State v. Bradley, 00-0894.

• Citation: 637 N.W.2d 206
• Decision Date: 29 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-0894.,00-0894.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Steven Dale BRADLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa

637 N.W.2d 206

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Steven Dale BRADLEY, Appellant.

No. 00-0894.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

August 29, 2001.

Richard R. Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and VOGEL and ZIMMER, JJ.

VOGEL, J.

Steven Dale Bradley appeals the district court denial of his petition to stay his restitution obligation and to grant him a restitution hearing pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 910. Because we find the petition did not contain a viable basis to challenge the restitution order, we affirm the district court.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1994 Bradley and three co-defendants were charged with two counts of first-degree kidnapping and one count of first-degree murder, based on allegations the four kidnapped and murdered two elderly Des Moines women, Clara Baker and Phyllis King. The murder charge arose out of the death of Baker only, as King was killed in Missouri. Bradley entered into an agreement with the State whereby he would plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for dismissal of both kidnapping counts. The plea agreement also stated Bradley would be pleading guilty to first-degree murder in Missouri, for the death of King, in an effort to avoid that state's death penalty. The State agreed to recommend that the Iowa sentence run concurrent with the one imposed in Missouri. The agreement was silent as to restitution.

At the February 1, 1995, Iowa plea proceedings, Bradley admitted he began his participation in the chain of events with foreknowledge that a co-defendant intended to kill King. He admitted to his voluntary participation in the abductions, acknowledging his understanding that, once Baker had been taken, his co-defendant would kill Baker as well. He then entered a guilty plea to first-degree murder in Iowa for the death of Baker, and the two kidnapping charges were dismissed. Eight days later he entered a guilty plea to first-degree murder in Missouri for the death of King.

On February 10, 1995, the Iowa district court sentenced Bradley to life in prison for Baker's murder, the sentence to run concurrent with the life sentence imposed in Missouri. The court directed Bradley to pay the fees of his court-appointed attorney to the extent he was reasonably able to do so, assessed him the court costs, and directed him to make restitution in both its written order and oral recitation: "Defendant is ordered to make restitution. The amounts of restitution are not available at this time. At such time as the amounts are available, a supplemental order will follow."

On October 10, 1997, the State moved to amend Bradley's sentence to include restitution to the crime victim compensation program: $1,645.65 for payment made to Hamilton's Funeral Home, and $4,979.50 for payment made to Watts Funeral Home.¹ The court granted the State's motion, subject to Bradley's right to object within thirty days. No objection was made. The Department of Correctional Services subsequently entered an amended restitution plan, which included the crime victim assistance payments and $501.82 in court costs. Court-appointed attorney fees were later assessed at $10,503.50.

Bradley filed a pro se petition for a Chapter 910 restitution hearing, which included a request for a stay of his restitution obligation. The original petition, filed April 10, 2000, was supplemented on May 2, 2000. In his petition Bradley forwarded a number of grounds that essentially challenged the propriety of ordering $6,625.15 in restitution to the crime victim compensation program, but arguably directed a vague attack on the court costs and attorney fees as well. The district court denied Bradley's petition on two grounds, ruling the request untimely, as Bradley failed to object within thirty days to the 1997 supplemental restitution order, and finding the petition failed to establish any legal basis on which to grant the hearing request. It is from this order that Bradley appeals.

Scope of Review. Issues of jurisdiction and the authority of the district court are reviewed for errors at law. State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1999). Decisions regarding sentencing and restitution issues are also reviewed for errors at law, Iowa R.App. P. 4, and are reversed only for a demonstrated abuse of discretion. See State v. Mai, 572 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Iowa Ct.App.1997)

. However, to the extent any such decision has constitutional implications, our review is de novo. State v. Love, 589 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1998).

Chapter 910 Restitution Hearing. Under Iowa Code Chapter 910, a defendant is entitled to a restitution hearing, at any time during the term of incarceration, "if on the face of the petition it appears that a hearing is warranted." Iowa Code § 910.7 (1999). Thus, denying Bradley's request solely on the basis he had not objected to the supplemental restitution order in a timely manner was an abuse of discretion by the district court. However, the court also stated the petition did not establish any legal basis to grant a restitution hearing. Bradley contends this second ground was also an abuse of discretion and now forwards a number of reasons why a hearing should have been granted. We note his appellate brief raises issues not present on the face of the pro se petition and greatly expands other arguments that appeared only to a limited extent. Since we are reviewing the district court's determination that nothing in the petition warranted a restitution hearing, we look only to the contents of the petition, and not to any argument raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997)

("Issues not raised before the district court, including constitutional issues, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."). Before we address Bradley's contentions, however, we find it necessary to clarify the nature of the restitution ordered by the district court.

I. Distinguishing Pecuniary Damages and Crime Victim Assistance Payments. Restitution is a broadly defined term:

"Restitution" means payment of pecuniary damages to a victim in an amount and in the manner provided by the offender's plan of restitution. "Restitution" also includes fines, penalties, and surcharges, ... the payment of crime victim compensation program reimbursements,... court costs ..., court-appointed attorney's fees, or the expense of a public defender, and the performance of a public service by an offender in an amount set by the court when the offender cannot reasonably pay all or part of the court costs ..., court-appointed attorney's fees, or the expense of a public defender.

Iowa Code § 910.1(4) (1999). Thus, while payments to the crime victim compensation program and payments to the victim of a crime are both restitution in the general sense, they are distinguishable concepts: Pecuniary damages payable to a victim are afforded a heightened deference in certain respects.²

In recognizing that a goal of victim compensation is public protection, see State v. Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1986),

the legislature has dictated that restitution to "victims of the offender's criminal activities" shall be made in full before payment of any fine, penalty, surcharge, crime victim compensation program disbursement, cost or fee. Iowa Code § 910.2 (1999). See also Iowa Code § 915.100(2)(e) (1999). Moreover, while victim damages and even fines, penalties and surcharges must be paid in full, the legislature placed no such requirement on payments to the crime victim compensation program for any reimbursements it has made. Along with court costs and court-appointed attorney fees, an offender must make restitution to the program only to the extent he or she is reasonably able to do so. Iowa Code § 910.2 (1999).

There is no question that the funeral expenses paid by the crime victim compensation program originated as victim damages. At its core the program is a tool for reimbursing crime victims and their family members for some expenses arising out of certain illegal activities. See generally Iowa Code chapter 915, subchapter VI (1999). The legislature has made it clear, however, that once a victim has been paid by the crime victim compensation program and the offender's restitution obligation is thereby transferred to the program, the special deference afforded to victim damages is no longer applicable. See Iowa Code §§ 910.2, 915.100(2)(e) (1999).

This special emphasis on victim compensation facilitates another goal of victim restitution — offender rehabilitation. See Kluesner, 389 N.W.2d at 372

. Restitution "goes beyond revenue recovery; it is designed to instill responsibility in criminal offenders." State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Iowa 1985). Forcing a defendant to pay restitution directly to a victim harmed by the offender's criminal actions has a greater impact upon that defendant than ordering repayment of restitution already made through "an abstract and impersonal entity." State v. Mayberry, 415 N.W.2d 644, 646-47 (Iowa 1987) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 353, 360 n. 10, 93 L.Ed.2d 216, 228 n. 10 (1986)).

With the distinction between victim damages and crime victim compensation program reimbursements set forth, we proceed to Bradley's arguments.

II. Timeliness of Supplemental Order. In order to assure prompt resolution of restitution issues, Iowa Code section 910.3 directs the State to provide, within thirty days of the sentencing date, a statement of any and all victim damages incurred up to the time of sentencing. State v. Blakley, 534 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa 1995). However, as restitution is not inherently finite, and as costs and expenses can continue to accrue after sentencing, that section also provides for supplemental restitution orders, to include any amounts incurred after...