douglas, Camden, for appellant (Elmer Bertman, Camden, attorney).

Robert Burk Johnson, Asst. County Pros., Camden, for the State (Mitchell H. Cohen, County Pros., Camden, attorney).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

The body of the defendant's mother was found lying in high bushes about 25 feet from the edge of Hampton Road in Delaware Township on the morning of July 3, 1953. She was still alive but died shortly after being taken to Cooper Hospital, where emergency treatments were unsuccessfully attempted.

Death was caused by multiple fractures of the skull, multiple fractures of the mandible, subarachnoid hemorrhage of the brain, and shock. The wounds were estimated to have been inflicted approximately between 10:49 p.m. on July 2, 1953 and 12:49 a.m. on July 3, 1953. They were caused by a relatively sharp and heavy instrument.

No suspicion was lodged against the deceased's son, the defendant, but he was initially questioned in a routine manner concerning his mother's activities. In response to questions as to when he had seen his mother last, he replied on Wednesday night, July 1, about 9:30 p.m. He made the same statement to his fiancee, Marion Boyd, in whose home he had been residing. Beard told another witness he did not see his mother on Thursday, the day of the felonious assault.

When those in authority investigating the case came upon corroborated information to the contrary, that the defendant had been seen with his mother on the day she was fatally beaten, the finger of suspicion moved in his direction.

Marion Boyd, the defendant's fiancee, whom he had arranged to marry on July 11, 1953, was questioned several times by the police and informed them the defendant had used her mother's car on Thursday, July 2, returning home about 11:30 p.m. A tire iron, ordinarily used to open the trunk because the lock was faulty and which was usually on the back or front seat of the car, was missing, its absence first being noticed when Miss Boyd was interrogated. The iron was 24 inches long, 2 inches wide and a quarter on an inch thick.

The defendant was detained in custody and during his interrogation inquired about Marion Boyd, asserting she had nothing to do with the alleged offense. He wanted to see her, which request was granted, and she pleaded with him to tell the truth if he knew anything about the matter. After a court stenographer was summoned, he was examined further, the questions and answers being taken down stenographically.

In this statement the defendant admitted he was with his mother on Thursday, July 2. He stopped for gas; he drove to Swedesboro; he was going to borrow money from her. She nagged him about his girl. He returned from Swedesboro to Camden and then drove to Merchantiville. Further on he stopped the car, got out, as did his mother, who stood outside the car while he was in the fields. Beard walked back to the car, picked up a piece of iron lying on the seat, walked around to the side where his mother was standing, and hit her about three times. He had made up his mind after a few drinks to strike her. He admitted knowing his mother would not be at the hospital when he inquired for her earlier Friday morning prior to her admittance in a critical condition. He acknowledged having reported her missing to the detective bureau when he knew she was not.

After this statement was taken, the defendant again saw his fiancee alone, when she said to him, 'Why on earth would you do a thing like this?' He replied, 'I am sorry it had to be this way.' This conversation was not contradicted.

The defendant was then taken to the scene of the crime, together with Captain Dube, Sergeant McDonald, Captain McKeone and the stenographer, where he revealed the location of the offense. Another statement was taken stenographically, in which the defendant identified the spot at which he had stopped the car, pointing out that when he hit his mother she was 'out where the car is parked.' He indicated where he threw the iron after he had used it, and covered a number of other details of no considerable importance except as they confirmed his original statement in the over-all legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom.

When further questioning was attempted on Sunday, Beard refused to answer, saying, 'There ain't nothing I can say to you that can help me * * * Take me out and shoot me, kill me * * * I ain't going to say any more.'

The pants, shoes and glasses which the defendant wore on the evening in question had blood stains on them. An expert chemist and toxicologist testified the blood stain on the pants was Type O, the blood in the soil at the scene of the crime being the same type, as was the blood of the deceased, although about 46% Of the people have that type blood, O. A comparison made between the soil on the defendant's shoes and the soil at the scene of the crime showed them to be identical.

The trial consumed seven days and the jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree. From the death sentence imposed by reason of the verdict, the defendant appeals.

The court erred, it is said, in admitting over objection two statements made by the defendant on July 4, 1953.

The record evidenced that Marion Boyd's mother's car had been used by the defendant at the time of the crime. His apprehension and concern about his financee by reason of this fact, plus the promise made by the police officer 'to turn her loose,' it is urged, 'nullifies the voluntariness of the statements made' because they were induced by the promise and thus rendered unreliable.

The contention is this 'promise' was made 'to encourage a fabricated and synthetic confession,' and it is insisted the statements were 'testimonially untrustworthy and should not have been admitted by the trial court; that it was prejudicial error and an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit their admission.'

The admission of the statements is sustainable on several grounds. Firstly, in reference to the alleged promise to release Miss Boyd, the record shows Captain Dube testified contrary to the defendant. He said: 'I didn't tell him that * * * I told him, 'I will let you see and talk to her if you tell me the truth and if after hearing your story I am satisfied she didn't have anything to do with it she will be out."

This cannot be construed as an inducement or a promise but is rather a statement of a customary police procedure in a criminal prosecution, the truth and propriety of which are well established and can hardly be controverted.

The same witness emphatically denied that any 'promises direct or indirect' were made to the defendant.

The primary inquiry in determining the admissibility of a statement made by the accused is whether it was voluntary. Roesel v. State, 62 N.J.L. 216, 41 A. 408 (E. & A.1898); State v. Young, 67 N.J.L. 223, 51 A. 939 (E. & A.1901); State v. Hand, 71 N.J.L. 137, 58 A. 641 (Sup.Ct.1904); State v. Foulds, 127 N.J.L. 336, 23 A.2d 895 (E. & A.1941); State v. Cole, 136 N.J.L. 606, 56 A.2d 898 (E. & A.1947), certiorari denied 334 U.S. 851, 68 S.Ct. 1503, 92 L.Ed. 1773, rehearing denied 334 U.S. 862, 68 S.Ct. 1519, 92 L.Ed. 1782; State v. Pierce, 4 N.J. 252, 72 A.2d 305 (1950); State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249, 19 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1950), certiorari denied 340 U.S. 839, 71 S.Ct. 25, 95 L.Ed. 615; State v. Grillo, 11 N.J. 173, 93 A.2d 328 (1952), certiorari denied 345 U.S. 976, 73 S.Ct. 1123, 97 L.Ed. 1391; State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A.2d 299 (1953), certiorari denied 346 U.S. 900, 74 S.Ct. 219, 98 L.Ed. ---.

With the exception of State v. Hand, supra, which did not touch upon the problem, these same decisions are to the effect that whether a statement of confession is voluntary depends upon the facts in each case, and the determination of the trial court will not as a rule be disturbed on appeal where there is sufficient evidence. to support it.

The principles as here enunciated were recently affirmed by this court in State v. Walker, 15 N.J. 485, 105 A.2d 531 (1954).

Secondly, the defendant dispelled any possibility of a false confession. His only contention was that 'they would turn her loose if I answered the questions,' the fair inference being, we think, he would answer the questions truthfully, not falsely.

The problem encountered is similar to the one disposed of in State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501, 117 A. 713, 714 (E. & A.1922). where the Court of Errors and Appeals observed: 'He (defendant) was not advised to confess guilt, but to tell the truth.'

Thirdly, at the conclusion of the inquiry by the court to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of the confessions, the record conclusively shows the defendant's only assertion was that he could not remember making a confession. His counsel said:

'I want to explain my position, if the court please. This is exactly what the defendant has related to me from the first time I spoke to the defendant concerning this case up and until the present time. The defendant has, at all times, denied to me that he remembers every making any confession, or any statement, if the court please. Under the circumstances, I felt it my duty, as having been appointed by the court, to put the defendant on the stand and let him explain his position in the best manner that he could, and that is all the testimony I have.'

Fourthly, a confession induced by a promise is not rendered inadmissible unless the promise or hope excited relates to some benefit to be derived by the prisoner in the criminal prosecution.

It would be received though it were induced by a promise of some collateral benefit or boon, no hope or favor being held out in respect the criminal charge against him.' Roesel v. State, supra (62 N.J.L. 216, 41 A. 412); State v. Kwiat-kowski, 83 N.J.L. 650, 85 A. 209 (E....