State v. Blake

• Citation: 72 S.E. 1080,157 N.C. 608
• Parties: STATE v. BLAKE.
• Decision Date: 06 December 1911
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

72 S.E. 1080

157 N.C. 608

STATE v. BLAKE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 6, 1911

Appeal from Superior Court, Henderson County; Long, Judge.

A. S Blake was convicted of an offense, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Public local acts passed in the exercise of the police power and which apply only to certain localities are valid.

Bartlett Shipp, for appellant.

T. W Bickett, Atty. Gen., and Geo. L. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CLARK C.J.

Chapter 184, Public Local Laws 1911, makes it "unlawful for any one to permit his, or her, setter, or pointer, dog to run at large during the closed season for quail" in Henderson county. This statute was enacted to protect game birds and is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Lawton v. Steel, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385; Geer v. Conn, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed 793; State v. Gallop, 126 N.C. 979, 35 S.E. 180; Daniels v. Homer, 139 N.C. 222, 51 S.E. 992, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 997.

Public local acts, passed in the exercise of the police power which apply only to certain localities, are valid. Such legislation has always been held to be within the powers of the Legislature both as to criminal and civil matters: As to local liquor prohibition (State v. Barringer, 110 N.C. 525, 14 S.E. 781); fence laws (State v. Snow, 117 N.C. 774, 23 S.E. 322); restricting sale of seed cotton ( State v. Moore, 104 N.C. 714, 10 S.E. 143, 17 Am. St. Rep. 696, where the subject is fully discussed); cattle running at large (Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 121 N.C. 418, 28 S.E. 515, 39 L. R. A. 245, 61 Am. St. Rep. 668); method of electing municipal commissioners (Harriss v. Wright, 121 N.C. 172, 28 S.E. 269); method of electing county commissioners (Lyon v. Commissioners, 120 N.C. 237, 26 S.E. 929); public schools (McCormac v. Com'rs, 90 N.C. 441); dispensaries (Guy v. Com'rs, 122 N.C. 471, 29 S.E. 771); working public roads (Tate v. Com'rs, 122 N.C. 812, 30 S.E. 352); and other matters (Intendant v. Sorrell, 46 N.C. 49). Double damages for willfully cutting timber in certain counties. Land Co. v. Hayes, 72 S.E. 1078, at this term, and many other cases cited; State v. Sharp, 125 N.C. 633, 34 S.E. 264, 74 Am. St. Rep. 663; Brooks v. Tripp, 135 N.C. 159, 47 S.E. 401.

In State v. Moore, 104 N.C. 719, 10 S.E. 145, 17 Am. St. Rep. 696, the court, speaking of laws that apply only to particular localities or particular classes, quotes Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) 556, as follows: "If the laws be otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required in these cases is that they be general in their application to the class or locality to which they apply and that they are public in their character, and of their propriety and policy the Legislature must judge." Judge Cooley further says (Const. Lim. [7th Ed.] 555): "The authority that legislates for the state at large must determine whether particular rules shall extend to the whole state and all its citizens, or on the other hand to a subdivision of the state, or a single class of its citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the prevailing public sentiment in that section of the state, may require or make acceptable different police regulations from those demanded in another."

As is concisely said in Black, Const. Law, § 136: "The rightful power of the Legislature of a state extends to every subject of legislation, unless in the particular instance its exercise is forbidden expressly, or by necessary implication by the Constitution of the United States and laws passed in pursuance thereof or by the Constitution of the state." It is further pointed out that under the Constitution of a state the executive and judicial departments are grants of power, whereas the Legislature exercises all power which is not forbidden.

The contention that this statute is obnoxious to the eighth amendment to the federal Constitution, which forbids "cruel and unusual punishment," cannot be sustained, for it is well settled that the first ten amendments are restrictions upon the federal government only. Pervear v. Com., 72 U.S. 475, 18 L.Ed. 608; McDonald v. Com., 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874, 73 Am. St. Rep. 293; State v. Patterson, 134 N.C. 617, 47 S.E. 808; and cases there cited. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793, there is an interesting historical review of the origin and adoption of the eighth amendment.

Neither is this statute in violation of the similar...