State v. Bouchard, 4570-II

Decision Date12 January 1982
Docket NumberNo. 4570-II,4570-II
Citation31 Wn.App. 381,639 P.2d 761
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jesse BOUCHARD, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

Gordon L. Godfrey, Aberdeen, for appellant.

Curtis M. Janhunen, Grays Harbor County Prosecutor, Montesano, for respondent.

PETRIE, Acting Chief Judge.

Defendant, Jesse Bouchard, appeals his conviction of indecent liberties with his 3-year-old granddaughter. Defendant's assignments of error to the admission of three instances of testimony raise the following issues: (1) whether the statements made by the little girl were properly admitted under exceptions to the hearsay rule; (2) whether testimony of prior acts of sexual misconduct between defendant and his minor son were properly admitted; and (3) whether the marital privilege barred the testimony of defendant's wife. We hold that the challenged testimony was properly admitted and, therefore, affirm the conviction.

The 3-year-old victim suffered a perforated hymen. Medical testimony at trial indicated that the injury was induced by a penetration generally associated with a projecting instrument. The State asserted that the cause of the injury was defendant's insertion of his finger into the little girl's vagina. The incident occurred when the child was visiting her grandparents who resided directly across the street from her own parents. Defendant contended that his granddaughter was sitting on the arm of his reclining chair when she fell on the metal bar which connected the chair to the foot rest and suffered the injury. A doctor said that was "not anatomically possible."

The following testimony was allowed at trial over the defendant's objections. (1) The little girl's mother testified that when her daughter returned home she complained of "water" in her pants. When the mother changed the child's clothing, she found blood around her daughter's lower abdominal and vaginal areas. When questioned about the blood, the child told her mother, "Grandpa did it." The father and attending physicians testified that the child made similar statements to them. (2) Defendant's 12-year-old son testified that when he was 9 years old, his father masturbated him and engaged in anal intercourse with him. (3) Defendant's wife testified that when she took her granddaughter to the bathroom she found blood in the little girl's pants. When she questioned her husband about it, he made no mention of his granddaughter's purported fall onto the metal bar.

Defendant's challenge to the testimony by the parents and physicians as to the little girl's statements is twofold. First, the statements are inadmissible hearsay and, second, the child's incompetency prevents the admission of the statements. Excited utterances are recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. ER 803(a)(2). Excited utterances must be spontaneous and made while under the influence of the event. Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 A.L.R. 1022 (1939). The test for admissibility is determined by whether the excitement of the event precludes a chance for fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment. Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wash.2d 398, 457 P.2d 194 (1969). The fact that the declarant herself (an infant) would not be competent to testify does not prohibit the use of the excited utterances. Johnston v. Ohls, supra at 406, 457 P.2d 194.

The danger of fabrication here appears remote, given the tender years of the child and the short lapse in time between the occurrence of the alleged acts and the time of the child's return home and subsequent recital of the statement. Similarly there are no intervening actions which militate against the reliability of the excited utterances. The fact that the statement was uttered in response to the mother's inquiries as to how the blood got in the little girl's pants is of no consequence to the admissibility of the statements. Excited utterances in response to a parent's questions are sanctioned in sex offense cases where the spontaneity of the statement is clear and the danger of fabrication remote. State v. Bloomstrom, 12 Wash.App. 416, 529 P.2d 1124 (1974); State v. Canida, 4 Wash.App. 275, 480 P.2d 800 (1971).

The statements to the attending doctors are clearly admissible under ER 803(a) (4) as statements "of the cause or external source" of the injury and as necessary to proper treatment.

Defendant next contends that the testimony of his son about prior sexual activities with defendant was improperly admitted since the evidence was not relevant to the instant charge and, furthermore, was overly prejudicial. ER 404(b). A defendant must be tried for the offenses charged, and evidence of unrelated conduct should not be admitted unless it goes to the material issues of motive, intent, absence of accident or mistake, common scheme or plan or identity. State v. Goebel, 36 Wash.2d 367, 218 P.2d 300 (1950). The court must balance the danger of undue prejudice against the probative value of the evidence in determining whether to admit acts of prior misconduct. State v. Whalon, 1 Wash.App. 785, 464 P.2d 730 (1970). When admitting the evidence of prior acts, the trial court should give a cautionary instruction to the jury outlining the limited purpose for which the evidence is allowed. State v. Goebel, supra, 36 Wash.2d at 379, 218 P.2d 300.

Here, defendant claimed that what happened to the child was a result of her accidental fall. After hearing argument on a pretrial motion to exclude, the trial court allowed the son's testimony of prior sexual activity with his defendant- father for the limited purpose of showing that what happened to the little girl was not an accident, i.e., absence of accident. See ER 404(b). Furthermore, a proper limiting instruction was given. 1

Defendant contends that there is only the weakest of links between the two acts of sexual misconduct. Additionally, he argues that the lapse of time between the two incidents weighs against the probative value of the testimony. Admittedly, the evidence here of prior acts with the son is particularly explosive and prejudicial to defendant's case.

Prejudice alone cannot be the determinative factor in excluding testimony under ER 404(b). Where the testimony has relevance, the admission of the prejudicial testimony may fall within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Bloomstrom, supra. The initial inquiry for the trial court is the relevance of the proffered testimony. What is necessary is that the evidence of prior acts have some relevance to the material issues of the crime charged or a claim or defense of the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Bloomstrom, supra (testimony rebutting the defendant's defense of accident sanctioned).

Though facially the connection between the two types of sexual misconduct here might appear attenuated, the testimony of the son is quite relevant when used to rebut defendant's claim of accident. We disagree with defendant that the homosexual conduct with the son is not relevant to the abuse of the granddaughter. This evidence of sexual abuse of other children and sexual misconduct with family members is relevant to show absence of accident with the little girl.

The fact that the acts with the son were three years removed from the charged act does effect relevance. Nevertheless, the effect on the evidence goes more to the weight accorded to the testimony rather than its admissibility. State v. Saltarelli, 29 Wash.App. 565, 629 P.2d 1344 (1981). While the lapse of time between events should be a factor that the trial court considers in the overall admissibility of acts of prior misconduct, we cannot say, in view of the...

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    ...victim's precocious knowledge of sexual activity, a child's nightmares and psychological evidence). See also State v. Bouchard, 31 Wash.App. 381, 386, 639 P.2d 761 (1982) (evidence of prior sexual assault may be admitted if its relevance outweighs prejudice.) The competency of a witness dep......
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