State v. Black
| Decision Date | 22 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-219,76-219 |
| Citation | 48 Ohio St.2d 262,358 N.E.2d 551 |
| Parties | , 2 O.O.3d 422 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BLACK, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. For the purpose of the mitigation inquiry, the words 'psychosis or mental deficiency,' as contained in R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), authorize the trial judge or panel to use the broadest possible latitude in determining the defendant's mental state or capacity.
2. Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), a convicted defendant's mental state or capacity should be considered in light of all the circumstances, including the nature of the crime itself, so that it may be determined whether the condition found to have existed was the primary producing cause of his offense.
3. Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), a finding that a psychosis or mental deficiency exists will not support a mitigation, unless such condition was the primary producing cause of the offense.
4. Where the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, have been given and fully honored, a confession which results from the defendant's independent decision to speak is voluntary although it was made to police officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them.
This capital case, appealed from the Court of Appeals which affirmed the defendant's conviction of two counts of aggravated murder, each specifying purposeful killing while the defendant was perpetrating a robbery, is before this court as a matter of right.
Appellant's five assertions in the order in which they will be considered concern his claim that the Ohio death penalty as authorized by R.C. 2903.01, and its implementing provisions, R.C. 2929.02, 2929.03 and 2929.04, are cruel and unusual punishment and are unconstitutional under Furman v. Georgia (1972), 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; his claim that the trial court, in improperly refusing to suppress upon motion evidence obtained from him during in-custodial interrogation and in admitting such evidence over objection at trial, violated the appellant's rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; his claim that his trial was unfair in that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; his claim that the trial court failed to conduct the hearing in mitigation as required by R.C. 2929.03(D) and (E) by failing to fulfill its affirmative responsibility of inquiring into the appellant's mental condition before determining the proper punishment; and, finally, his claim that the sentencing statute, R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous and fails to provide sufficient standards upon which to base the court's required conclusion preliminary to the death sentence that the offense was not primarily the product of deficiency.
The cause is now before this court as a matter of right, pursuant to Section 2(B)(2)(a)(ii), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
William F. McKee, Pros. Atty., and William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Frizzell & Hendricks Co., L. P. A., Kenneth G. Frizzell, Mills, Nelson & Remy and Reese F. Mills, Mansfield, for appellant.
Appellant's claim that Ohio's death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment under Furman, supra, and under the specified provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, has been decided by this court in State v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035, and the appellant's claim is overruled for the reasons therein stated.
We have examined the record and carefully considered the appellant's claim with regard to his self-incriminatory statements given during intermittent in-custodial police interrogation during a period beginning February 11, 1974, at 10:24 a. m. and ending February 13, 1974, at 7:10 p. m., while the appellant was confined for an unrelated crime (possession of marijuana).
Appellant claims that by persistent interrogation at that time he was coerced by police conduct in proceeding to question him after he had refused to sign a written waiver of his Miranda constitutional rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), and after he had on two occasions specifically requested the opportunity to call his attorney.
We have carefully reviewed the record as did also the Court of Appeals and find that the appellant's claims in this regard are groundless. Quite clearly during this entire period, the confinement was treated by the police as an opportunity to focus upon the appellant an ongoing inquiry designed to identify the person or persons responsible for two separate murder-robberies which had occurred in Richland County on January 21, 1974.
On an earlier date, January 22, 1974, appellant had been arrested as the result of a 'stake-out' of a red Mercury Cougar automobile owned by his girlfriend and tied to each of the homicides by statements of witnesses at the murder scenes as well as by an anonymous phone call to the police suggesting both its use by appellant and his complicity in the crimes. At that time appellant voluntarily took a lie-detector test and was released.
The questioning, which took place during the stated period and which resulted in his self-incriminating statements directly confirming appellant's responsibility for one of the homicides under investigation and his complicity in the other, was intermittent. It began shortly after appellant's arrest on February 11, 1974, at which time he was read his Miranda rights. It stopped very shortly thereafter when appellant asked for an opportunity to use the phone to call his lawyer, which request was promptly granted. We conclude from the record, and particularly from that part of the record which covers the hearing upon appellant's pretrial motion to suppress his statements containing testimony of appellant and of the numerous police officers involved in the questioning or present when it occurred, that appellant neither before nor after this phone call made more than a request for permission to call his counsel. He did not indicate a desire not to be questioned unless his counsel could be present. He made no request that counsel be appointed. His conduct and his responses to questioning throughout the period demonstrated his belief that he was represented by counsel and his confidence that he knew his rights and was in control of the situation.
At each resumption of questioning, his rights were again read from a statement which was then initialed by him. Questioning then continued until appellant indicated that he wanted it to stop. The record shows that appellant called a halt upon several such occasions conditioning his further answers upon his being given the opportunity to talk to his girlfriend, his father, his sister, a minister, and one Eatmon, his alleged accomplice.
On each occasion his request was granted, his rights were again read, and, upon resumption of questioning, further disclosures were made by the appellant.
Not only were the directions of Miranda scrupulously observed, but also care was taken so that it can not be said that it was an 'incommunicado interrogation' of one alone and deprived of outside support, so as to effectively undermine his will to resist confidently-made suggestions of his guilt. Defendant's rights were fully honored. Under such conditions, as stated in Wan v. United States (1924), 266 U.S. 1, 14, 45 S.Ct. 1, 69 L.Ed. 131, and quoted with approval in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at page 462, 86 S.Ct. at 1621, '* * * (A) confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them.' Unlike Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, the confession here resulted from the defendant's independent decision to speak after being confronted at his own request by those of his friends and associates who were aware of his involvement in the crimes and by his ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Collins, 2005 Ohio 1642 (OH 4/5/2005)
...because of coercive police conduct. Colorado v. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at 574, 107 S.Ct. at 857. See, also, State v. Black (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 262, 2 O.O.3d 422, 358 N.E.2d 551, paragraph four of the syllabus, vacated in part (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3134, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. Thus, co......
-
State v. Turvey
...of coercive police conduct. Colorado v. Spring [1987], supra, 479 U.S. at 574, 107 S.Ct. at 857 . See, also, State v. Black (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 262, 2 O.O.3d 422, 358 N.E.2d 551, paragraph four of the syllabus, vacated in part (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3134, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. Thus, co......
-
State v. Lomack
...because of coercive police conduct. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954. See, also, State v. Black, 48 Ohio St.2d 262, 358 N.E.2d 551(1976), paragraph four of the syllabus, vacated in part 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3134, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154(1978). Thus, coercive po......
-
State v. Wade Turvey
... ... was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was ... critically impaired because of coercive police conduct ... Colorado v. Spring, supra , 479 U.S. at 574, 107 ... S.Ct. at 857. See, also, State v. Black (1976), 48 ... Ohio St.2d 262, 2 O.O. 3d 422, 358 N.E.2d 551, paragraph four ... of the syllabus, vacating in part (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 ... S.Ct. 3134, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154. Thus, coercive police activity ... is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not ... ...