State v. Board of State Land Com'rs

• Decision Date: 04 January 1901
• Citation: 23 Wash. 700,63 P. 532
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. WHITE v. BOARD OF STATE LAND COM'RS et al.

63 P. 532

23 Wash. 700

STATE ex rel. WHITE v. BOARD OF STATE LAND COM'RS et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 4, 1901

Original application in the supreme court for a writ of prohibition by the state of Washington, on the relation of C. F. White against the board of state land commissioners. Writ dismissed.

Greene & Griffiths, for relator.

Thomas M. Vance and Winstock & Israel, for respondents.

WHITE J.

This matter comes on for final determination upon the application of the relator for a writ of prohibition against the board of state land commissioners, which writ has heretofore issued, and is now returnable. The relator briefly claims that heretofore, and while he was a taxpayer in the town of Cosmopolis, Chehalis county, and engaged in the lumbering and shipping business along the water front of the harbor area of said town, Engene Bell and W. H. Abel made a written request of the respondent board for permission to lease from the state certain harbor areas; that the board made an order that such areas should be let to the highest and best bidder, and directed the county auditor of Chehalis county to offer such privilege of leasing at public auction to the highest bidder on the 25th of June, 1898; that said auditor some time between the 24th and 25th days of June 1898, posted on the wall inside his office three paper writings, containing, respectively, the descriptions of the tracts of harbor areas so to be offered, and wherein it was stated that the same would be offered at public auction on said 25th of June to the highest bidder; that on said date in the afternoon, said auditor offered said privileges at public auction, and there was but one bidder, and one bid, at $10, offered for each of the tracts, averaging $30, the same being made by and on behalf of one Eugene Bell for one of said tracts, and one Henry Rosmond for the others; that after said bids had been accepted by said county auditor, and said privileges sold to said parties, this relator filed with the said auditor a written bid of $20 for each of said tracts that his bid was forwarded to the board of state land commissioners, with the returns of said sale, and that he filed with the said board a protest against the acceptance of the bids made, and claimed the right to purchase the privilege; that his protest was objected to by said Bell and Rosmond, and upon hearing before the board of land commissioners the objection was sustained, and the right to lease awarded to Bell and Rosmond. Of this action of the board he complained in his petition, and asked the writ prohibiting the board from further acting in the matter, alleging that the notice of the intention to so sell such privilege was illegal and insufficient. Upon the respondent's answer, this board referred the questions of fact raised thereby to Hon. O. V. Linn, superior judge of Thurston county, for the purpose of having the evidence taken and the facts determined. That judge heard the testimony, and filed his findings in this cause.

This court directed a reargument of the case on the demurrer to the application and writ, as well as on the findings of Judge Linn. The application for the writ was originally made in this court. By section 1, art. 4, of the state constitution this court has power to issue writs of prohibition. When our constitution was adopted, the courts and text writers of this country generally held that the writ was to restrain the exercise of unauthorized judicial or quasi judicial power, and that the remedy might be invoked against any court, or body of persons, board, or officers assuming to exercise judicial or quasi judicial powers, although not strictly or technically a court. High, Extr. Rem. § 764a. Undoubtedly this is the function the writ is to perform under our constitution. The writ, as so understood, was to prohibit proceedings of a judicial nature, but not to prohibit merely administrative, executive, or ministerial acts. High, Extr. Rem. §§ 769, 782; Spell. Extr. Rel. §§ 1722-1744. 'And, to warrant granting the writ to any organized body other than a court, it is necessary that the acts sought to be prohibited are purely judicial, and not executive, administrative, or legislative.' Spell. Extr. Rel. § 1744. If the court or organized body in the particular is acting only in an administrative or executive capacity, although in other matters it may exercise judicial powers, a writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy, however illegal such administrative or executive acts may be. Spell. Extr. Rel. § 1722; State v. Justices of Clark Co. Ct., 41 Mo. 44. In some particulars the act of 1897 confers upon the board judicial powers. In the matter complained of by the respondent, the powers are purely administrative or executive. Section...