State v. Bennett
| Decision Date | 23 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 31118.,No. 31117.,No. 31119.,31117.,31118.,31119. |
| Citation | 142 Idaho 166,125 P.3d 522 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joshua W. BENNETT, Defendant-Appellant. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Clinton L. Marsters, Defendant-Appellant. State of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jennifer L. Ouellette, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cude argued.
Joshua W. Bennett, Clinton L. Marsters, and Jennifer L. Ouellette (collectively, "appellants") were cited for violating I.C. § 23-604, which prohibits individuals under twenty-one years of age from purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcoholic beverages. They are all under twenty-one but eighteen years or older. The magistrate court denied their motion to dismiss the charges. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision in an interlocutory appeal. The appellants argue that: (1) a spoliation of evidence occurred when the State officers poured out the contents of, and then threw away, the can and bottles containing the alcoholic beverages allegedly in their possession; and (2) I.C. § 23-604 and § 18-1502 are unconstitutional as written and applied because there is no rational relationship between the state's interest in prohibiting alcohol use among minors (I.C. § 23-604) and the corresponding punishment suspending a minor's driver's license (I.C. § 18-1502).
Sergeant Bruce Fager (Fager) and Officer Dustin Blaker (Blaker) were on alcohol emphasis control on August 22, 2003, in an area known by the officers for its noise complaints and parties. They encountered three college students carrying containers of what looked and smelled like alcoholic beverages. According to the record before this Court, Ouellette was carrying a white grocery sack and walking across a parking lot with a young man who was twenty-one years old. Ouellette told the officers she was nineteen, and that there was beer in the bag. There were two unopened bottles in the bag with the labels "Tequiza" printed on them. Officer Fager testified that when he opened the bottles and poured out the contents, the liquid inside was "like beer" in its smell, look, and amber color, and also in the way it foamed. After pouring out the contents, Fager threw the beer bottles into a nearby garbage can as a matter of practice, following the posting of a 1993 memo on Moscow Police Department letterhead from the Deputy Prosecutor. The memo stated:
YOU do not need to enter Empty Beer cans or Beer in General into Property if you cite someone for Possession of Beer by a Minor. Cite the suspect or suspects and dump the beer into the garbage dumpster later. YOU should be able to make your case on the fact that you know what beer smells like, and what you saw, etc.
While the officers were talking to Ouellette, Officer Blaker noticed Bennett coming from an apartment complex, walking in the direction of the officers, and carrying two blue bottles, one in each hand. As Blaker approached Bennett, Bennett stopped, looked at Blaker, and "just kind of lowered his hands down." At that point Blaker also saw Marsters moving toward the driver's side of a vehicle and holding a silver can. Blaker instructed Bennett to put the blue bottles down on the ground. While Blaker was doing this, Marsters disappeared behind a trailer that was parked next to the car, and returned without the silver can in his hand. After determining that both Bennett and Marsters were twenty years of age, Blaker walked around the trailer to where Marsters had disappeared earlier. Blaker discovered a half-empty twelve ounce can of Bud Light and an unopened bottle of Mike's Cranberry Hard Lemonade. He then examined the two blue bottles Bennett had been carrying. One bottle was opened and the other was not. The labels on each read "Labatt Blue." Blaker poured out the contents of the can and bottles possessed by Bennett and Marsters. He testified that the liquid contents smelled, looked, and behaved like alcoholic beverages. He threw away the Bud Light can and the bottles of Mike's Cranberry Hard Lemonade and Labatt Blue because that was what his superiors at the Moscow Police Department had taught him to do. The officers cited Ouellette, Marsters, and Bennett for possession of alcoholic beverages.
The appellants moved to dismiss the citations, claiming: (1) a spoliation of evidence occurred when the citing officers dumped out the contents of, and then threw away, the can and bottles containing the beverages; and (2) I.C. § 23-604 and § 18-1502 are unconstitutional as written and applied because there is no rational relationship between the state's interest in prohibiting alcohol use among minors (I.C. § 23-604) and the corresponding punishment suspending a minor's driver's license (I.C. § 18-1502).
The magistrate court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to dismiss, finding that there was no issue of spoliation of evidence, and that I.C. § 23-604 and § 18-1502 are constitutional. The magistrate court recommended acceptance of an interlocutory appeal. The district court accepted the appeal from the magistrate court and subsequently affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss. The appeal to this Court followed.
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity over the magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. This Court will uphold the magistrate court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. With respect to conclusions of law, this Court exercises free review.
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 273, 92 P.3d 521, 523 (2004) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 136 Idaho 761, 764, 40 P.3d 119, 122 (2002) (quoting Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478, 849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993)).
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which this Court exercises de novo review. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute is unconstitutional and "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990). An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197, 969 P.2d at 246. Additionally, "it is a general rule that `a legislative act should be held to be constitutional until it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not so, and that a law should not be held to be void for repugnancy to the Constitution in a doubtful case.'" Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 68, 28 P.3d 1006, 1011 (2001) (quoting Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244, 256, 263 P. 32, 35 (1927)).
The rational relationship test is applied under both the substantive due process clause and the equal protection clause in determining the constitutionality of a law that does not deal with a fundamental right. Cecelia Packing Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture/Agricultural Mktg. Serv., 10 F.3d 616 (9th Cir.1993). "Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome only by a `clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.'" Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.1994). Moreover, "in a substantive due process challenge, we do not require that the [government's] legislative acts actually advance its stated purposes, but instead look to whether "`the governmental body could have had no legitimate reason for its decision.'"" Id. Additionally, "[i]f it is `at least fairly debatable' that the [government's] conduct is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, there has been no violation of substantive due process." Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Kawaoka, 17 F.3d at 1234).
The appellants argue that a spoliation of evidence occurred when the citing officers dumped out the contents of, and then threw away, the can and bottles containing the alcoholic beverages "allegedly" in the possession of the appellants. The appellants contend that the destruction of this "potentially exculpatory evidence" has unconstitutionally deprived them of their ability to mount a meaningful defense.
The standard to be applied concerning the spoliation of evidence is found in Garcia v. State Tax Comm'n of State of ID, 136 Idaho 610, 615, 38 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2002):
The destruction of evidence is not per se a violation of defendant's due process rights. Whether the destruction of evidence constitutes a due process violation depends upon the nature of the proceeding, the nature of the evidence, and the circumstances surrounding the destruction of the evidence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289 (1988) (); Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 539, 716 P.2d 1306, 1311 (1986). This Court has previously held that a specific showing of bad faith is required to constitute a due process violation. In the criminal context, this Court applies a balancing...
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