State v. Blackwell
| Decision Date | 18 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 59544-5,59544-5 |
| Citation | 120 Wn.2d 822,845 P.2d 1017 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Hyson BLACKWELL, a/k/a Hyson Sabb, and Lateira Sabb, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Ronald D. Ness & Associates, Jeffrey J. Jahns, Port Orchard, for respondents.
Defendants were charged with two counts of third degree assault and one count of first degree trespass. The trial court dismissed the prosecution's case under CrR 8.3(b), finding that the State did not comply with a pretrial order requiring production of the personnel files and service records of the police officers who were the alleged victims. The State appealed. We granted direct review and reverse.
On November 25, 1990, juvenile defendants Hyson Blackwell and Lateira Sabb were causing a disturbance in the Life Center Church in Tacoma. Church officials called the Tacoma Police Department to assist when defendants refused to leave as ordered. Tacoma Police Officers William Berger and John Durocher were dispatched to the church. Upon arriving at the church, the officers directed Blackwell and Sabb to leave the premises. The defendants refused to comply and then allegedly assaulted the two officers. The State filed two charges of third degree assault and one charge of criminal trespass in the first degree against both Blackwell and Sabb in Pierce County Juvenile Court.
On January 30, 1991, which was the morning of trial, defense counsel moved for a continuance based upon a demand to the State to produce the service records of arresting Officers Berger and Durocher. The trial court granted the continuance, reset the trial for February 13, 1991, and directed the State to look into the possibility of obtaining the At the pretrial hearing, defense counsel Lucile LaDue stated that when she saw Officer Berger the morning of trial she became concerned because of a previous encounter she recalled having with Officer Berger. Ms. LaDue told the court that, in her opinion, Officer Berger was the most racist man she had ever met, and that she wanted to inspect both officers' service records because of her belief that the arrests may have been racially motivated. 1 Ms. LaDue did not provide any information about Officer Durocher or express any opinion concerning him other than he was Officer Berger's partner. The trial court was persuaded by Ms. LaDue's statement and ordered the prosecutor to produce the service records and personnel files of both officers.
records. The State filed a motion for reconsideration under CrR 4.7(d), contending that the prosecutor's office had no control over the officers' service records. A pretrial hearing was set on the motion for reconsideration on February 7
The State objected to this order, claiming the prosecutor did not have access to or control over the documents. The deputy prosecuting attorney informed the court that prior to the pretrial hearing he had attempted to obtain the files, but he was told by an official in the Tacoma City Attorney's Office that the prosecutor was not eligible to receive those records.
On the ground that the State could not produce records not in its control, the prosecutor suggested that the trial court issue a subpoena duces tecum directed to the Tacoma Police Department. Skeptical of the State's efforts to produce the documents, the trial court left the order unchanged, but added a sentence permitting defense counsel to issue a subpoena duces tecum to the Tacoma Police Department.
On February 13, 1991, the new trial date, defense counsel, being notified that the State had not obtained the service records, moved to dismiss the prosecution's case against both defendants pursuant to CrR 8.3(b). Defense counsel argued that the State's failure to produce the requested The State appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030. We granted direct review.
discovery amounted to mismanagement of its case, and that dismissal was warranted in the furtherance of justice. The trial court agreed and dismissed all counts
ISSUES
This case presents two issues for review. First, did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered the prosecution to produce the police officers' personnel files/service records? Second, did the trial court err in dismissing criminal charges against the defendants under CrR 8.3(b)? We hold that the trial court erred in both instances. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
ANALYSIS
Criminal Discovery Rules
CrR 4.7 governs criminal discovery. State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d 457, 471, 800 P.2d 338 (1990). The scope of criminal discovery is within the trial court's discretion. We will not disturb a trial court's discovery decision absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Yates, 111 Wash.2d 793, 797, 765 P.2d 291 (1988).
CrR 4.7 is a reciprocal discovery rule that separately lists the prosecutor's and defendant's obligations when engaging in discovery. Yates, 111 Wash.2d at 797, 765 P.2d 291. The prosecutor has a duty to disclose and to preserve evidence that is material and favorable to the defendant. CrR 4.7(a)(3). Failure to do so will generally be held to violate the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial. State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 704, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986). The prosecutor's general discovery obligation is limited, however, "to material and information within the knowledge, possession or control of members of the prosecuting attorney's staff." CrR 4.7(a)(4). Where the prosecutor's efforts to obtain discoverable material held by others are unsuccessful, the Defendants assert that CrR 4.7(b) authorized the trial court to require the State to obtain this discovery even though the service records were held by the Tacoma Police Department. Defendants' reading of CrR 4.7(b) is incorrect. CrR 4.7(b) identifies defendant's obligations regarding discovery and not court authority to order discovery. CrR 4.7(d) is the provision which allows the trial court to order discovery from third parties via a subpoena.
court has authority to issue suitable subpoenas or orders. CrR 4.7(d). 2
The personnel files of the Tacoma police officers were not within the control or possession of the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office. Pursuant to the court's direction to look into the possibility of obtaining the records, the prosecutor contacted both the Tacoma Police Department and the Tacoma City Attorney's Office. The prosecutor informed the trial court and defense counsel that he had requested the personnel files and had been told he could not have them. The trial court was unpersuaded that the prosecutor had made sufficient efforts to produce the documents and ordered the State to produce them.
The State further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering discovery since defense counsel failed to substantiate the claim that the documents contained information material to their clients' defense. We agree.
A defendant's constitutional due process right to disclosure relates only to evidence which is favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); see also State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d at 704, 718 P.2d 407. CrR 4.7(a) lists the prosecutor's obligations in engaging in criminal discovery. If an accused requests disclosure beyond what the prosecutor is obliged to disclose, he or she must show that the requested information is material to the preparation of his or her defense. Mak, 105 Wash.2d at 704, 718 P.2d 407 (citing CrR 4.7(e)(1)) 3.
As we stated in Mak, "[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Mak, at 704-05, 718 P.2d 407; accord, State v. Bebb, 108 Wash.2d 515, 523, 740 P.2d 829 (1987).
Assuming arguendo that the documents were in the possession and control of the prosecutor, we review the record to determine whether the defendants established that the requested documents contained information material to their defense.
The trial court ordered the prosecutor to produce the officers' service records based solely on defense counsel LaDue's Defense counsel instead argued that the service records/personnel files are material because they could lead to exculpatory evidence of improper police conduct and/or arrests based on race and excessive force that might rebut the officers' claim of proper police conduct. This reasoning was persuasive to the trial court, which apparently relied on the broad discovery language of CR 26(b) as a basis for its order. We reject this rationale. See State v. Gonzalez, 110 Wash.2d 738, 744-45, 757 P.2d 925 (1988) ().
suggestion that the arrests of Blackwell and Sabb might have been racially motivated. Neither defense counsel established any factual predicate to demonstrate that the officers' service records contained information...To continue reading
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