State v. Blakley, 94-1176

• Decision Date: 21 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-1176,94-1176
• Citation: 534 N.W.2d 645
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Judith Ann BLAKLEY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 645

534 N.W.2d 645

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Judith Ann BLAKLEY, Appellee.

No. 94-1176.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 21, 1995.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing August 4, 1995.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Mary Tabor, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Patrick White, County Atty., and Richard Westphal, Asst. County Atty., for appellant.

Mark C. Meyer of Kinnamon, Kinnamon, Russo & Meyer, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, LAVORATO, and NEUMAN, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

In this discretionary review, we must decide whether the State's motion to amend sentence to include restitution was untimely under Iowa Code section 910.3 (1993). The district court thought so and refused to allow the State's requested amendment because it was filed some nine months after sentencing.

We conclude the district court erred in interpreting section 910.3. We reverse the district court's order denying the State's sentencing amendment. We remand for hearing on the defendant's remaining objection to the State's motion.

On the evening of February 26, 1993, Iowa City police officers responded to an emergency call. At the scene they discovered a man bleeding from a deep gash on his left temple. The victim identified two individuals as his attackers. One of them was Judith Ann Blakley.

On March 22, 1993, the State filed a single-count trial information against Blakley, alleging assault causing injury. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1(1), 708.2(2), and 703.1. Blakley initially entered a plea of not guilty. On August 17, 1993, Blakley entered a change of plea and submitted a written plea of guilty to the charge. The plea agreement contained the State's recommendation that Blakley pay restitution.

The court accepted the plea agreement. In the "change of plea, judgment and sentence," the court ordered Blakley to "pay appropriate restitution to the victim." The document also advised Blakley that "[i]f there is a dispute as to the amount of restitution, further hearing will be scheduled." In the notice to Blakley of payment due, the Johnson county clerk of court indicated the amount of victim restitution was "to be determined."

On May 23, 1994--about nine months later--the State moved to amend

the sentence of the defendant to reflect crime victim assistance program restitution in the amount noted on the attached statement of pecuniary damages. The amendment is requested for the reason that an award has been made by the crime victim assistance program on behalf of the victim in this case.

The motion states further that "[t]his amendment is submitted in addition to previously ordered restitution as the crime victim assistance program has paid additional compensation since the time of sentencing." (Emphasis added.)

Attached to the motion is a document captioned "statement of pecuniary damages." In it, the county attorney states that the crime victim assistance program "has paid $357.40 as the result of defendant's criminal activities and is entitled to restitution. A summary of the payments to be reimbursed is attached." The attached summary indicates that on May 12, 1994, the crime victim assistance program paid the University of Iowa Hospitals $357.40.

The court granted the State's motion to amend sentence to include this amount unless Blakley objected within ten days from the filing date of its order. Blakley did object in a timely manner. Her objections were two. First, she contended that the University of Iowa Hospitals was not a "victim" under any chapter 910 definition. Second, she contended that the State's motion was untimely under chapter 910. At the hearing on the State's motion to amend, the court concluded the motion was untimely under section 910.3.

The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and a request for discretionary review, challenging the district court's order denying its motion to amend. We granted the request for discretionary review in a single-justice ruling. Blakley applied to us for review of the single-justice ruling, which the State resisted. A three-justice panel affirmed the single-justice ruling.

Interpretation of a statute is a legal question. So our review is at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4.

I. Iowa Code section 910.3 states in pertinent part:

The county attorney shall prepare a statement of pecuniary damages to victims of the defendant and, if applicable, any award by the crime victim assistance programs.... If pecuniary damage amounts are not available at the time of sentencing, the county attorney shall provide a statement of pecuniary damages incurred up to that time.... The statement shall be provided no later than thirty days after sentencing.... At the time of sentencing or at a later date to be determined by the court, the court shall set out the amount of restitution.... If the full amount of restitution cannot be determined at the time of sentencing, the court shall issue a temporary order determining a reasonable amount for pecuniary damages incurred up to that time, any award by the crime victim assistance programs, court-appointed attorney's fees or the expense of a public defender, and court costs. At a later date as determined by the court, the court shall issue a permanent, supplemental order, setting the full amount of restitution. The court shall enter further supplemental orders, if necessary. These court orders shall be known as the plan of restitution.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 910.1 defines pecuniary damages as

all damages to the extent not paid by an insurer, which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event, except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium. Without limitation, "pecuniary damages " includes damages for wrongful death and expenses incurred for psychiatric or psychological services or counseling or other counseling for the victim which became necessary as a direct result of the criminal activity.

The district court order rejected the State's restitution amendment, stating: "The court orders that the claim for restitution be, and is hereby disallowed under section 910[.3] in that the claim is not timely."

The State contends that the district court's "interpretation" of section 910.3 is erroneous on two grounds. First, this interpretation is contrary to the plain language of section 910.3. Second, under our rules of statutory construction, this interpretation offends the legislative purpose behind enactment of victim restitution statutes generally.

Blakley replies that the language "the county attorney shall provide a statement of pecuniary damages incurred ... no later than thirty days after sentencing" in her words "specifically and unambiguously requires that a statement of pecuniary damages be filed at the time of sentencing or within thirty days thereafter." Blakley contends the State procedurally defaulted when it did not provide a statement of pecuniary damages incurred at the time of sentencing or no later than thirty days after sentencing. And for this reason, Blakley concludes, no restitution is owed. In essence, Blakley is arguing that the thirty-day requirement in section 910.3 is jurisdictional: The State's failure to comply with this time requirement terminates the victim's right to restitution under Iowa Code chapter 910.

We resort to statutory construction only when necessary to carry out legislative intent. Krull v. Thermogas Co., 522 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted). When the meaning of a statute is evident from the words used, statutory construction is unnecessary. Meier v. Sac & Fox Indian Tribe, 476 N.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Iowa 1991). Here, statutory construction is not necessary. The meaning of section 910.3 is evident from the words used.

We agree with the State that the language Blakley relies on refers only to the filing of a statement of pecuniary damages incurred by the victim up to the time of sentencing. The nature of the crime, the types of injuries a victim sustains, the extent of a victim's injuries, and the amount of damages covered by a victim's insurer will determine at what point the victim's total pecuniary damages become fixed and ascertainable. A victim's total pecuniary damages easily may not be fixed and ascertainable at the time of sentencing.

The legislature recognized these facts by adding the language contained in the balance of section 910.3. We refer to the statements "at a later date to be determined by the court, the court shall set out the amount of restitution," and "[a]t a later date as determined by the court, the court shall issue a permanent, supplemental order, setting the full amount of restitution." These statements clearly contemplate that in cases where the victim incurs pecuniary damages after the time of sentencing, (1) the State may file a motion to amend sentence more than thirty days after sentencing, and (2) the court will issue supplemental restitution orders for pecuniary damages the victim incurs after the time of sentencing.

II. The State's motion indicates that the crime victim assistance program paid the victim compensation since the date of the sentence. However, the record is silent on when the victim allegedly incurred the $357.40 in pecuniary damages. He may have incurred the damages before sentencing at a...