State v. Bradshaw

• Decision Date: 25 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 39943.,39943.
• Citation: 313 P.3d 765,155 Idaho 437
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. JAMES CLAYTON BRADSHAW, Defendant–Appellant.

155 Idaho 437

313 P.3d 765

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.JAMES CLAYTON BRADSHAW, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 39943.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Oct. 25, 2013.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Spencer J. Hahn, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Spencer J. Hahn argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Mark W. Olson argued.

MELANSON, Judge.

James Clayton Bradshaw appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony destruction of evidence and being a persistent violator of the law. Specifically, Bradshaw argues that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support the verdict. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Bradshaw was arrested for driving without privileges after an officer observed him drive into a parking lot and exit his vehicle. The officer searched Bradshaw and placed items taken from him onto the trunk of Bradshaw's vehicle. The items included a small plastic baggie containing a white, powdery substance. Before Bradshaw could be placed in a patrol car, he lunged back toward his vehicle, threw himself on the trunk, grabbed the baggie with his mouth, and swallowed the item before officers could retrieve it. A drug detecting canine subsequently alerted to the spot on the trunk of Bradshaw's vehicle where the item had been located. Officer testimony, based upon the appearance of the substance and the dog's alert where the baggie had been, showed that the substance was likely either cocaine or methamphetamine and possession of either substance is a felony.

Bradshaw was charged with felony destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence, I.C. § 18–2603, and with being a persistent violator of the law, I.C. § 19–2514. Bradshaw was found guilty, and the district court sentenced him to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years. Bradshaw appeals.

II.ANALYSIS

Bradshaw argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony destruction of evidence. Specifically, Bradshaw asserts that this Court's interpretation of I.C. § 18–2603, as set forth in State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607, 83 P.3d 781 (Ct.App.2003), was incorrect because it examined legislative history and public policy in interpreting the ambiguous portion of the statute, but failed to consider the rule of lenity. Bradshaw invites this Court to overturn Peteja, apply the rule of lenity as he understands it, and construe the statute in his favor by holding that an investigation involves a felony offense only when the investigation is for a felony at its inception.

Stare decisis dictates that we follow controlling precedent, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overturning it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013) ; State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).

Bradshaw asserts that in Peteja this Court should have applied the rule of lenity when construing I.C. § 18–2603 and failure to do so requires that we overturn that case. This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999) ; State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory construction because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001). To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. Id. Constructions of an ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004). Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998). However, where a review of the legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not be applied. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct.App.2011).

Idaho Code Section 18–2603 provides:

Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other object, matter or thing, is about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, wilfully destroys, alters or conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, used or discovered, is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation is criminal in nature and involves a felony offense, in which case said person is guilty of a felony and subject to a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and a maximum sentence of five (5) years in prison.

(Emphasis added.) In Peteja, this Court interpreted the emphasized portion of this statute, which elevates destruction of evidence to a felony offense if the investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or trial involves a felony. Peteja, 139 Idaho at 611–12, 83 P.3d at 785–86. The facts in Peteja are very similar to the facts here—both cases involving a defendant (initially being investigated for a misdemeanor offense) who swallowed a white, powdery substance wrapped in clear plastic. Peteja argued that the nature of an investigation is fixed at the time the investigation begins and that the statute only applies if evidence was destroyed during an investigation initially involving a felony. We determined the statutory language "involves a felony offense" to be ambiguous in this regard. Id. at 611, 83 P.3d at 785. After reviewing the statute's statement of purpose and the underlying public policy, we noted that the nature of an investigation-whether misdemeanor or felony—was not set at inception, thereby fixing forever the destruction of evidence offense a person could commit. Id. at 611–12, 83 P.3d at 785–86. Instead, we held that whether an investigation "involves a felony offense" depends on whether the evidence that was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to demonstrate the commission of a felony. Id. at 612, 83 P.3d at 786.

Bradshaw does not dispute that the portion of I.C. § 18–2603 at issue here is ambiguous. Instead, he asserts that the rule of lenity limits the means of determining legislative intent for an ambiguous criminal statute to the statutory language. Although determining legislative intent begins with the plain language of the statute, it does not end there. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. The rule of lenity does not require courts to disregard legislative history, public policy, or the context of the statutory language when determining the intent of the legislature. Jones, 151 Idaho at 946–47, 265 P.3d at 1158–59; see also State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 766, 779 P.2d 438, 441 (Ct.App.1989) (noting, in dicta, that the rule of lenity does not require complete disregard of the clear purpose of a legislative enactment). Also, the mere existence of some statutory ambiguity or the possibility of articulating a narrower construction is not sufficient to warrant application of the rule, as most statutes are, to some degree, ambiguous or susceptible to a narrower reading. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1919–20, 141 L.Ed.2d 111, 122–23 (1998) ; Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2059, 124 L.Ed.2d 138, 154 (1993).

There must be a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute that is not resolved by looking at the text, context, history or policy of the statute, thereby allowing for multiple reasonable constructions. See Jones, 151 Idaho at 946–47, 265 P.3d at 1158–59; see also Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138–39, 118 S.Ct. at 1919–20, 141 L.Ed.2d at 122–23 (stating that the rule of lenity applies only if the court can make no more than a guess as to Congress's intent after looking to everything that might help determine that intent); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177, 79 S.Ct. 209, 213–14, 3 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1958) (stating that the rule of lenity applies only when neither the wording of the statute or the legislative history points clearly to a single meaning of a statute). Only then, when there is an interpretive "tie" between two or more reasonable readings, is a court mandated to strictly construe the ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant and apply the rule of lenity. See Jones, 151 Idaho at 947, 265 P.3d at 1159. This satisfies the admonition that the courts are without power to supply what the legislature has left vague. See State v. Hahn, 92 Idaho 265, 267, 441 P.2d 714, 716 (1968).

Nevertheless, Bradshaw argues that this approach to the rule of lenity is supported only in the dicta of Idaho case law and Idaho courts have never explicitly adopted an approach similar to the federal rule of lenity that allows for examination of legislative history. He fails, however, to identify any case law from this...