State v. Bradford

• Decision Date: 12 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 53684,No. 2,53684,2
• Citation: 434 S.W.2d 497
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Tommy Lee BRADFORD, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 497

434 S.W.2d 497

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Tommy Lee BRADFORD, Appellant.

No. 53684.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Nov. 12, 1968.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer to Court En Banc Denied Dec. 9, 1968.

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, James R. Reinhard, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Paris, for respondent.

John C. Boyd, Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

A jury found Tommy Lee Bradford guilty of robbery by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon and fixed his punishment at fourteen years' imprisonment. Upon motion for new trial 'or in the alternative for reduction of punishment' the court reduced the punishment to seven years' imprisonment and, after filing a written waiver of his right to appeal, he has nevertheless appealed.

The circumstances of the robbery, as testified to by the victim, were that on Saturday evening, May 28, 1966, Reuben Harris, a filling station worker, spent some time in a tavern at Whittier and Hodiamont. When he finally walked outside, intending to get in his parked automobile, two men approached, 'their face looked familiar,' and asked if they could 'ride down to Whittier and Easton with me.' Harris agreed and both men got in the front seat of his 1963 Buick Photo Electra 235, bearing Missouri license KBO--664. When the automobile approached the designated area Bradford 'tried to get me to carry him some place else down through some alley or other' and by then, he said, he 'knew something was wrong' and Bradford 'stuck a knife in my side.' Bradford said 'to give him the money that I had in my pocket' but Harris denied that he had money. Finally Harris 'hit the handle of the door and came out, come out of it from up under the driver's side,' Bradford grabbed him by the collar and 'this other fellow came on around and they both wrestled me down.' Both men kicked him, fracturing his ribs, 'I seen that they was going to kill me or something' and took $43.00 from his pants pocket. As Harris scrambled toward the lights of another automobile the appellant and his companion, Hubbard, 'got in my car and taken off.' Harris made an in-court identification of Bradford as one of his assailants, the one with the knife, and these circumstances, needless to say, refute his claims that the state did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or that 'The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.' State v. Smith, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 354; State v. Preston, Mo., 184 S.W.2d 1015.

Harris' 1963 Buick, Missouri license KBO--664, was recovered in these circumstances: Between 3 and 4 o'clock a.m., on May 30, 1966, patrolman Hatcher of the Meridian, Mississippi, police force saw the automobile near a closed shopping center. Hatcher and fellow officers noted the out-of-state license tag and 'we knew anybody shouldn't be around at that time' and so they decided to 'check it (the car) out.' When Hatcher approached the automobile he saw two people in it, Bradford in the rear seat and Hubbard, whom he had known since childhood, in the front seat. Upon the principal obligation urged here this is the direct examination of Officer Hatcher:

'Q. * * * Now, did he (Bradford) at any time state anything to you regarding this automobile?

'A. He did in questioning and trying to determine what they were doing there, and they admitted that--he did--that they took the car from Missouri--from a man in Missouri.'

On cross-examination the only question important here was:

'Q. Now, how long was--did your questioning last?

'A. Didn't last any longer than it took to determine that they didn't have sufficient identification to prove ownership of the car.'

Whereupon they were arrested and delivered to the detective bureau of the Meridian police department.

Prior to the trial there was a hearing before the court on the admissibility of any confession Bradford may have made to Hatcher and there more details of the investigation and eventual arrest were given. On direct examination:

'Q. Do you recall any statement Mr. Bradford made to you or to your fellow officers while he was still in this car?

'A. He did. He made two or three statements to different people that owned the car because he and the other guy either one couldn't make an identification of them owning the car, and finally admitted that they took the car from some fellow in Missouri.

'Q. All right. Now, was this statement that they had taken the car from somebody else in Missouri made while they were still in the car?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Had you placed anybody under arrest or taken anybody into custody at that time?

'A. No, sir.

'Q. Had either you or any of your other officers told either of the occupants that they were then under arrest for any violation of the law?

'A. Not up until that time. After then we placed them under arrest.'

On cross-examination these were the pertinent questions to and answers by Officer Hatcher:

'Q. Officer Hatcher, did you tell the defendant, Bradford, that any statements he made could be held against him?

'A. No, sir. I didn't ask him for any statement.

'Q. Did you tell him that he had a right to have a lawyer when you took him in?

'A. We placed him under arrest and carried him to the City Hall. We didn't question him any further on anything.

'Q. You placed him under arrest at the site of the shopping center?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. And is it your statement that he merely volunteered this information?

'A. He did. He couldn't show proof of the automobile and he just up and said he took it.'

'Q. Now, are you sure which of the defendants made any statements?

'A. Both defendants--both Ernest Hubbard and Tommy Lee Bradford said that they took the car. They didn't make any statement. We didn't ask for any statement. They just said they took the car from a man in Missouri.'

In further clarification Officer Hatcher gave this answer in response to a question from the court:

'A. He (Hubbard) told me some fellow's name, and then Mr. Bradford in the back spoke up and said it belonged to somebody else, and the two names conflicted, so we asked for identification papers on the car which they didn't have.'

Pointing to all these circumstances appellant's diligent court-appointed counsel very earnestly argues that the court prejudicially erred in permitting Officer Hatcher to testify to 'said alleged confessions' or admissions. It is said that the admissions were elicited 'during custodial interrogation,' that Bradford had not been warned of his right against self-incrimination, that is, to remain silent or of his right to counsel and that therefore his state and federally protected constitutional rights had been infringed with the consequence that he is entitled to a new trial. These arguments are made in great detail, point by point, but it is not necessary to detail them, it is sufficient to say that the appellant contends that the circumstances fall within the are governed by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974; Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; and numerous other related cases. There have been no precisely similar Missouri cases and therefore both the state and the appellant rely, appropriately in this instance, on cases from other jurisdictions. The circumstances in this particular case are so aptly illustrative of a type of permitted police investigation and incriminating admissions or confessions, within the meaning of the above noted cases, that they have been set forth in their precise context and in detail. And in this connection it is not necessary here to quote from, distinguish and illustrate from the Miranda decision, that is well-done in the seven cases relied on by the parties.

In Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765, relied on by the appellant, a police officer entered a hospital room and said, 'What happened?' The defendant, apparently in a room with others, replied: 'There was a fight. * * * They jumped me and I stabbed them.' Subsequently, some minutes perhaps, a second police officer appeared, entered the hospital room and said, 'Who did the stabbing?' The appellant raised her hand and said, 'I did. I think I got the wrong one.' Analyzing and illustrating from the Miranda and other cases the Pennsylvania court pointed out that as to the first officer's interrogation his question was directed to all present, he did not know whether any of them had committed a crime and the defendant's 'response was truly a volunteered, spontaneous, freely-made utterance to general...