State v. Sherman
| Decision Date | 01 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 40995.,40995. |
| Citation | 327 P.3d 993,156 Idaho 435 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Nikolas LEE SHERMAN, Defendant–Appellant. |
John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender; Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Nikolas Lee Sherman appeals from the district court's appellate decision affirming the magistrate's order denying his motion to dismiss and refusing his requested jury instruction. We affirm.
A resident contacted police after finding an intoxicated male on his property. When a police officer arrived at the property, the intoxicated male attempted to flee and was restrained by the officer. The individual was identified as Sherman and the officer found two prescription drug bottles in Sherman's pockets, one bottle prescribed to Sherman and one bottle prescribed to Mr. Gallegos. Sherman initially told the officer that he was holding the prescription drugs for a female friend. The police officer arrested Sherman and transported him to the police station, where Sherman changed his story and told the officer he was holding the prescription drugs for a friend named Mr. Wilhelm. The officer returned the prescription drug bottle to Mr. Gallegos. The prescription drugs may have been in Mr. Gallegos' vehicle which was parked outside his home and left unlocked. The officer located Sherman's vehicle near Mr. Gallegos' home and was informed that Sherman had been seen in the area prior to the officer's arrival.
Sherman was charged with the unlawful possession of a prescription drug, Idaho Code § 54–1732(3)(c). He filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that I.C. § 54–1732(3)(c) violated his substantive due process rights both on its face and as applied to him. The magistrate denied Sherman's motion to dismiss. Sherman filed a motion to reconsider the magistrate's decision. The magistrate declined to revisit its prior ruling, but invited argument on an issue involving the jury instructions. Specifically, Sherman requested that the court provide an instruction regarding the warehousemen exception to unlawful possession of prescription drugs found in I.C. § 54–1734(2)(f). After argument, the magistrate declined Sherman's request to provide the instruction.
Thereafter, Sherman entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11, to the unlawful possession of a prescription drug. The magistrate imposed a term of 180 days in jail with 174 days suspended, with Sherman to serve sixteen hours in the sheriff's labor program in lieu of six days in jail. The magistrate also imposed a two-year term of unsupervised probation and imposed a fine. Sherman's sentence was stayed pending his appeal.
Sherman appealed to the district court. The district court, in its intermediate appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate's denial of Sherman's motion to dismiss and the magistrate's denial of Sherman's proposed jury instruction. Sherman timely appeals.
Sherman claims that I.C. § 54–1732(3)(c) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. He also contends that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's decision to deny his proposed instruction informing the jury of the warehousemen exception to the statute.1 When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858–59, 303 P.3d 214, 217–18 (2013) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012) ). Thus, the appellate courts do not review the decision of the magistrate court. Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973. Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n. 1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n. 1 (2009).
A. Constitutionality
The United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against State deprivation of a person's "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ; Idaho CONST. art. 1, § 13 ; Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding County, 148 Idaho 653, 661, 227 P.3d 907, 915 (2010). In order for a defendant to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the State action that deprived the defendant of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis. Idaho Dairymen, 148 Idaho at 661, 227 P.3d at 915. A substantive due process violation will not be found if the State action "bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective." Id.
Constitutional questions are questions of law over which we exercise free review. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 151 Idaho 882, 884, 265 P.3d 495, 497 (2011). This Court presumes the constitutionality of challenged statutes and we are obliged to seek an interpretation of the statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id. The party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional. Id. "A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional ‘on its face’ or ‘as applied’ to the party's conduct." American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 (2007) (quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003) ).
Sherman filed a motion to dismiss with the magistrate court, claiming that I.C. § 54–1732(3)(c) was facially unconstitutional. The magistrate denied the motion, finding that the State had a rational basis for regulating the possession of controlled substances. The district court, in its intermediate appellate capacity, determined that the statute could be constitutionally applied and thus, was not facially unconstitutional. Specifically, the district court stated that the statute was not vague because it addressed specific conduct and that the statute did not infringe upon a fundamental right.
A facial challenge to a statute is purely a question of law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). Generally, a facial challenge is mutually exclusive from an as applied challenge. American Falls, 143 Idaho at 870, 154 P.3d at 441. The United States Supreme Court has debated the appropriate standard to be applied to facial challenges to state statutes.2 In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that "[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d at 707.3 In a later case, Justice Stevens stated that the Supreme Court had never actually applied the strict Salerno standard and noted that Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), applied a significantly lesser standard providing that a statute would be invalidated if the overbreadth of the statute was real and substantial in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2304–05 n. 7, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 800 n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917–18, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841–42 ). The United States Supreme Court again recognized the different standards applicable to substantive due process challenges in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). In that case, the Court stated:
To succeed in a typical facial attack, Stevens would have to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [§ 48] would be valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep. Which standard applies in a typical case is a matter of dispute that we need not and do not address....
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472, 130 S.Ct. at 1587, 176 L.Ed.2d at 446 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
Idaho Appellate Courts have also applied different standards for facially unconstitutional challenges. In Hernandez, 151 Idaho at 884, 265 P.3d at 497, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "To succeed on a facial challenge, one must demonstrate that under no circumstances is the statute valid." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied the rational basis test in determining if a statute violated the substantive due process clause. In State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P.3d 522 (2005), the Supreme Court said:
Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome only by a "clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality." Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.1994). Moreover, in a substantive due process challenge, we do not require that the [government's] legislative acts actually advance its stated purposes, but instead look to whether "the governmental body could have had no legitimate reason for its decision." Id. Additionally, "[i]f it is ‘at least fairly debatable’ that the [government's] conduct is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, there has been no violation of substantive due process." Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Kawaoka, 17 F.3d at 1234 ).
Bennett, 142 Idaho at 169, 125 P.3d at 525.
On appeal, Sherman contends that I.C. § 54–1732(3)(c)...
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