State v. Williams

• Citation: 522 S.W.2d 641
• Decision Date: 22 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 35554,35554
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Gwendolyn WILLIAMS, Appellant. . Louis District, Division Four
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 641

522 S.W.2d 641

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Gwendolyn WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 35554.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Four.

April 22, 1975.

Shaw & Howlett, Terry J. Flanagan, Clayton, for appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., K. Preston, Dean, II, Scott Raisher, asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

ALDEN A. STOCKARD, Special Judge.

Gwendolyn Williams, charged by indictment, was found guilty by a jury of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of ten years.

Appellant testified and admitted that she shot Benjamin Matthews. In view of this admission and the nature of the points presented on this appeal, there is no occasion to relate in detail the facts. It is sufficient to say that the shooting occurred at Glover's Food Shop in St. Louis County after an argument and a series of name calling.

On April 29, 1972, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, Police Officer James Miller went to Glover's Food Shop after he received a call 'that there was a shooting' there. When he arrived he saw a man on the floor against the wall and Benjamin Matthews was on the floor. He also saw a man by the name of L. C. McCray standing at the end of the bar. Appellant was seated on a stool at the end of the bar.

Officer Miller took or received a pistol from Mr. McCray. In answer to the question if he said anything to appellant, he replied: 'I asked her did she do the shooting; she says 'yes. " Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial, which were both overruled. Officer Miller then testified that he requested that an ambulance be called and he then told appellant that she was under arrest. Sergeant Dunn arrived and he advised appellant of her 'Miranda rights.' She was not asked any question other than the one set out above at the scene by Officer Miller.

Appellant's first point is that the trial court erred when it permitted Officer Miller to testify that she admitted that she shot Matthews when that admission was made before she had been given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

In the Miranda case it was ruled that an accused must be advised of certain federal constitutional rights before being subjected to 'custodial interrogation,' which was defined as 'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of action in any significant way.' The court further stated:

Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. . . . General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.

In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.

No hard and fast rule can be established as to when custodial interrogation begins, but it must be determined from the surrounding circumstances, some of which include probable cause to arrest, the subjective intent of the police officer, and who if anyone was the focus of the investigation at the time of the interrogation. Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972). Officer Miller had no knowledge of what had occurred, except a report that there had been a shooting. He did not go to Glover's Food Shop with the preconceived intent to arrest appellant. He went there to make an on-the-scene investigation of a report that there had been a shooting. Under these circumstances, the single question asked by him of apellant did not constitute 'custodial interrogation.' There was no custody taken of appellant or restraint of her until she was arrested, which was after she had made the voluntary answer to the question of Officer Miller.

Appellant cites only the Miranda case in support of her contention. She cites no case in which a similar factual situation has been ruled to constitute 'custodial interrogation.' Numerous cases with analogous factual situations have been ruled contrary to appellant's contention.

In State v. Hale, 463 S.W.2d 869 (Mo.1971), police officers investigated a report that an automobile was being stripped, and when they questioned the accused at the scene he stated that he was pulling the automobile from a ditch for a friend. When he could not name the friend or the owner of the automobile he was placed under arrest. The court ruled that the accused's statements to the police were the result of proper pre-custodial interrogation. Also, in State v. Bradford, 434 S.W.2d 497 (Mo.1968), police officers saw an automobile with two men in it at a closed shopping center, and decided to check on the reason it was there. In the course of the questioning the accused made some statements which were later used against him. It was held that this was not custodial interrogation but proper precustody investigation, noncoercive in nature, and justified by the circumstances as a legitimate police practice. For other cases supporting the view we have taken, see Allen v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 390 F.2d 476 (1968); State v. Ralls, 472 S.W.2d 642 (Mo.App.1971); Schnepp v. State, 84 Nev. 120, 437 P.2d 84 (1968); Stallings v. State, 255 Ind. 365, 264 N.E.2d 618 (1970); Ison v. State, 281 Ala. 189, 200 So. 511 (1967); and see the cases cited in the annotation entitled 'What Amounts to Custodial Interrogation,' 31 A.L.R.3d 565.

In addition to the fact that there is no merit to appellant's contention on the basis presented, appellant took the witness stand and on direct examination testified that she intentionally shot Mattews. In State v. Ussery, 357 Mo. 414, 208 S.W.2d 245 (1948), it was stated: '(W)hen the truth of a confession is established by the very person who made it under such solemn circumstances as on oath in open court, he may not be permitted to claim error because of the use of the confession on the ground it was involuntary.' See also State v. Crow, 486 S.W.2d 248 (Mo.1972), where the rule was applied to a situation where it was contended that the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona had been violated, but the accused testified under oath to the substance of the confession, and the court said: 'Any error in its (the confession) admission in evidence was harmless,' citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Other cases where the rule has been applied include State v. Taylor, 472 S.W.2d 395 (Mo.1971); State v. Brandt, 467 S.W.2d 948 (Mo.1971); State v. Walker, 416 S.W.2d 134 (Mo.1967); and State v. McGee, 447 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. banc 1969). There is no merit to appellant's first point.

Appellant next claims prejudicial error resulted when the trial court sustained the objection of the prosecutor to an attempt of appellant to impeach the testimony of John Arrington, a witness for the State. A statement of certain testimony is necessary.

As is typical in cases of this nature the testimony is none too clear, but we shall attempt to set out the essential parts of the testimony of John Arrington. He stated that when he went to Glover's Food Shop a girl there was talking to appellant on the telephone, and that he took the telephone and talked to her. Appellant told Arrington that Matthews had told her that he, Arrington, was going to beat her up. Arrington denied this, and she told him over the telephone that she was coming out there and that she was going to bring a pistol. When she arrived she was accompanied by her son and four other persons. One of them, a person named Ricky, told Arrington to 'leave Gwen alone,' and then the other four left. Later Matthews drove up and 'blew his horn' and Arrington went outside and asked him if he had a pistol. Appellant objected to Arrington stating what Matthews said and the objection was sustained, but he did testify that he, Arrington, did not get a pistol. The two then went to the bar, and appellant walked up to them. Matthews 'pushed her back' and said, 'Get out of my face.' Arrington and Matthews then walked toward the door, and without anything further being said, Arrington hit Ricky, the person who had arrived with appellant but did not leave with the other four. The reason for this assault is not disclosed, but Matthews also for some reason hit Ricky. The next thing that happened was that Matthews said, 'This bitch got a pistol,' and appellant then shot him. Arrington ran to the door and appellant shot him in the back. McCray then took the pistol away from her. Arrington testified that he did not have any weapon on him, and that he did not observe any weapon on Matthews. On cross-examination, Arrington stated that after Matthews pushed appellant back and told her to 'get out of his face,' he said, 'I'm going to get my pistol out of the car.' He and Matthews both walked toward the door, and then Arrington 'turned around and hit this dude named Ricky,' apparently because he has previously told Arrington to 'leave Gwen alone,' and had come 'up to my face.' Arrington twice stated that although Matthews said he was going to get his pistol, he 'didn't have any pistol,' but on both occasions appellant objected and the statements that Matthews had no pistol were stricken. Toward the end of his testimony, on recross-examination, he was asked if Matthews said: 'I'm going outside to get my pistol,' and he replied, 'Yes, I remember telling you, but before he told me he didn't have no pistol.' Appellant's counsel then said: 'That is not what I am asking you.'

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